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a Utah corporation; RICHTRON
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation; RICHTRON GENERAL,
a Utah corporation, and FRONTIER
INVESTMENTS, a Utah corporation,
Defendants, Respondents,
and Cross-Appellants.
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GOFFf individually and as
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PAUL H. RICHINS; RICHTRON INC.,
a Utah corporation? RICHTRON
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation; RICHTRON GENERAL,
a Utah corporation, and FRONTIER
INVESTMENTS, a Utah corporation,
Defendants, Respondents,
and Cross-Appellants.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND VERDICTS
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Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT CQURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN P. SAMPSON, MILTON
R. GOFF, Trustee for Virgil
R. Condon, PAUL D. HUBER,
0 & M PLUMBING & HEATING,
EARL V. GRITTON, PHILIP 0.
BOYER, TOFFIE SAWAYA and
RUSSELL SMUIN,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND VERDICTS
CIVIL NO. 29552

Plaintiffs,
vs.
PAUL H. RICHINS, RICHTRON,
INC., RICHTRON FINANCIAL
CORPORATION, RICHTRON GENERAL,
FRONTIER INVESTMENTS,
Defendants.
The Court has prepared a supplemental document entitled
"Memorandum and Summation" as a part of its decision herein
and based thereon, now submits these Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law which contain its rulings on the issues involved.

Each

bit of relevant, admissible evidence may establish a fact that
exists in this case.

I have by my summation of the evidence

endeavored to set forth the relevant content of all exhibits
and oral testimony.

Some of necessity contain opinion, hearsay

and evidence for which no necessary foundation exists.

I have

tried to disregard such information in making the summation,
yet I am aware that upon occasion such information may have
been included in writing the summation.
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Upon completion of the summary I began writing a commentary
of the issues of fact and law and a discussion of the evidence
with respect thereto.

After so writing extensively, I reached

a point where I came to believe that directing counsel on either
side to undertake the preparation of findings and conclusions
based thereon seemed a monstrous assignment.

I had not undertaken

my summation of the evidence as an exfercise in writing, but
rather to produce a source of factual data gleaned from the
mass of exhibits and testimony to which all concerned might
turn to as a help in reaching a better understanding of what
we have in this case.
The more I wrote on my commentary of the issues and evidence,
the more I became convinced that reason suggested that I rewrite
what I had written and stated in the commentary in the form
of findings of fact and conclusions of law, and thus avoid passing
such an assignment to counsel*

I have done so, but in commencing

this undertaking and reflecting thereon, I deemed it necessary
to include in the findings and conclusions commentary on my
views of the evidence as it related to the various claims and
defenses raised in the pleadings and the law with respect thereto.
Thus, of necessity, many findings and conclusions will be extensive,
but hopefully the content thereof will help others to understand
what I see in the evidence as to each point in issue and my
reasons for ruling as I do.

There will be times when matters
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will be mentioned on more than one occasion, but bear in mind
that I do so, not in a period of forgetfulness, but because
such repetition seems important and necessary on a particular
point under discussion.
GENERAL FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
This case involves a claim set forth in plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint against defendants Richins, Richtron, Inc., and Richtron
Financial Corporation (RFC) based upon a judgment entered against
said defendants in the state of Oregon in favor of one Robert
Osborn (hereinafter frequently referred to as the Osborn judgment).
Osborn was a well driller and had been employed by defendant
Richtron, Inc. to drill some water wells en farm property in
the state of Oregon referred to as the Catlow Valley Farms.
Richtron, Inc. was the sole general partner in seven Catlow
Valley limited partnerships which defendant, Paul Richins, had
created and set up. Defendant RFC was another Richtron corporation
which Richins had organized.

Richins individually and RFC had

executed a guaranty agreement with Osborn a$ guarantors of Richtron,
Inc.'s obligation for drilling the wel^s on the Catlow Valley
Farm property.

Osborn drilled the wellsl, was not paid for his

work, and so filed suit against these defendants on the obligation
owed, seeking also general damages and attorney's fees. Defendants
were represented by Idaho counsel who, wit^h defendants' approval,
settled the action on May 13, 1980, the day set for trial, stipu-

2044

SAMPSON V. RICHTRON

-4-

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

lating to the entry of a judgment for $27,683.16 (including
all accrued interest to May 20, 1980 $t

12%), $30,000 general

(plus interest thereon at 9% from Mayl 20, 1980) and for all
costs and disbursements including a reasonable attorney's fee
of $18,000 (with interest thereon at [the legal rate from May
20, 1980).

The total of the judgment was $75,683.16.

John P. Sampson, an Ogden, Utah attorney, got involved
in controversies leading to this laws^t on or about May 20,
1980, one week after the entry of the olsborn judgment.

In the

months that followed many events occurred with respect to which
Sampson was sued by defendants on a counterclaim filed in this
action.

The major portion of this lawpuit centers around the

Counterclaim and most of the evidence presented and the Findings
of Fact hereinafter to be set forth relajte to the Counterclaim,
but some also have relevance to the issues raised on plaintiffs1
Complaint.

Likewise, evidence and Findings of Fact which deal

primarily with the claim asserted against defendants in the
Complaint also have relevancy to the claims asserted under the
Counterclaim.

While I will first deal with the Complaint and

make findings particularly relevant thereto, it should be remembered,
as stated, that findings relating primarily to the Counterclaim
may have relevance to the issues on tfye Complaint and should
not be overlooked in considering the sufficiency of the findings
of fact to support the conclusions and| rulings on the issues
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raised by the pleadings relating to the claim set forth in the
Complaint.

Otherwise, many findings would have to be restated

with respect to both sides of this lawsui|t.
The Complaint commencing this lawsuit was filed on February
11, 1981.

On March 11, 1981 an Amended Complaint was filed.

By stipulation of counsel time to answer was extended and no
Answer to the Complaint was filed until July 20, 1982 which
included the Counterclaim.

On September 11, 1982 another Answer

and an Amended Counterclaim were filecj.

The defendants filed

a further Amended Answer and a Second Amended Counterclaim on
September 6, 1985, which together with the Amended Complaint
filed March 11, 1981 formed the pleadings upon which this case
was tried.
The plaintiffs1 Complaint was simply a claim upon the Osborn
judgment entered against defendants in the state of Oregon.
In answer, defendants admitted the entry of the Osborn judgment
against them, but asserted as affirmative defenses that (1)
the judgment was fully paid and satisfied; (2) the judgment
was subject to a constructive trust or equitable lien; (3) offset;
(4) estoppel based upon improper dealing, misrepresentation
and deceit in satisfaction of the obligation which gave rise
to the judgment, including improper conduct and unfair advantage
in connection with obtaining an interest in the judgment.
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As to these issues raised by these pleadings, the following
are:
FINDINGS OF FACT ON PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
1.

In May, 1980, and for years prior thereto, Richins

was president of Richtron, Inc., which company was the general
partner of each of seven limited partnerships known as Catlow
Valley Farms 1 through 7, which Richins had organized on April
1, 1977 (5) and January 1, 1978 (2).
2.

Under the limited partnership agreements and the laws

of the state of Utah, Richtron, Inc. as general pjrtner had full
management control and Richins as its president contracted with
Osborn to drill wells for water on the Catlow Valley Farms.
3.

Osborn was not paid for the well drilling work he

did on these farms, but did not record a mechanic's lien on
the property.
4.

He instituted his lawsuit against the three defendants

and on May 13, 1980, he obtained and h^d entered a stipulated
judgment for $75,683.16, the details of which are set forth
supra under the General Findings of Faqt.

By agreeing to the

stipulated judgment defendants were benefited because Osborn
reduced the total amount he was seeking in his Complaint.
5.

Satisfaction of the obligation which gave rise to

the judgment was the responsibility and under the control of
Richtron, Inc.

Sampson did not get involved until May 20, 1980,
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and neither he nor other plaintiffs (identified supra) were
involved in any improper dealing, misrepresentation or deceit
with respect to satisfaction of the obligation upon which the
judgment was based.
6.

On or about May 20, 1980, Sampson was retained by

two Catlow Valley limited partners, Milt Goff and Rex Kohler,
to make inquiry concerning reported difficulties that had arisen
with respect to the Catlow Valley partnerships and Sampson contacted
Richins and learned of the entry of the Osborn judgment and
also concerning the entry of another judgment in favor of MinterWilson on April 30, 1980, who had alsp

done drilling work on

the Catlow Valley property, and who by May 20 had a sheriff's
sale scheduled for June 6, 1980 to execute on its judgment.
7.

Richins had a telephone discission with Osborn, who

agreed to settle the judgment upon payment of $26,000.00 and
$9,000.00 attorney's fees, but nothing wa$ then paid.
8.

On May 29, 1980, Richins held a meeting of Catlow

Valley limited partners and advised theft, among other existing
difficulties, of the existence of the Osborn judgment and of
the fact that Osborn would settle it u$on payment of the sums
mentioned in Finding 7.
9.

As a consequence of the May 29, 1980 meeting, those

present, acting upon Sampson's recommendation, voted to have
RFC immediately file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding to stay
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At the first meeting of creditors on

July 1, 1980, with regard to that bankruptcy, Richins and Sampson
jointly had a discussion with Osborn about settling the judgment,
as previously discussed, at which time Osborn said he had not
filed a mechanic's lien on the Catlow Valley property and thus
his judgment was not a lien upon it, and in view of RFC's bankruptcy
and Minter-Wilson1 s judgment lien, he did not think he would
then settle for anything less than the face amount of his judgment,
Richins claimed Sampson's participation with him in holding
this discussion with Osborn placed Sampson in a position of
having undertaken in some degree, of Representing Richins and
his companies as counsel, concerning which other findings will
be set forth relating to that contention.
10.

At a meeting of limited partners having large partnership

holdings held on June 26, 1980, Sampson, acting as counsel for
certain limited partners, reached an Agreement with Richins
to buy out
$700,000.00.

all of his

and his

corporations' interests for

A settlement and compromise agreement was drafted

in the months that followed, but when certain limited partners
refused to accept and sign it, the settlement failed.
11.

At a meeting of Catlow Valley limited partners, held

on August 5, 198 0, it was determined th|at $150,000 in capital
contributions would be assessed and pai<(i, part of which would
be used to pay off the Osborn judgment.

This was not achieved,
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but at this time funds were being paid to Sampson by the limited
partners with the understanding and agreement that he would
transfer funds to Richins as needed for us£ by the general partners.
12.

When the settlement negotiations failed, Sampson began

a vigorous effort to take over controll of all of the limited
partnerships, some of which activitiels will be covered later
in these findings, but one of the things Sampson did was to
contact Osborn and his attorney and reached an agreement whereby
for $40,000 Osborn would assign his judgment to Sampson, $20,000
to be paid immediately and the balance on stated dates in the
near future.

To obtain control, Sampqon had solicited voting

powers of attorney from all limited partners, together with
funds, doing so with the intent and purpose of using such voting
powers to elect his newly created professional corporation (PC)
new substitute general partner of each limited partnership.
Before any such goal was achieved, Sampson received several
thousand dollars from various limited partners, including funds
from those who were not Catlow Valley partners.

Using these

funds Sampson sent Osborn's attorney 4 $20,000 check as the
down payment on their agreement. The attorriey, Cramer, acknowledged
receipt of it, confirming that $10,000 more was to be paid in
two weeks and the remaining $10,000 in thtee months.

On January

23, 1981 Cramer wrote Sampson enclosing copies of the summons
on the Oregon lawsuit, the answers filed b^ the three defendants,
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the judgment and cost bill, an Assigilment of Judgment which
stated that in consideration of $40,000 Osborn thereby assigned
and transferred to Sampson personally all of his right, title
and interest in and to the Osborn judgment of May 13, 1980,
Sampson did not advise Richins he had done so.
13.

Armed with this assignment of judgment, Sampson retained

attorney Blackburn to commence an action against the three defendants
upon the Oregon judgment.

The Complaint was filed on February

11, 1981 with Osborn being named as plaintiff, the action being
on the Oregon judgment with no mention being made of its assignment.
14.

As set forth in the Conclusipns of Law that follow,

such action by Sampson constituted a violation of state law,
but none of the penalties provided for therein were pursued.
After the Complaint was filed in Osbornfs name Richins contacted
Osborn, who did not know the action had £een filed in his name,
and learned of the assignment of the judgment to Sampson.

Upon

filing a Motion to Dismiss because Osborn was not the real party
in interest, Blackburn as counsel of record, moved to amend
the Complaint and did so by showing Sampson as the plaintiff
in an Amended Complaint filed March 11, 19$1. The Oregon judgment
remained as the claim for relief for which a judgment was sought.
Blackburn's stated reason to amend was that Sampson was in fact
the assignee of the judgment.
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Sampson failed to pay the remaining $20,000 due Osborn

for the assignment and Osborn's attorney wrote Sampson saying
if the money was not paid by April 23, the assignment would
be rescinded and the judgment taken back.

Sampson responded,

saying they were then in the middle of a compromise settlement
which he hoped would go through, as he would then have his money
supply reopened and would take care of the obligation.

On June

9, 1981 Cramer sent Sampson a Revocation of Assignment of Judgment,
reciting that the $40,000 had not been paid and so the assignment
was void for failure of consideration and the judgment was reinstated
in Osborn1s name.

On June 17, 1981 $ampson replied, saying

he was still working with Richins to resolve the matter and
if not successful, they would have to work out some kind of
arrangement.
16.

On December 31, 1981 Cramer wtfote Sampson, confirming

his telephone report, that Osborn had had a sheriff's sale foreclosing on his judgment on defendants1 interests in the Catlow
Valley property, and as the only bidder, Osborn had bid $50,000
at that sale. Cramer confirmed that Osborn would sell the judgment
to Sampson for $45,000, plus the $20,000 payment made one year
before, if payment were made by January 7, 1982.

Sampson sent

a check for $45,000 on January 29, 19$2, drawn on Sampson's
PC Trust Account and directed that thd assignment be made to
Milt Goff, Trustee.
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The property sold to Osborn at the sheriff's sale

was RFC's interest in its purchase of the Catlow Valley property
from the Glenns and its resale to the partnerships, as well
as any interest Richins and Richtron, Ihc. had in the property.
On December 28, 1981 the county sheriff of Harvey County, Oregon,
executed a certificate of sale on all the interests the defendants
had in the land described therein, which description was the
legal description of the Catlow Valley farms property for which
Osborn was shown as having bid $50,000.

The court confirmed

the sale and on January 4, 1982, Osborn executed a warranty
deed conveying said property interests to Milton R. Goff, Trustee,
(c/o John Sampson) for a stated consideration of $65,000, subject
to defendants' statutory rights of redemption.

On March 2,

1982, Cramer, as attorney for Osborn, executed an assignment
of Osborn's judgment (as originally entered) to Goff as trustee
(c/o Sampson) in consideration of $65,000, The $65,000 consisted
of the $20,000 originally paid in January, 1981 and the $45,000
sent by Sampson in January, 1982.
The $45,000 was furnished by the following limited partners
for the amounts shown and are the persons for whom Goff is trustee:
Sawaya
Boyer
Simmons
Condon
Huber
Gritton
0 & M
E. F. Hutton

$ 2,646
2,969
914
3,050
5,569
2,959
28,882 (Goff & Kohler)
2,000 (for several partners)
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Although the assignment was executed on March 2, 1982,
the status of this case was not changed until December, 1982,
when Blackburn withdrew as counsel.

Attorney Handy, who officed

with Sampson, filed an appearance and requested the court to
substitute Goff, in his role as trustee, as party plaintiff.
The court so ordered, but no Amended Complaint was ever filed
reflecting the change in circumstances or for what amount Goff
was seeking in the complaint.

On February 23, 198 3 Sampson

filed an appearance as co-counsel with Handy in this case.
No mention was made in the assignment that Goff had been
given a warranty deed from Osborn conveying all interests Osborn
had acquired at the sheriff's sale of whatever interests Richins,
Richtron, Inc. and/or RFC had in the Catlow Valley property.
18.

During the trial plaintiffs asserted that Osborn acquired

at the sale RFC's right to receive money from the partnerships
on the purchase of the farm properties from RFC and also whatever
right RFC had in the buyer's role in the purchase of that property
from the Glenns.

I find that these were among the rights Osborn

purchased at the sale and that they wetfe also included in the
rights which Osborn conveyed to Goff by the warranty deed.
Also, during the trial plaintiffs contend the purpose of
this transaction was to preserve the property and protect the
investment.

But Osborn had no judgment Against the partnership

nor a judgment lien against the partnership's interests in the
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Any right Osborn acquired (and then conveyed to Goff

by deed) to collect RFC's payments due from the partnerships
had to take into consideration the Glenns1 right to be paid
on their contract of sale to RFC or t0 repossess the property
if not paid.

If the plaintiffs1 concern was to preserve and

protect the property, they could during 1981 have paid another
$2 0,000 to Osborn and his judgment wc^uld have been paid off
as agreed, and would have offered no threat to the property.
That not having occurred, under Osborn1s deed to Goff, Gcff
could have asserted the right to receive the contract payments
from the partnerships and make certain they were used to pay
what was owed to the Glenns under th^ir contract.
no evidence that this was done by Goff.

There was

During 1981 and 1982

only $6,000 were paid to Glenn en a $00,000 contract balance.
I thus find that the main purpose in paying Osborn $45,000 was
not to protect the property, but to acquire an assignment of
the judgment in the belief that the ba|lance due thereon would
be sufficient to help persuade Richins to agree to a settlement
that was more favorable to Sampson and hisi group. By then Sampson
was asserting control over the partnerships —

the legality

of which will be considered elsewhere in the findings and conclusions
—

and a judgment against Richins and his companies would have

enhanced Sampson's advantage in his adversary role against them.
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Also, with respect to the Osborn judgment controversy,

defendants asserted that since Sampson had represented them
as counsel in various matters after June, 1980, including negotiations with Osborn —
set out elsewhere —

findings with tfespect to which will be
he had violated legal ethics standards,

creating a constructive trust situation when he obtained the
first assignment of the Osborn judgment as well as the second.
As to the first assignment, I find that any trust created would
have become moot when Osborn rescinded the assignment and re-entered
his judgment.

Defendants contend that the sums paid to obtain

the $45,000 were recorded by Sampson as capital contributions
to those advancing the money and that Sampson also listed the
Osborn judgment as a partnership asset.

Defendants contend

the money used to pay Osborn did in fact belong to the partnership
entities, and that the Osborn judgment, when assigned, became
an obligation owed only by the partnerships and this was an
obligation upon which only the partnerships could sue.
—

as will appear elsewhere in these findings —

But

neither Sampson,

nor his PC, nor his Ag Management were ever legal general partner
for any Catlow Valley (or other) partnerships and thus had no
legal authority to make such decisions concerning partnership
assets. The legal effect of illegal and invalid acts are determined
by law and not by the wrongful assumption of (control over partnership
assets by one who, though he may have believed he was acting
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properly, was doing things he had no authority under the law
to do.

While Sampson's efforts on obtaining the assignment

to Goff as trustee placed Sampson in violation of Section 78-51-27,
he was not the assignee.

Goff was, and Goff was not under that

statutory prohibition, which applied bnly to lawyers, and the
fact that Goff was acting under the illegal advice of counsel
did not, in my opinion, create a constructive trust in favor
of defendants and I so find.

While Gof£ is named as a trustee

as plaintiff, the fact is that he and Kohler owned 0 & M, and
together put up the $2 8,000 out of company assets.

These two

were Sampson's original two clients in May, 1980, and had taken
an active role in settlement negotiations.

Under partnership

agreements capital contributions were to be assessed upon a
pro rata basis when assessed by a valid general partner, and
I do not find the collections made to obtain the $45,000 constituted
capital contributions.
The provisions of Article VII (3) of the partnership agreement
gives general and limited partners rights to possess an interest
in other business ventures of every naturte and description independently or with others, and owning an interest in a judgment
against at least Richins or RFC would not Appear to be in conflict
with this provision.
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When Osborn received a certificate of sale from the

sheriff following his bid of $50,000 f0r the property offered,
he received compensation on his judgment of the amount of his
bid.

His bid was a payment on the judgment.

As noted in the

other document, under Oregon law a deficiency judgment need
not be obtained if a judgment is not fully satisfied on execution
sale.
21.

Another fact to be considered with respect to the

Osborn judgment is how the first $20,000 paid to Osborn should
be considered and treated.

On the 13th and 20th of October,

1981, Sampson and Richins discussed the Osborn judgment at which
time Sampson told Richins Osborn's attorney, Cramer, had stated
the $20,000 would be applied on the judgment.

As already found,

the assignment to Sampson upon payment of the $20,000 was illegal
and contrary to law.

The money paid was not Sampson's money,

nor are any of the partners whose money was so used parties
to this lawsuit asserting a claim thereto.

It came from Catlow

Valley limited partners and others, the payment of which would
normally be entered in the partnership books as capital contributions.

As such, it was funds over which the general partner

should have had complete control.

Osborn was willing to accept

the $4 0,00 0 in full satisfaction of his $75,000 judgment.
$20,000 was given to Osborn because of the judgment.

The

Sampson,

in engineering the matter as he did, was seeking satisfaction
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of the Osborn judgment and to rid th£ Catlow Valley partners
of the problem created thereby, but he was trying to do so in
a manner which he thought would satisfy Osborn, but preserve
a claim against defendants for the face amount of the judgment.
Sampson, in fact, admitted such intent.

Had Osborn rescinded

the assignment as he did for failure to pay the remaining $20,000
and then sued on his judgment in the Utah court, he would, in
my opinion, have been required to acknowledge that he had been
paid $20,000 on his judgment and would hafve had his claim reduced
by that amount.

Are not defendants entitled to have the $20,000

payment considered as a credit on the judgment, further reducing
the deficiency by that amount?

The capital contributions of

partners used to make that payment were at that time partnership
assets subject to the complete control of the general partner,
Richtron, Inc., payment by whom would have been a credit on
the judgment.

I find that under the facts and circumstances

of this case, the $20,000 was a credit that should be applied
towards the total due on the judgment wjiich, together with the
$50,000 credit, provides a $70,000 offset on the Osborn judgment.
I find no reason why Goff and the beneficiaries of his trust
should benefit from the $20,000 illegally paid by Sampson one
year before.

The judgment provided that interest on the judgment

ran from May 20, 1980 at the rate of 13% on $27,683.17, 9% on
the $30,000, and the legal rate on the attorney's fee of $18,000.
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I find the $20,000 payment mailed January 23, 1981, should be
credited on the amount bearing the highest interest rate. Using
a 10% legal rate, I compute interest to May 30, 1986 to total
$13,257.13, plus $1,557 per day on a deficiency of $5,683.13,
or a total still owing as of May 30, 1966 of $18,875.26, should
judgment be granted to plaintiffs.
22.

Goff and the limited partners for whom he serves as

trustee in this case put up $45,000 to acquire something from
Osborn.

What did they get?

First they got a warranty deed

from Osborn transferring all of the defendants' assets in the
Catlow Valley Farm Properties for which Osborn obviously was
willing to bid at the sheriff's sale. Th£y also got an assignment
of the Osborn judgment.

The partners putting up the $45,000

did not owe anything to Osborn.
any part of it.

They had no obligation to pay

But they had a statutory right to lend money

to and transact other business with the partnership, so advancing
the $45,000 was not per se an illegal act (Section 48-2-13).
The inferences are clear that Osborn wanted to be paid off on
his judgment with money and would not have otherwise assigned
the judgment over.

Plaintiffs knew they had to pay off the

judgment to obtain an assignment thereof.

They were following

Sampson's advice -- albeit given contrary to law —

intending

to utilize the judgment so assigned to get their own judgment
against the defendants to use, no doubt, ^s a weapon in Sampson's
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ongoing conflicts with Richins.

The issues do not leave us

SAMPSON V. RICHTRON

with a concern as to whether the $45,000 was paid to get the
warranty deed or the assignment.

No evidence was presented

to show what use plaintiffs made of the interests conveyed by
the warranty deed,

Osborn's bid at the sheriff's sale fixed

the legal consequences of that action, and defendants themselves
made no effort to bid at the sheriff's sale.
I do not see that the evidence establishes any unfair advantage
to plaintiffs in connection with their obtaining an interest
in the judgment insofar as Richins and RFC are concerned as
they allege in their affirmative defense.

Nor do I see that

the plaintiffs acting upon the advice of counsel in obtaining
an interest in the judgment as constituting improper conduct
where the statutory law did not bar lay persons from acquiring
such an assignment.

So I find that the defense of estoppel

on the grounds asserted by defendants in their Answer has not
been proven by any preponderance of the evidence.
23.

In asserting various defenses commonly used in pleadings,

such as estoppel, counsel frequently allege phraseology of one
sort or another and suggest it constitutes such defense.
appears to have been done in this case.

This

In Conclusion of law

16 is set forth a statement of our Supreme Court as to the circumstances under which the doctrine of estoppel has application.
In the evidence presented in this case I find none that could

20 Gl

SAMPSON V. RICHTRON

-21-

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

be said to show by a preponderance thereof that Goff or those
for whom he took as trustee did any act, made any misrepresentation,
or engaged in any conduct, or remained silent when there was
a duty to speak, that induced Richins to believe that certain
facts existed on which Richins relied to his detriment.
Richins individually, and as president of RFC, knew the
legal consequences of the guaranty by them of the general partners1
obligation to pay Osborn for his well drilling activities.
They raise no defense that liability as to them did not arise
under any guaranty agreement and indeed jfio evidence with respect
to that agreement was ever tendered into evidence.

Richins

knew long before May 13, 1980 that the obligation to Osborn
had not been paid, knew an action thereon had been filed, and
knew that judgment had been entered on that date, and yet had
in fact kept hidden from the Catlow Valley partners that such
troubles confronted them.
Richins knew of the assignment of the judgment to Sampson
shortly after the action was filed under Osbornfs name on February
11, 19 81, and yet, through stipulation, did not file an Answer
to the Complaint until July 20, 1982. Richins learned of Goff's
role as assignee by December, 1982, and of his substitution
as plaintiff, but did not require Goff to file an Amended Complaint
and did not raise as an estoppel defense any such conduct by
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Goff when he filed his last amended pleading in this case on
September 6, 1985.
Also, Richins has raised no defense that his and RFC's
liability for any deficiency was subject to exhausting of any
collateral which came to Goff by Osborn14 warranty deed.

Indeed,

the absence of any information as to the content of the guaranty
agreement, precludes speculation that any such defense might
have been available to them.
Thus, I find that neither Richins, nor RFC have proven
any facts that constitute an estoppel of plaintiffs' claim against
them for the remaining deficiency found to be due under the
j udgment.
24.

Another element of defense as far as Richtron, Inc. as

general partner is concerned comes to mind although not specifically
alleged in the pleadings, but so evident in the evidence as
to justify amending the pleadings to conform to the evidence
if need be.

I see an element of defense arising from the fact

that as to the Complaint the limited partners are suing their
general partner because they obtained an assignment of the Osborn
judgment after it had been entered against their general partner.
The partnership agreements bar limited partners from suing the
general partner for losses resulting from errors in judgment
or any acts or omissions not based upon willful misconduct or
gross negligence.

The entry of the Osborn judgment may not
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have been a loss to the limited partners under the circumstances
because it did not give rise to a judgment lien against partnership
property, no£ did it create a personal liability against limited
partners.

The work out of which the obligation arose conferred

a benefit upon the partnership property, for what farm is worth
anything without water, and it was the general partner who engaged
Osborn to do the work.

Had the limited partners of Catlow Valley

all paid all capital assessments made upon them by their general
partner, the Osborn obligation may long before have been paid.
But Richtron, Inc. omitted paying the Osborn obligation and
the Osborn judgment was a significant If actor that the limited
partners found disturbing in May, 1980.

But from my review

of all of the evidence the obligation went unpaid because funds
that should have been available did not become so.

Such evidence

does not lend support to any finding that any loss to the limited
partners, if one existed, was caused by reason of gross negligence
or willful misconduct of the general partner and I so find that
there was none.
The partnership agreements state the general partner shall
have full charge of the management, conduct and operation of
the partnership affairs in all respects and in all matters.
This certainly includes the control of lawsuits.

In addition

to precluding liability of the general partner to a limited
partner as elsewhere noted, the partnership agreement also provides
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that if the general partner shall be made a party to any action
or proceeding by reason of the fact that it was a general partner
of the partnership, the partnership shall and agrees to indemnify
and hold harmless the general partner against any and all judgments,
liabilities, fines, amounts paid in settlement and reasonable
expenses including a reasonable attorney's fee actually and
necessarily incurred by it as a result of such action or proceeding
if the general partner acted in good faith for a purpose for
which it believed to be in the best interest of the partnership.
(Article V (4)).

But, again, a partnership is not a party to

this action, and thus in this case the general partner is not
entitled to such relief in this action.

Partners, both general

and limited, are members of a partnership, they are not the
limited partnership which exists as a separate legal entity,
but a limited partner suing a general partner about a partnership
matter or obligation is committing an act contrary to the spirit
and letter of the partnership agreement and I so find.
25.

With respect to the Osborn judgment transaction Sampson

by letter of March 17, 1982 advised the Catlow Valley investors
that by so using the $45,000, $28,000 of which he said was paid
by Goff and Kohler, the Richtron interests in their property
were purchased from Osborn for that amount and defendants had
until December 17, 1982 to redeem it for $50,000.

He did not

say that if the property was not so redeemed, the sale became
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final and the bid and resulting transfer of property interests
entitled the defendants to a $50,000 Credit upon the judgment
liability.

Counsel for defendants suggested at trial that the

RFC equity in its purchase contract With Glenn was $190,000;
that in RFC's sale of the Glenn property to the partnerships
it had an income flow of $175,000 (as Set out in Richins1 memo
of May 30, 1980) and that based upon Richins valuation schedule
as of June, 1980, the fair market value of the Catlow Valley
Farms was at least two million dollars (although such value
was set at $360,327 in the bankruptcy schedule with total debts
as fixed by Richins reaching $995,633).

Thus, says defense

counsel, the property had an equity of at least $385,000, that
Osborn got such a bargain for his $50,000 bid that the conscience
of the court should be so shocked as to render the sale invalid.
One wonders how much mark-up is in the alleged $190,000 and
how much of the alleged income flow was flowing in, and how
much is the equity figure inflated.

The judgments; the unpaid

debts, particularly on the sprinkler system equipment; the unpaid
assessments concerning which Richins did Nothing over an extended
period of time; the unsuccessful operation of the property as
farms; the serious discontent of the investors; the failure
to submit reports required in the agreement; Richins1 expressed
willingness at the May 29, 1980 meeting to step out as general
partner of Catlow Valley partnerships so the partners could
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put someone in as general partner in whom they had more confidence;
his failure to press for settlement of the Osborn judgment for
$26,000 and attorney's fees as first offered by Osborn; his
failure to bid at the sheriff's sale; or to redeem the property
from sale during the year following the sale; all add up to
a sufficient easing of the Court's conscience to make a finding
that the sale should not be invalidated for the suggested reasons.
26.

In his letter of March 17, 1982, in which Sampson

set forth the details of the acquisition of defendants' property
at the sheriff sale, he advised Catlow Valley investors that
$110,000 was owed in bills, $400,000 was owed to the Glenns,
$700,000 was owed to Valmont, but it had agreed to accept $450,000,
and that Sampson thought the property could be sold for $1-1/2
million.

Sampson said that a new partnership was to be formed

and that any investor could come in by paying past assessments
in full and come in pro-rata on current cash contributions currently
paid and their existing capital contributions in former Catlow
Valley partnerships.

Sampson said 33 investors owed $135,182

and that a meeting had been set for March 20, 1982, and those
not in attendance would lose all, from which the Court finds
that Sampson was continuing to exercise control over the various
partnerships with an increasing assertion of authority.
27.

In summary from the foregoing findings, I find that

a deficiency exists on the Osborn judgment in the amounts set
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forth in Finding of Fact 21 in favor of plaintiffs and against
Richins individually and RFC, but for the reasons set forth
in Finding of Fact 24 I find the issues on plaintiffs1 Complaint
in favor of Richtron, Inc. and against the plaintiffs of no
cause of action.

But entry of judgment against Richins and

RFC must await a ruling in this decision on the counterclaim
asserted by Richins and RFC against Goff and the named limited
partners for whom he is trustee.
GENERAL FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM
As I have previously noted the defendants' claims for relief
are set forth in their Second Amended Counterclaim which was
not filed until September 6, 1985.

Two prior Counterclaims

had been filed, the first on July 20, 1982 when defendants first
filed a responsive pleading to plaintiffs' Complaint, which
had been filed on February 11, 1981. Defendants filed an Amended
Counterclaim on September 1, 1982.

This trial began January

27, 19 8 6 and thus it can be seen that defendants' claims for
relief set forth in their Second Amended Counterclaim were asserted
less than five months before trial.

Counsel for plaintiffs

raised no objection to such late amendment of the pleadings,
promptly filed a responsive pleading and were ready for trial
when the trial date arrived. As with the findings and conclusions
on the plaintiffs' Complaint, so here, because of the extensive
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nature of the record, I believe it necessary to include in the
findings and conclusions comments which, while they may appear
as comments on the evidence or facts and circumstances related
to the particular finding or conclusion under consideration,
may also nevertheless explain or clarify the facts or conclusions
reached which, in turn, hopefully will justify the extended
comments on those findings and conclusions.
The defendants set forth general averments relating to
the parties which were previously identified at the beginning
and will not be related here, except as such may be helpful.
The names of 2 5 limited partnerships are set out as mentioned
many times in the Summation, before which partnerships were
created at various dates between October 15, 1973, and March
1, 1980 in which Richtron, Inc. or its then subsidiary/ Richtron
General, acted as the sole general partner of each respective
limited partnership.
Limited partnership agreements were prepared for each separate
entity, provided in general terms for the purchase by various
properties of the various partnerships for development and/or
resale for the benefit of each limited partnership and the particular
investors therein.

The terms of the 25 partnership agreements

were substantially identical.
In my Memorandum and Summation submitted as a separate
document herewith, I have set forth under separate headings
information contained in the limited partnership agreement which
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I believed would have a bearing on the relevant facts and circumstances of this case, the contents of which I will incorporate
herein by this reference to avoid needless repetition.

However,

some of the provisions of the agreement set forth therein may
be repeated in my comments, findings or conclusions on the counterclaim issues, and I will do so because of the relevancy thereof
to the matter being considered.
Also in that document I have included a section discussing
what I considered to be sections of the State Limited Partnership
Statutes which I believed would have relevant use and application
to the issues of this case.

Here, also, I incorporate that

section as a part hereof by this reference with the same caveat
that I may further discuss them in my comments.
The Counterclaim sets forth six claims for relief which
I will try to briefly summarize with the expectation that more
details thereof will be considered when I consider the findings
and conclusions that may have a bearing thereon.

While this

may be repetitious to my summary of the pleadings set forth
in the other document, I believe it will state and help to keep
in mind the issues that were to be tried.
The first claim alleges that from about June 11, 1980 until
about October 7, 1981 Sampson acted as legal counsel for defendants,
who in the first claim are identified as Richins, Richtron,
Inc., Richtron General and RFC, in various stated matters but
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also undertook to represent partners and partnerships in matters
adverse to defendants; endeavored to obtain interests in various
enumerated judgments or debts owed by defendants for the purpose
of using them to defendants' detriment; utilized confidential
information received while representing defendants to their
detriment; alleging that all such conduct constituted conflicts
of interests, fraudulent attempts to injure defendants, breach
of fiduciary duty and trust on which the attorney/client relation
is based, and gross overreaching.

It is in this first claim

that defendants assert a claim for relief against Goff and the
beneficiaries of his trust, asserting that Goff's acquisition
of an interest in the Osborn judgment and their manifest intent
to acquire an interest against the general partner to whom they
as limited partners allegedly owed a fiduciary duty constituted
a conflict of interest, a fraudulent attempt to injure defendants,
gross overreaching and a breach of fiduciary duty.

Defendants

allege that as a direct and proximate result of plaintiffs'
conduct, including Sampson's, defendants had suffered damages
and injury of a character and amount to be ascertained at trial.
They also allege malice and bad faith for which they seek $1,000,000
in punitive damages.
Defendants in their second claim for relief allege Sampson,
in addition to the allegations made under the first claim, while
legally representing defendants and after, failed to timely
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or in any manner prepare or file responsive pleadings on defendants'
behalf with respect to certain civil complaints filed by third
parties against them and certain limited partnerships, and thereby
breached his duty to them with respect to an attorney/client
relation in that he failed to exercise that degree of reasonable
care or skill ordinarily possessed and exercised by members
of the legal profession; that he acted far beyond the scope
of his expressly and impliedly delegated duties; and that he
utilized confidential information acquired during his course
of representation of defendants to his own unfair personal advantage,
for which they seek damages of a character and in an amount
to be ascertained at trial.

(At trial defendants abandoned

their third claim for relief).
In their fourth claim for relief defendants incorporated
prior allegations and asserted that by reason thereof and by
reason of conduct included in this claim, Sampson, knowingly,
intentionally and maliciously interfered with and invaded Richins1
right to earn a livelihood as a syndicator of limited partnership
interests; and with Richtron's ability to effectively discharge
the general partner duties and functions imposed upon it by
the limited partnership agreements and by law; and further interfered
with defendants1 existing contractual relationships, anticipated
opportunities for employment and/or beneficial economic expectancies.

The additional alleged wrongful conduct of Sampson which
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defendants assert as grounds for this' claim involve Sampson's
wrongful endorsement of two Blackfoot Farms checks and delivery
thereof to Clark Wangsgard and the fact that between June, 1980,
and November, 1981, Sampson solicited an4 received capital contributions, assessments and other monies in an amount of at least
$702,000 from numerous limited partners of various partnerships,
the specific details as to name, partnership, date and amounts
of which are all set forth.

Defendants allege Sampson converted

at least $670,000 of these monies to ltiis own use and benefit.
Defendants further allege that since November, 1982, Sampson
has solicited and received from partners additional monies rightfully
belonging to defendants and assert tliey are entitled to have
a constructive trust or equitable lieift against such monies on
the products or proceeds thereof. Other than two or three specific
items, defendants do not set forth in thife claim what uses Sampson
allegedly made of such funds, assertimg generally their claim
of damages of a character and in an Amount to be determined
at trial, together with $1,000,000 in punitive damages.
In the fifth claim for relief defendants allege that between
June 14, 1980 and January 15, 1981, the general partners withdrew
as general partners of 2 4 named limited partnerships, thereby
causing a dissolution of each partnership in accordance with
Section 48-2-20 of our Code, and placing defendants under an
obligation to wind up and terminate eacli partnership and settle
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their accounts. They allege that nothwithstanding these statutory
obligations, Sampson had unlawfully continued to manage and
operate the limited partnerships by purporting to act as successor
general manager, and has deliberately interfered with the rights
of defendants to properly wind up partnership affairs, and have
substantially damaged limited partnership assets by inducing
limited partners to transfer the assets to a newly formed entity
known as Western Farms, whose sole purpose is to receive all
such assets; have commingled crop proceeds and assets of all
the partnerships; have purchased and attempted to purchase judgments
and debts of third parties against the limited partnerships
and defendants; and have converted partnership assets to their
own use and excluded defendants therefrom for winding up and
termination; for which defendants seek ai* accounting with respect
to all dealings with such assets and damages as may be established
by such accounting.
In their sixth claim for relief defendants assert by reason
of all conduct alleged in the other claims they have received
irreparable injury for which there is no adequate legal remedy
and thus seek injunctive relief.
In their response to defendants1 claims as set forth in
their Second Amended Counterclaim plaintiffs generally deny
each and every allegation and assert as affirmative defenses:
(1) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

2073

SAMPSON V. RICHTRON

-34-

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

which I summarily rule upon as having no merit; (2) barred by
illegal, inequitable and malicious conduct; (3) (goes to defamation
claim which was abandoned); (4) laches; (5) waiver; (6) estoppel;
(7) breaches of duty and trust; (8) a combination and conspiracy
to defraud the limited partners; and (9) unjust enrichment from
the limited partners for which defendants are barred from seeking
relief from plaintiffs.
As I have stated elsewhere, the Counterclaim is almost
completely an assertion of claims against Sampson.

Neither

the limited partners of the partnerships nor the partnerships
are parties to this action, and I view it beyond the scope of
this case for me to consider issues involving the partners and
partnerships or any rights or obligations they may have against
or to the general partners or other defendants.

A discussion

of relationships and duties and obligations existing between
the general and limited partners and the partnerships may be
a basis of comment in my summary of findings and conclusions
on the Counterclaim issues, but in no way are my rulings in
here intended to determine rights or obligations of those not
parties to this action.

In his opening statement counsel for

defendants stated the evidence would show what happened to each
partnership.

I note a paucity of evidence with respect to what

happened to the partnerships, their investors, the farm properties,
and debts and obligations owed by them or the general partners.
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Of necessity, specific findings of fact relevant to the
issues involved will require comments of evidence leading to
a basis for facts as found.

Hopefully, such comments can be

minimized and I can only endeavor to do so as my ability may
allow. It should be remembered that in my prior comments regarding
plaintiffs1 Complaint that I said that findings as to one side
may have application to the other.

If that occurs, I hope to

do so without unnecessary repetition.

My consideration of the

issues raised in the various claims for rdlief will not necessarily
be treated in the same order in which they are alleged in the
Counterclaim.

Numerical numbering of findings will continue

on from those numbers in the findings on the Complaint.
FINDINGS OF FACT RE:
28.

COUNTERCLAIM

In the general findings set tforth at the outset, the

dates upon which the respective pleadlings were filed are set
out.

Notwithstanding the fact, as shoWn by the evidence, that

Sampson's activities with respect to partnership affairs began
immediately after the May 29, 1980 meeting with Catlow Valley
partners, defendants pleading seeking permanent injunctive relief,
as requested in their sixth claim, wa|s not filed until July
20, 1982, almost 18 months after this action was filed. Thereafter,
other than continuing asking for injunctive relief in the Counterclaim, the record does not reflect an^ affirmative action in
the Court seeking a restraining order or preliminary injunctive
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relief against Sampson up to the time of trial at which no evidence
of any need for present injunctive relief was presented. Generally,
it can be said that at trial neither side produced any evidence
as to what finally happened with respect to the partnerships
or their properties other than Richins' schedule showing foreclosure
dates.

Upon closing argument defense counsel stated that Sampson

and twelve people ended up with all the Richtron assets, but
I have carefully searched the record in vain for evidence to
support that statement.

I have no evidence before the Court

that shows any partnership activities u#on which any injunctive
relief can be based.
29.

Defendants1 allegations under their first claim relate

to a claim that for a period of about 16 months beginning in
June, 1980, Sampson represented defendants as counsel in various
cases affecting partnership matters, and nevertheless undertook
to represent interests adverse to defendants to their injury.
Sampson claims to have only represented individual limited partners.
He first got involved in the partnership affairs in May, 1980,
when he, as counsel for Goff and Kohler, first questioned Richins
about Catlow Valley partnerships in which t^hose two had an interest,
and then appeared with them as their counsel at a meeting of
Catlow Valley partners held on May 29, 1980.

His actions there

were a bit more than just privately courtseling his two clients,
for he not only orally recommended to those at the meeting and
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got started the movement to have RFC f'ile for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11 proceedings, but he also expressed the legal opinion
to all present that he did not think RFfc could keep the mark-up
equity arising from RFC's resale of the farm property to the
Catlow Valley partnerships for an amount in excess of what it
paid for it, which was a theme which Sampson repeatedly expressed
in the months and years ahead.

Whil0 these comments are not

found as constituting a representation Of defendants as counsel
at this time, it began a series of negotiations to carry out
a scheme he had suggested to Richins the very next day —

that

of Sampson and his clients buying out all of the Richtron interests
in the 25 partnerships.
During the month of June, 1980, Sampson pressed this matter
up to and at a meeting held on June 26, 1980, of limited partners
with substantial interests at which tjoth Richins and Sampson
were in attendance.

Prior to the meeting Sampson called Richins,

said he desired to attend the meeting, stating he would rally
support for Richins, but not unless Ricthins agreed to sell out
to him and his group on their terms anc} allow him to take full
control.

Although Sampson's right to be at the meeting was

questioned by one investor, Sampson said he was there to advise
Goff and Kohler about their investment, and speaking further
at Kohler!s request, Sampson stated that in his opinion the
basic problem was mismanagement; said that the investors would
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be very angry about Richins claiming a return for advances;
that if given a list of 40 of the largest investors, he would
contact them and get $60,000; that he wanted a power of attorney
to vote the Richtron stock; and that he thought $650,000 at
12% interest was a fair price to buy out the Richtron interests.
Richins requested a recess to think itj: over during which time
Sampson and Kohler intruded upon Richins, and after a heated
discussion, Sampson said the settlement would be $650,000 at
13% or nothing. Richins told Sampson it was none of his business,
as he was not a limited partner.

Kohler then convinced Sampson

the offer should be $700,000 which was agreed upon when the
meeting reconvened. Richins said he wanted David Day, his attorney,
to draft the settlement agreement.

These facts to this point

do not establish the allegations of defendants under their first
claim, but are important facts becausie what occurred at the
meeting constituted a basic foundation and understanding of
events that followed in the months and years ahead, as well
as leading up to facts concerning an attorney/client relation
between Sampson, Richins and his companions.

For at that meeting

Richins said he anticipated that durifrg the drafting time on
the agreement a couple of creditors may file a lawsuit, to which
Sampson told Richins to send him the complaints and he would
answer and stall them off.

Sampson then further stated that

once the settlement agreement was consummated, he would like

2073

-39-

SAMPSON V. RICHTRON

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

to take over as legal counsel for Richtron, for which expressed
desire he obtained the support of the investors at the meeting
over Richins1 objections.
30.

Shortly after the June 26, 1980 meeting the first

meeting of creditors on the RFC bankruptcy proceedings was held.
Sampson and Richins were there and together they had separate
discussions with Glenn, the original owner of the Catlow Valley
Farms property, the payments on which were in substantial default;
with Osborn about his judgment; and with attorney Knov/les, who
represented Valmont, who had a very large contract balance owing
for sprinkling equipment purchased for the Catlow Valley Farms
payments on which were delinquent, who stated Valmont and its
Chicago bank were pressing for payment.
31.

While the certainty of the existence of an attorney/client

relation between Sampson and Richins during discussions with
Glenn, Osborn and Knowles was by no means clear, Sampson soon
became involved in handling certain legal matters for Richins
and his company.

Attorney George Mangan of Roosevelt, Utah

wrote concerning payments for farm property due his clients,
the Feltons, then in default by one of the partnerships, and
also concerning the release of a portion of Young Farms sold
to Mangan1s clients, the Macks.

Sampson got involved with Mangan

in handling these claims for Richins and his companies.
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unethical conduct, defendants have suf'fered injury and damages
of a character and in an amount to be ascertained at trial.
Defendants also assert a punitive damage claim of $1,000,000
against plaintiffs for what defendants allege was conduct actuated
by malice and bad faith.
The Osborn judgment was against Richins, Richtron, Inc. and
RFC and its acquisition could not and did not constitute any
injury to Richtron General or Frontier upon which any claim
for relief can be asserted and I so find4
43.

As set forth in Finding of Fact t24, plaintiffs' relation-

ship with their general partner, Richtron, Inc. was not identical
to or the same as their relationship tq Richins or to RFC, for
although Richins was president of these two Richtron companies,
his office gave him no special rights or claims to, or duties
from, the limited partners.

The latterfs rights, duties and

obligations arise from statutory law and from agreements in
the partnership certificate not in conflict with law.

RFC's

contract on the sale of the farm property Was with the partnership,
not the limited partners, and Section 48-2-1 states the limited
partners, as such, shall not be bound by the obligations of
the partnership.

Wherein lies Richin£' and RFC's claim for

relief against these plaintiffs?

The evidence established no

fiduciary duty as to the Osborn judgmjent between plaintiffs
and Richins or RFC.

Acquisition of thel judgment does not show

2U3o
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a conflict of interest, breach of fiduciary duty nor a fraudulent
attempt by these plaintiffs to injure those defendants.

There

was no pleading of such alleged fraud with particularity, nor
is the burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence
met by the evidence. What character of injury by Goff was established by the evidence?
claim I find none.

Other than defending against the Goff

Neither Richins nor RFC produced any evidence

that they were injured by the assignment of the judgment to
Goff, which carried only the deficiency owing therein.

They

both had liability as guarantors on the judgment and the assignment
to Goff did not increase their liability above the deficiency
that remained.

Osborn proceeded according to law and when his

judgment against Richins, Richtron, Inc. and RFC remained unsatisfied, he was entitled to levy upon and sell at sheriff's sale
whatever interests those three defendants had in the Catlow
Valley partnership properties.

The sale was not a sale of the

farm real estate, but only of whatever interests the defendants
had therein.
RFC had an interest in the real property because it had
solD the Catlow Valley property to those respective partnerships
under an installment sale contract.

Furthermore, RFC was a

limited partner in three partnerships - Catlow Valley Farms
#2 ($7911) and #6 ($2301) and Richfield Farms ($20,960.50).
In September, 1982, Marilyn Brown sent incomplete partnership
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returns for 1980 to the IRS and the statue tax commission showing
Ag Management as general partner for ^ach of the seven Catlow
Valley partnerships.

Attached were forms containing the name

and capital interest of each limited partner.

The return for

#2 showed RFC was a limited partner with a capital account of
$7f911 and that for #6 showed RFC's Capital account in it as
$2,301.

Section 42-2-18 states that a limited partner's interest

in the partnership is personal property.

Thus, I find that

RFC's limited partnership interests were not affected by the
sale.

The real property is the asset OJ6 the partnership entity,

not that of the limited partners.

RFC's contract interest as

seller of the real property would have been included in its
interests sold in the sheriff's sale.
Richtron Inc.'s interest was that of a general partner.
It also had a limited partnership interest in Pleasant Valley
Farms in the amount of $4222.50.

On July 23, 1981, Marilyn

Brown telephonically advised Richins th4t while assessing other
limited partners in Pleasant Valley, she had not sent an assessment
to Richtron for its portion as a limited partner because she
believed Richtron would not have paid it, aind that she had pro-rated
Richtronfs portion to the other limited partners.

Its right

to continue on as general partner was ndt affected by the sale,
for it existed by reason of Richtron'$ partnership agreements
with the partnerships.

The Osborn judgment was a money judgment.

The assignment to Goff on March 2, 1982, as$igned only the judgment.
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The Certificate of Sale executed by the sheriff on December
28, 1981, stated the judgment and decree of foreclosure commanded
him to sell all the interests which the defendant had on May
13, 1980, and all the interest which the defendants had thereafter,
in the real property therein described, setting forth the legal
description in all the Catlow Valley properties.

The Certificate

recited the sale thereof to Osborn for $50,000 subject to the
statutory right of redemption. The seven Catlow Valley partnerships
each had purchased 1/7th of said land| from RFC.

The court's

"order confirming sale of real property," dated January 10,
1982, confirmed the sheriff's sale of "all of the defendants'
interest in the real property."

Osborn's warranty deed to Goff

as trustee executed January 4, 1982, conveyed only Osborn's
interest in the real property.

Thus, I do not believe that

the sale included Richtron, Inc. 's right it|had under the partnership
agreement, such as its right to 10% of profits remaining after
final sale, nor in Richtron Inc.'s limited partnership interest
in Pleasant valley Farms of $4222.50. tfor did the sale include
the respective partnerships' obligation to repay to the general
partner any and all advances made to any particular partnership
which was a debt of the partnership repayable as provided in
the partnership agreements.
Richins, as president of the general partner, Richtron,
Inc. and of RFC had no individual interests in the Catlow Valley
real estate.
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Osborn's bid of $50,-000 at the sale for defendant's interests
in the real property reduced Richins^ and RFCfs liability on
the judgment by that amount.

No doubt Ojsborn gave both the

deed and assignment to Goff as trustee because of the $45,000
payment they made to him in 1982 ovet and above the $20,000
he had received in 1981.
This action is based upon the judgment so assigned to Goff
and his associates, and defendants assfert their claim in their
Counterclaim against Goff and his associates upon the assignment,
not the deed, asserting that it was wrohg for them to sue their
general partner, Richtron, Inc., and such is the basis of defendants'
claim against said plaintiffs.

I hav£ elsewhere resolved the

claim as to Richtron, Inc., but I fijid no compensable injury
to Richins or RFC by reason of the assignment, nor proof of
any valid claim for relief against Go^f and those for whom he
sues as trustee, nor proof of damages therefrom, and thus no
offset to those plaintiffs' claims against Richins or RFC.
44.

Remaining for determination isfcichtron,Inc.'s Counter-

claim against the plaintiffs upon the grounds asserted as set
forth in finding 42.

I have already determined that plaintiffs

had no claim for damages against their own general partner,
Richtron, Inc.

The fact that plaintiffs asserted a claim against

Richtron, Inc. on the assigned Osborn judgment does not constitute
a fraud against Richtron, Inc., nor an actionable breach of
fiduciary duty.

Such action may constitute an actionable conflict
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of interest because I have found supra that the partnership
agreement precludes an action by limited partners against the
general partner under facts and circumstances found to exist
here.

The only injury I can find support for in the evidence

is that arising out of the need to defend against this case
and the damages arising from costs and attorney's fees for having
had to do so.

But the fact that a p^rty has a legal defense

to a claim for relief does not necessarily give that party a
right to recover for attorney's fees spent in asserting the
defense.

Defending an action on a foreign judgment does not

normally include an allowance for attorney's fees, and I find
no conduct upon the part of Goff and his associates as to justify
an award of attorney's fees under Section 78-27-56.
45.

Plaintiffs filed this action upon the advice of counsel

with respect to a judgment already entered against the defendants.
I find no evidence that this action was actuated by plaintiffs
by malice or bad faith such as would support any claim against
them for punitive damages under this claim for relief.

This

finding relates to the limited partners for whom Goff is trustee,
and is not intended as a finding at this time as to Sampson
with respect to any such claim.
46.

As to the Counterclaim against Sampson, each claim

for relief incorporates by reference tt^e allegations set forth
in the prior claims.

The purpose of such pleading seems to

be that if one's prior allegations are riot sufficient to assert
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a claim upon which relief may be granted, adding a bit more
fuel to the fire may enhance the claim f0r relief.
By the second claim defendants assert that Sampson's breach
of the attorney/client relationship in bailing to timely prepare
or file responsive pleadings on defendants' behalf with respect
to certain civil complaints filed by third parties against them
(as identified in prior findings) constituted negligence in
that he failed to exercise that degree of reasonable care or
skill ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the legal
profession; that Sampson acted far beyond the scope of his expressly
and impliedly delegated duties; and that he utilized confidential
information, etc. as alleged in the first claim.

This second

claim is, in effect, another way of setting forth a claim for
relief as was done under the first claita.

As previously noted,

Sampson did fail to respond in those cas$s on defendants' behalf.
Such handling of lawsuits constitutes a failure to exercise
the reasonable care required of the leg&l profession.

The fact

that such failures may have occurred 4fter it became apparent
that the Settlement and Compromise Agreement, then acceptable
to both Sampson and Richins, failed of confirmation or consummation
may have been a reason for Sampson's negligence in these matters,
but it was not a justification therefore.

He did not, but should

have, advised Richins and the opposing counsel in those cases
with whom he had been dealing that he could not or would not
further be representing the defendant$ therein and arranged
for time for defendants to obtain new counsel and respond.
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However, with respect to the default judgments so entered,
defendants offered evidence only with re$pect to damages incurred
in the cases of Valmont v. Richtron, Inc. and Richins and Interlake
Thrift v. Richtron, Inc. With respect thereto defendants' evidence
showed that attorney Gary Kennedy was employed to set aside
the default judgments entered against the named defendants in
those cases.

Exhibit 236 shows Kennedy1 Is firm charged Richtron,

Inc. $161.30 for legal fees on the Interlake case and charged
Richins and Richtron, Inc. $2,027.40 for legal fees on the Valmont
case.

Said defendants were thus damaged in these amounts by

Sampson's allowance of default judgments to be entered against
them.

Richins thus established proof of damages by Richins

for $2,027.40 and Richtron, Inc. did |so for the total of the
two amounts under their second claim for relief.
As set forth in my general findings on the Counterclaim,
the fourth claim for relief includes a claim by Richins that
Sampson's conduct interfered with and invaded Richins' right
to earn a livelihood as a syndicator of limited partnership
interests; a claim for the Richtron General partners that Sampson's
conduct interfered with their ability to effectively discharge
the general partner's duties and functions imposed upon it by
the limited partnership agreements and by law; and a claim for
the defendants generally that his conduct interfered with the
defendants' existing contractual relationships, anticipated
opportunities for employment and/or beneficial economic expectan-
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The allegations thereof are broad enough to cover andd

include the basics of the claims for relief set forth in the
fifth claim for relief in which defendants assert a right to
and request an accounting from Sampson.
The fourth claim for relief will require a broad and extended
consideration of facts established by the evidence that should
be sufficient to cover Sampson's conduct with respect to all
claims for relief.
The main thrust of this claim ca^i be found in language
contained in paragraph 25 of the claim to the effect that Sampson
interfered with defendants' existing contractual relations,
anticipated opportunities for employment ahd/or beneficial economic
expectancies.
48.

Discussions between Richins and Sampson concerning

the limited partnerships began about May 20, 198 0, but that
date did not mark the beginning of Richins' problems relating
to the partnerships.

The evidence clearly established that

long before that date Richins was confronted with substantial
problems in the overall operations.

Indeed, I think that as

of May, 1980, the evidence suggested a bleak outlook for the
future.

I see, among others, two major developments that had

created the problems then existing in May, 1980.

One was the

failure of many limited partners to pay their assessed capital
contributions which they had agreed td do in their respective
partnership agreements.

Section 48-2-2^1)(a) (7th) of the Code
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states that the certificate of the parties forming a limited
partnership shall sign and swear to must state, "The additional
contributions, if any, agreed to be made by each limited partner
and the times at which, or events on the happening of which,
they shall be made."

The Certificate of Limited Partnership

contained various provisions with respect to what each limited
partner would contribute as his pro rata share (based upon his
capital interest) of the necessary funds determined by the general
partner to pay the annual expenses of the partnerships. Plaintiffs
contended that in his efforts to finance the purchase of farm
equipment Richins had altered the language of Section 2 of Schedule
B of certain limited partnership agreements to change the purposes
and maximum amounts for which assessments could be made by the
general partner from the limited partners, and did so without
the knowledge and consent of the limited partners affected thereby.
Plaintiffs1 main contention is that the words "irrigation equipment"
was added to the enumerated purposes for which assessments could
be made.

To support such contention plaintiffs pointed to three

Catlow Valley partnership agreements, copies of which were placed
into evidence by plaintiffs1 exhibits 153 (#6), 328 (#1) and
329 (#4).
An analysis of all the partnership agreements reflect that
the following language of Section 2 reading

"Each limited partner

agrees to contribute his pro rata share (based upon his capital
interest) of the funds determined by the general partner to
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be necessary to pay the annual expenses of the partnership,
including without limitation payments on the purchase price
of the property, irrigation equipment and any lease payments,
annual property taxes, accounting expenses ... as may be incurred
by the partnership* 1:he estimated maximum annual amount ... that
a limited partner shall be required to contribute shall be ..."
is contained in the agreements for the following partnerships:
Springfield Properties dated 4/1/78
Catlow Valley #1 dated 4/1/77
Catlow Valley #2 dated 4/1/77
Catlow Vallley #3 dated 4/1/77
Catlow Valley #4 dated 4/1/77
Catlow Valley #7 dated 1/1/78
Moreland dated 5/15/78
*East Taber dated 3/1/78
*North Taber dated 1/1/79
+West Taber dated 10/15/78
+Taber dated 10/15/78
+Shosone dated 11/8/76
Wixom dated 5/1/79
(* these two agreements also include the word "advances11.

+

these three agreements omit the word "maximum").
In the partnership agreements for the following limited
partners the language of Section 2 reads "Each limited partner
agrees to contribute his pro rata share (based upon his capital
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interest) of the funds determined by the general partner to
be necessary to pay the annual expenses of the partnership,
including without limitation payments on the purchase price
of the property, annual taxes, accounting expenses (and reasonable
reserves for premiums and all other such out of pocket expenses)
as may be incurred by the partnership.

The maximum amount that

... shall be required to contribute ..•",
Catlow Valley #4 dated 4/1/77
Blackfoot dated 4/15/76
Burley dated 8/20/76
Kanosh dated 7/30/76
North Bear Lake dated 5/15/75
Randlett dated 7/18/74
Pleasant Valley dated 4/8/76
Richfield dated 1/1/77
Richtron A-13 dated 10/15/73
Also falling into this group are the three Catlow Valley
partnership agreements for #6 (Ex. 153), #1 (Ex. 328), and #5
(Ex. 115) which three also contain different language than that
set forth above for either group in that for those three the
second sentence of the quoted language reads "the maximum annual
amount that . . . may, under certain circumstances, be required
to contribute, shall be ...".

The foregoing sets forth language

differences in two partnership agreements for Catlow Valley
#1 and #4. While the two partnership agreements for #1 and
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the two for #4 reflect the indicated differences, the significance
of such evidence is lacking.

A copy of the agreement for Catlow

Valley #3 was sent to one Kelly of Rainier Bank Leasing Company
of Seattle, Washington, by letter dated February 10, 1978, but
no evidence was presented that it achieved any reuslt.

I note

that prior to the Catlow Valley partnership agreements of April
1, 1977, the only agreement including the words "irrigation
equipment" is the Richfield agreement of November 8, 1976, and
that said words are included in all agreements executed after
April 1, 1977, and none others before.
Richins denied generally that he altered any partnership
agreements and gave no explanation for the language differences
noted above.

However, no evidence was presented as to how such

alterations, if made, affected the issues in this case, and
the only relevance thereof goes to the credibility of Richins,
as did many other exhibits, and I do find.
By statute, limited partners as such shall not be bound
by the obligations of the partnership (Section 48-2-1) and Article
VI, Section 1 states no limited partner shall be personally
liable for any debts of the partnership or any of the losses
thereof.

But Section 2 of Schedule B of the agreement provides

that in the event that a limited partner fails to pay his percentage
share of subsequent installments of cash contributions to the
capital of the partnership, the general partner shall have the
right to cancel the portion of the defaulting limited partner's
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interest in the partnership for which payment was not made,
and also as agreed, as liquidating damages to reduce the portion
of the defaulter's investment for which payment was made by
20% of the total dollar amount contributed to the partnership
by the limited partner.

Further guidelines as to distribution

and disposition follow in said Section 2,
49.

The frequent and repeated failures of many limited

partners to pay such needed funds resulted in the general partner,
who was under no obligation to make any capital contributions
to the partnership (Schedule B, Section 3) lacking the necessary
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funds to meet the partnership obligations such as installment
payments on partnership property, irrigation equipment and well
drilling expenses.

Thus, such failure to pay was an important

factor leading up to the judgments obtained in the spring of
1980 such as the Minter-Wilson and Osborn judgments.
50.

Such failure to pay such assessments also led to the

necessity of Richins making advances of funds to various partnerships
to meet such necessary payments or expenses, which such advances
had by June, 1980, exceeded $300,000. ffhile the general partner
was under no obligation to make any capital contributions to
the partnerships and could not have capital interests therein,
Article V of the agreement specifically provided that the general
partner, acting for itself or with otfters, had the discretion
to advance monies to the partnerships for use in the operations,
the aggregate amount of such advances becoming an obligation
of the partnerships to the general partner to be repaid in accordance
with the loan instrument out of gross receipts of the partnerships.
The agreement further provided that such advances were not to
be deemed a capital contribution, but that any and all advances,
together with interest, should become immediately due and payable
upon sale of the property or the termination and dissolution
of the partnership unless otherwise agreed upon.
Notwithstanding these express provisions Sampson, as early
as June 9, 1980, told the limited partners at a Blackfoot Farms
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meeting that the general partner was not entitled to the repayment
of any advances.

He thereafter frequently and repeatedly made

such statement regarding advances to other limited partners,
as well as to Richins, both orally in meetings and through letters
sent to all investors.
51.

The evidence clearly shows that the second development

which led to problems confronting Richins, his companies, and
the partnerships by May, 1980, was Richins' own failure as president
of the general partners of each partnership to fulfill the duties
and responsibilities he had to the limited partners under the
partnership agreements.

He of all people knew having made the

advances just mentioned, that many limited partners had not
and were not paying the assessments made by the general partners
of each partnership pursuant to the partnership agreements.
He also knew that under the express provisions of the agreements,
upon failure of any limited partner to pay his pro-rata share
of subsequent assessments of cash contributions to capital,
the general partner had the right to cancel that portion of
the defaulting limited partner's interest in the partnership
for which payment was not made, and to forfeit as liquidated
damages up to 50% of capital contributions already made.

He

further knew that the resulting consequence would be a reversion
to the partnership of the cancelled interest with the general
partner having the authority under tlfie agreement to buy that
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forfeited interest or to sell it to any eligible purchaser who
would then become a limited partner.

This Richins did not do,

stating he did not wish to offend defaulting investors, and
his failure to do so, as it became known and spread among the
limited partners, became a source of irritation to those limited
partners who had faithfully paid their assessments.

It appears

Richins was reluctant to stir up trouble with such defaulting
investors, hoping time would take care of the problem, and that
the advances made by the general partners, though unknown to
have been made by the limited partners until the bubbles began
bursting about May, 1980, would take care of the debts and expenses
until better times evolved.
52.

Under the agreements the general partner had a duty

to keep the limited partners informed of partnership operations
through written reports at such intervals as the general partner
deemed appropriate; to deliver to each limited partner on or
before March 15 of each year a statement or audit prepared by
a CPA of all income and expenses of each partnership; and, beginning
in the third year of operation following formation, to annually
obtain an independent appraisal of partnership properties and
report to each limited partner the value of his net share based
upon such appraisal.

These things Richins did not do, although

he wrote numerous and lengthy letters to the limited partners,
but without such specific details and generally assuring them

that all was well.
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The result was that as the existing problems

began to surface in May, 1980, *£»^1 imited partners began to
lose trust and confidence in Richins to the point that those
limited partners who were still actively concerned about their
investments refused to pay over to Richins any further funds
either on past or current assessments and began to consider
the need to seek the advice of counsel with respect to their
various partnership interests.
Such attitude surfaced at the May 29, 1980 meeting of the
Catlow Valley partnerships at which Sampson appeared as counsel
for Goff and Kohler and there began to assert his influence
in the future courses of action that were taken.

It was through

his suggestion at that meeting that the decision to file a Chapter
11 petition in the bankruptcy court for RFC, the immediate purpose
of which was to try to delay an execution sale on the Catlow
Valley properties scheduled to take place on June 6, 1980, by
Minter-Wilson.

The Minter-Wilson problem had had an early start.

A construction lien had been recorded on May 25, 1978 for $199,143
for well drilling work at Catlow Valley.

A foreclosure action

was filed August 22, 1978 by which it obtained its $137,000
judgment, entered on April 30, 1980, for well drilling work
on the Catlow Valley farm properties.

The judgment was reduced

to $57,519 on appeal and Richins was eliminated as a judgment
debtor.

Thereafter Sampson's role as counsel for various limited
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Also, it appears from

the evidence that the partnerships through the limited partners
began to more affirmatively assert themselves in the courses
to be followed, although the partnership agreements expressly
provided that no limited partner shall take part in the conduct
or control of the affairs of the partnership and no limited
partner shall have power to sign for or to bind the partnership.
(Article VI).
53.

The evidence established other problems Richins and

the partnerships were experiencing prior to May, 1980, some
of which will be set forth here. They w£re as follows:
a.

On June 22, 1979 Richins was advised by

attorney Baker for Agricultural Services that notice
of nonpayment on installment contracts due on irrigation
contracts for Shoshone, Randlett and Young at the
Idaho State Bank had been issued and that if the bank
returned them under its recourse rights, Ag intended
to immediately initiate its claims for possessory
rights to the equipment, regardless of the condition
of the crops.

On August 29, 19^9 Richins advised

the bank it would be receiving a check for $12,847
on the three agreements, but it had not had cash on
hand to make the total payments $nd must await crop
funds.
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On September 12, 1979 notice was given that

a $300,000 loan by Utah Mortgage to RFC and assigned
to Nortwest National Life and guaranteed by Paul and
Shari Richins, was in default and if payments were
not made in full by September 25, a foreclosure proceeding
would be started.
c.

On November 20, 1979 two lien claims were

filed by the Sages against Shoshone, RFC and Richins
for over $30,000 which had gone to judgments later.
d*

On January 4, 19 80 an Idaho Bank reported

payments due on Randlett and Shoshone totaled about
$62,000 and if not paid by January 10, 1980, the balance
in full would be demanded which totaled $278,000 on
the two properties.
e.

Loans from Shari Richin^ ($32,000) and the

Richins Family Trust ($50,000) were made in January
and February, 1980, made necessary because RFC had
no funds to meet its current obligations.
f.

On March 18, 1980 Richins sent attorney

David Day a list of addresses for the Catlow Valley
limited partners as requested by the state securities
commission, but suggested it would be wise to delay
giving it as long as possible.
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At a Taber partnership meeting on April

3, 198 0, it was reported that some RFC checks to PCA
had been returned for insufficient funds.
h.

On April 18, 1980 the state of Oregon issued

a Certificate of Revocation of RFC's Certificate of
Authority to do business in Oregon because of its
failure to file statements and pay fees due for 1978
and 1979, which totaled only $219, with Richins saying
he never told the Catlow Valley partnerships of the
revocation and didn't know if its certificate had
ever been reissued.
i.

On April 29, 1980 Richins told Jerry Hayes

he had not told his partnership about the RFC contract
going into default because he did not want to create
a panic situation and his main concern was to get
the contract reinstated.
j.

I mention here the summaries of problems

set forth in the Hurd memoranda summarized in the
summation of evidence, but will not restate them.
k.

Two judgment liens were made of record,

one on August 17, 1979 by Rex Clemmons for $2,340
and one on October 5, 1979 by Lemmon White Drilling
for $3,264.
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As previously found, May 29, 1980, was a significant

date in the history of the conflicts, some of which we are trying
to resolve in this case.

The findings of fact with respect

to the plaintiffs1 Complaint on the Osborn judgment substantially
covers most of the important facts disclosed by the evidence
from the May 29, 1980 meeting up through all of the factual
matters relating to the controversy over the Osborn judgment.
Many of the facts found with respect thereto have a bearing
on the issues raised by defendants1 Counterclaim.

Mention was

made of that fact earlier in these documents, so that the findings
of fact set forth supra on plaintiffs1 complaint become by this
reference and my prior comments findings to be considered on
the Counterclaim.

Some matters with respect thereto that had

little to do with the Osborn judgment controversy should now
be considered in some further detail and hopefully without much
repetition.
At the May 29, 1980 meeting the evidence established that
mention was made that the $17,600 payment due Glenn in September,
1979 had not been paid; that from $30,000 to $50,000 would be
needed to complete the Minter-Wilson wells; that a total of
$240,000 was needed to meet current Catlow Valley obligations
and that as Richins did not have such money, the limited partners
were the only source for it; that if the limited partners contributed
the $240,000, RFC would eliminate its $190,000 mark up on its
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resale of the property to the Catlow Valley partnerships; and
Richins said he would step out if the limited partners wanted
that.
At the meeting it was also disclosed that the contract
of June, 1978 with Valmont Credit for a sprinkler system at
a cost of $932,530 required annual payments of $118,338.70 beginning
June 25, 1979 which installment had not been paid.
55.

The limited partners present at that meeting agreed

that $17,000 be raised for attorney's fees and expenses, but
voted that such funds would be placed in the custody of Ken
Hanson (suggested by Richins) .

We thus see here for the first

time as far as this case goes, the limited partners exercising
some control over partnership funds and affairs contrary to
Article VI (2) of the Certificate of Limited Partnership.

On

May 30, 1980, Sampson called Richins and stated he and his group
wanted to buy out the interests of the Richtron companies but
Richins said he was not interested.
Also on May 30, 1980 the Snowville investors met, decided
they wanted an audit, wanted to employ Sampson as legal counsel
for the partnership and to have him take the necessary steps
to relieve Richtron, Inc. as general partner and to liquidate
in an orderly manner.

They also decided they would not pay

contributions requested by Richins until after an audit but
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would make contributions to meet the July 1 payment if Sampson
advised them to do so.
56.

On June 2 and 5, 1980 Richins, acting on his own and

without advising any investor or partnerships, executed as president
of the Richtron general partner quit-claim deeds which purported
to convey to RFC all partnership properties held by Catlow Valley
Farms 1-7, Springfield, Kanosh, Pleasant Valley, Randlett, Richfield,
Shoshone and Taber.

Such deeds were not recorded until December,

1980 and January, 1981.

One deed purported to transfer property

to the Leo H. Richins Family Trust that Ri|chins stated had advanced
$100,000 toward payment of partnership expenses and another
to Shari Richins for a $32,000 advance she allegedly had made
for a similar reason.

The apparent bases for such deeds was

the failure of such partnerships to keep current the payments
due RFC on the real estate contracts by which said partnerships
had purchased their farm lands from RFC.
57.

On June 5, 1980 Richins prepared and signed as president

of Richtron, Inc., the general partner, 18 promissory notes
which obligated the limited partnership of the note issued to
pay Richtron, Inc., Richtron General, or RFC, or their respective
successors or assigns, the greater amount of the principal sum
named therein or the total of the aggregate advances made to
the partnership by the holders as defined in an agreement of
even date therewith and as shown as due and payable to the holders
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at any time in the financial records and accounting books of
the maker.

The specific amount listed for each partnership

was as follows: Blackfoot $25,000; Burlejf $20,000; Kanosh $22,000;
Moreland $6,000; Pleasant Valley $10^,000; Randlett $85,000;
Richfield $90,000; Snowville $32,000; T&ber $29,000; West Taber
$5,000; and for Shoshone and each of the seven Catlow Valley
partnerships $100 or the total of the advances as reflected
on the books.
58.

Other documents executed were formal minutes by the

three Richtron companies authorizing in separate minutes for
each document the execution of the notes and quit claim deeds.
59.

On June 5, 1980, the board of directors of Richtron,

Inc. authorized its officers to execute any necessary papers
or documents to effect the withdrawal of Richtron, Inc. as general
partner for Blackfoot, Kanosh and Snowville.
60.

On June 9, 1980 the Blackfoot directors had a meeting

attended by both Richins and Sampson.

Again Sampson stated

his position that the mark-up on the property purchase was a
breach of fiduciary duty and that Ricbhtron was not entitled
to the repayment of advances made to Blackfoot.

Dee Hanson

took the lead in voicing dissatisfaction of Richins1 performance,
so Richins stated that if they were not satisfied therewith,
they could repay the advances, agree to pay in full for the
personal property and could elect a new, more compatible general
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partner to take Richtron, Inc.'s place, but that if they refused,
he might withdraw Richtron, Inc. as general partner and effect
a dissolution and liquidation and force settlement of accounts
and would not consent to the election of a new general partner.
On June 10, 1980 Richins sent a letter to the limited partners
of Blackfoot which stated he was filing notice of Richtron,
Inc.'s withdrawal as general partner; that the limited partners
repay the advances ($25,000); that they *'now elect" a new general
partner to fill the vacancy, but also stated that the partnership
was then terminated, that its affairs were to be wound up, the
debts paid, its assets distributed and \Wien done the partnership
would be dissolved.
61.

The Snowville partners had a meeting on June 11, 1980

at which Ralph Wright showed a telegram he had from Richtron,
Inc. resigning as general partner.

Richins wrote a similar

letter to Snowville partners as he had to the Blackfoot partners,
stating the advances totaled $30,000.
62.

On June 12, 19 8 0 the Kanosh partners held a meeting

with Richins and Sampson both there.

Sampson restated his views

about the partnership not being liable to repay Richtronfs advances
($22,000) , and about Richins1 mismanagement and breach of fiduciary
duty.

The limited partners decided %hey would not repay the

advances.

Richins told them they weij'e obligated to pay and

he would assess them for their pro-rata Share.
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Following the service of notice of withdrawal of the

general partner as such upon the BlackfOot, Snowville and Kanosh
partners, the meeting of June 26, 1980 took place and finding
with respect to developments at that meeting have elsewhere
been set out.

With the probability of an amicable settlement

existing following that meeting, at the insistance of active
limited partners and with Richins' consent, Sampson became the
recipient of partnership funds paid tyy some limited partners
for assessments, past and present, primarily for the purpose
of maintaining some control over how such funds were to be spent,
with such initial arrangements including an agreement for Sampson
to pass the funds through to Richins for payment on pressing
obligations.
64.

On October 2, 1980 Sampson sent to all investors for

signing a copy of the then completed Compromise and Settlement
Agreement, urging them to sign it and return it immediately
to Richins.

This agreement as drafted fyad received the approval

of both Richins and Sampson and afforded the gateway through
which the controversies could be resolved.

However, although

many limited partners signed it, others did not and so this
agreement was never consummated.

A mgijor stumbling block was

the insistance of a few partners that nothing should be paid
to Richins which factor, I believe, and so find, was based in
part upon Sampson's early and repeated statements that the partnerJL±4
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ships were not obligated to repay advances.

However, I note

here that prior to the June 26, 1980 meeting Sampson had suggested
to his clients that the best solution to the controversy was
to work with Richins and agree upon a settlement rather than
to take a course that promised extended litigation.
65.

Following failure of having the settlement agreement

consummated, Richins, on November 13, 1980, drafted and executed
a Notice of Withdrawal of the General Partner which he then
sent to the limited partners of six partnerships, three of which
were to Blackfoot, Snowville and Kanosh which set forth dates
in June, 1980 as being the effective dates of such withdrawals,
as noted supra.

On January 6, 1981 identical notices were mailed

to the limited partners of eighteen other partnerships.

Copies

of all such notices were recorded in clerk's offices, some in
November, 1980, and some in January, 1981.

By separate letter

Richins advised the limited partners that the general partner
had withdrawn, the partnerships were terminated, and affairs
would be wound up as indicated in the partnership agreements.
It is noted that in the withdrawals sent to the three partnerships
in June, 1980, Richins told the limited partners to elect a
new general partner.

This suggestion was not followed, nor

restated in the subsequent notices of withdrawal in late 1980
which had been immediately followed up with notices that the
partnership affairs would be wound up.
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What steps Richins took, if any, to so "wind up" the affairs
of each partnership does not clearly appear in the evidence.
There was evidence that Richins1 attorney, David Day, had prepared
complaints to file in court to effect such wind up, and testimony
that they were never filed upon Richins1 instructions not to
do so. Richins wrote volumes to all the investors, but we search
in vain for evidence of any affirmative action by Richins to
have the general partners undertake the promised wind up of
partnership affairs. Richins1 course of action, or lack thereof,
may have been influenced because further settlement negotiations
were in the wind.

Further settlement negotiations during 1981

were mentioned periodically and it is recalled that although
this lawsuit was filed on February 11, 1981, by written stipulation
defendants filed no responsive pleading thereto until July,
1982.

But Sampson's actions were more than passive at the time

and no doubt his activities were a stumbling block to Richins
as to such wind up actions, but the Courts were always open
for him to get judicial assistance in bringing the "wind up"
to a head.
Article V of the partnership agreement sets forth the rights
and obligations of the general partners.

In paragraph 5 thereof

we find the statement that the general partner may at any time
withdraw from the partnership, sell, or assign all or any part
of its interest as a general partner to a qualified party, by
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giving notice to all the limited partners, and such action shall
be effective upon the receipt of the last partner of such notice
of withdrawal, sale, or assignment.

Nothing is said in this

article about a withdrawal dissolving the partnership.

In fact,

the provisions with respect to sale or assignment suggests either,
coupled with the withdrawal, does not bring partnership affairs
to a halt.
Section 48-2-9(2) of the Code states that a general partner
of a limited partnership cannot, without the written consent
or ratification of all limited partners "do any act which would
make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business of a partnership."

This statutory provision may preclude a general partner

from withdrawing in an effort to terminate the partnership if
such act would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business
of the partnership.
Article VII (a) provides that the partnership shall terminate
upon the prior occurrence of any of the following, which include
the withdrawal of the general partner or the affirmative vote
of not less than a majority in interest of the limited partners,
a right specifically granted to them by Article VI (6) (b) ,
which also provides that the limited partners have the right,
by vote of a majority in interest, to remove the present general
partner and elect a new general partner (which shall not affect
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to do so,

r«e oartners A H uue ^«~: --*
* ever*

.

To haw

.

advised

counsel

would have avoided the expenditure

of great time and expense by Sampson and Richi ns t ::> effect that
i"»=iS'!lt ,

Sue"i

.'a I ni i:epl,dceineivi

ot the general partner would

not have resulted in a dissolution and terminaticr :- ?: . partnerships

- -v severance of f r i e n d s h i p s , c

1

in

record an . \ „ . J, ,

, \. . - . -

It termination of the partnership either
of t h e general partner
i n i ntei: «

withdrawal

affirmative v o ^
-

.

^ k e s ;.J.C

^uc^

provides the partnership's <\\ fairs shall be woundup, i^s 1 . abil ities
and obligations to creditors s-iall be paid (or adequate*
for

.-.::.

manner

provided . article . v - ^ru ihe partnership;shall then be dissolved.
Dissolution of *
re

partnership does not take place unti. I III1!*"
;-.-

are met.

Both the general

2i ..\
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. aited partners also had the statutory right to have dissolution

and winding up by a decree of court.

(Section 48-2 :

/ *

withdrawal

the general partner as to all partnerships, stating the withdrawal
would become effective when, written notice was receive"
1.3 s t- I

• • HE .] : c s the agi: eeme i it so requires.

There - .-

an absence >. i evidence as to when and whether any limited partner
received such noti ce of withdrawal and particular"
i iin1; partnership did so,

.1 imit.p.ri f>artni > t • i in C.JCII

=> ,

when tlu" ! t".t notice w a s received as to any partnership.
w e a r e left to speculate .
:i r i

f i i ,f"

M

"

66.

I..'. "i

^o whether a n y such

«: 1 I t .

Under the partnership agreement the general partner

had full charge

•>*•

management

I *

respects

\ 1/..

.fc agreemer

shall take part

urther provided tha^ -v, : imited partner

-

^7t — . ui uonauc'

t •
f^*.

' partner had ;. •- power
.

43-- -

-*
.

partnership.

ed ; artner

/tide VI)

Under Section

•- granted iipau

a~

.imited partner takes part in

t h e ^<^,x\ .
112«
ii

. . _ matters (Article

•

* rus;r.ess
Supreme Cour^

I* H a r l i n e v . Davies. 567 P,2d

tated that

nit

lenni'.n

i hi i i iit«i'

... ; power to conduct the business

2x18
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Tn Harline the limited partnership

i i action against 1 he 1wu general partners. h\\

ousted, inl thPir i nf' orpst- in N

M

| 11 t* n o r s h J | li i m i

Hit m

• .• •

to ettect the ouster it took court action and until that proceeding
was begun inil concluded, the general partners remained
control.

In M M

flu1

IM^ I H m

n

*i

0111 t, Ihen* is 11 » 1 n i 1 , > . on

that any partnership brought in action into court to oust the
general partner.
6n . Uui wi t fn t in 11 n i ( IK

in 1 \\ 11 t in i hip agreement

•>( it nl ui

provisions just cited, Richins was faced with the rebellion
of many limited partners who st 1J] cared enough about their
investment

1

u 111

- •••... 11 1 ( June.,

to pay tuiiLL. directly to Michins with n

no they refused

strings attached

an i

with Sampson appearing in t!"e action, Richins appeared to hd\n
become r< I M P PI!

M M

I

1 hit iM I lemenl

1 the controversies

through negotiations was t reasonable way to go, and, as already
noted, st Jid Sampson
the settleme? 1

However, if not earlier, certainly

ironm* M

f aL 1 L 1 1

ill 1

1 e a n f uiiion in October

and November, 1980, Sampson began a significant effort In cbtain
control of all the partnerships *n<i to exclude Rirhins therefrom.
68,

i'he M r I f 1 liiuft . n roi)nr i lioii'tn t

obtain control

occurred when he tent out forms for granting him the noting
rights b. -.* power of attorney to all
them t\. .;

limited partners

telMn

; ; ,^\\\^\ ! !i •: ! : ; 1 !:• ! rin I M*quested each to sign ind
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There was a, dispute as to how m -•> limited

partners executed the form and whether they representee - -

ority

i n interest

lumuer, i f

|>d r111Pr '.11 111

' arrre ma ; cr . i

I >111

i ml i,.-,L J111" i a

did so,

The power cf attorney prepared by Sampson stated in substance
t h a t uii

11"'1 e .-I'.vl appoint Sampson the

"

t r u e ar.

iCtorney for the undersigning partner, to act

in the undersigned's name, place and stead for the limited purpose
of unconditional

._ . jigned may have

w i till regard tc

named partnership as ..;-i

r : ;r,t w-

in the limited p a r t n e r s h i p agreement
w e r e to be

ers statec

- Le i n ";. IIU1 month1,.. .

-

o t h e r w i s e • .. . . . led.
•

-•

continue c

I;. ^e^-iing out: this

t h a t such w a s n e c e s s a r y

utlined

form Sampso-

r e m o v e R i c h i n s and h i s comr inn ea f I or c o m m e n c e legal act*or.

as genera 1 pan tin iei : , =; ai

against him and his companies to retain the properties and preserve
their legal remedies against him.
of Sampson*

of Rico
for doinc

'
-

-. rre

-*

businebs
i

•
r

This activity marks the beg.i i in inn

^ companies,

* -

in each partnership

control thereof to the exclusion
- * <= a s s e r t e d legal a nth
Issues in this case.

. . About this time Sampson incorporated the John
Professional Corporation
received

- "

;

Sampson

•y uie ;
* +-h<? Richtron companies
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out as general partners and voting his own professional corporation
as

the

new

genera 1

substitute

partner

-1

in

-* -

partnership.

. .-

individually ana ^
partners

president

- *•

reciting that the limited

r ::r^+

representing

eacn

^; n.^

.ocument both

*-•-*

,

imited partners ot
•- tnership

agreement,

vote, sustain and ratify Sampson's PC as the successor and substitute
general partner, stating the same was subscribed and
by

LX:

•

'

h Sampson

!

-: r Sampson

signed t.. .- documen I:

On January 2 8 , 1981 Sampson r e c o r d e d N o t i c e s of Si xbst i tii i t i ::)i i
o f hiff

Pi

Again

only

was

< \ ifiMipr nl fih in l'in ii M i n t . P H I |
his

. r. tended

signature
*-

amendment

•

.

. . ., i cu .

dated Marc;

.<~,L

^

which

*-* * -

•» — -

—
virtue

c

^nc:

i^r

in fact have, \-

.i. .

tf

*e

*-

•-•*.;-.,

., ^

partnerships
I: o Section

stated

effect

.imited partners, which he 1

*atify -^1

general r .
pursuant

Secticr.n

tie thereafter prepared another document

<a» j.

powers

-.nd

ueicificatp
. .iws as

48-2 i . ,. .

also

• r :s re- .; e

appeared

Agrees

and

che p a r t n e r s h i p s .

that

48-2-.

: -. n

* ode.

- t ~vities
This document

-. *• w=*<=; -* unanimous vot;e of rill pat hmoi' .,
^ amendment was made pursuant

2i^ i
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. C v t . ^ s 4Q-0-0/ ^~*

oc ~.c 4-^Q code.

t ;• have teen intended

amendment

This document appears
certificate

still wa

Sectior; *

apply +"r

March ;

. -.,, Sampson purported to 1

;

meeting ^ *" :r:': -:he limited > *

his powers of att.*rnttor ea: 1

purported

J*. L .; *

and cont,..u Lut substitution *. : nis PC as the new general partner.
Sampson alone signed the minutes o f e a ch s a I d m e e t i n n ;
,
- h :i :: I i
I i e i- I w\. I Mi«

minutes iini

jf tendance thereat of; any limited

partner.
70•

At this time the RFC bankruptcy proceedings W P T P sr.iij

alive and Sampsoi I \ i .v. mil i f ieil hy I I'm
a professional

legal

bankruptcy court

corporation was not authorized to become

a general partner i n an agricultural enterprise
1981 Sampson
one of

i no.:,) ;r [,,. i:a t .;;. I ,."\ i H.j nagement f

Oi I i n ; 1

*,

i nc . of whi ch he was

it's? Incorporators, directors and the president thereof,

After doing so Sampson took steps *
for

that

hj_s

_

substitute ftq I-Iri narjcinierii
, partnership•

To do so

Sampson sent an authorization form,, to al 1 investors on November
1 2, 1 9 8 1 , w h i c h substituted Ag Management *•« --f^n^ra1.
On Januai

-

*

-\

president ,:: Ag Management

documents entitled "Notices of Substitution of General Partner,11
stat;:;j -^
2'

1981, '

...-.- -.

genera-

r»r\ner ef*
n was

in accordance with
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the limited partnership agreements and Certificates c
The acknowledgments

~'~

these notices stated they were executed

by author!«

"proper

authority wi
signed sue

limited partners
' ocument

T:

aa oersonally

n; .* partnership

for* any .

- .*

:

As to tlii J effort

required Y

^

.

iw
above.

' • make Ag Management the general partner,

the evidence indicates that no amended Certificate was
with any

e.

7

, - -ri:* ui

to obta:

J9RA

and i: \.> ""8" when Sampsor

--

efforts

^ attempts to

new

to acquire

judgment, he had begun to repeatedly solicit

tu ::

- Osborn
frc- r-*-

limited partners, directing that surh be sen*
i m i j'u.'i I t.liu1

Lo

usee
ahead.

.. ,
A::

that "••;--'•• -

x

midiinei

in

which

*

- --=

thereafter did so in the ~t rtns 3nd years

^t forNi in the summary of evider *
" i

\ \y

i u< U I M

rvember-

. received

and disbursed at U:aA, $645, OOu from i . *" ;. *'*-* limited partners
and their partnerships,
.i'
receipts and disbursements, s, r i* *re\
Sampsoi *
procrr

-. i - r

records available *
t-

_

:: **. i records
r.r* court ordered

Richins-

i^hpr detai.au summaries

- y
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as to the specific source of all funds and disbursements that
had been made therefrom.

Based upon all of the evidence, I

find to my satisfaction that Sampson honestly believed that
the powers of attorney authorized him to exercise the vote of
each partner that signed the power and returned it to him and
to thereby authorize him by majority vote to remove the Richtron
general partners and to substitute fi^st his own PC and then
his Ag Management as general partners,

Richins and Sampson

debated this issue in meetings with each other, with investors
and in the many written letters which eabh wrote to the various
limited partners and to each other.

What Sampson did he, in

my opinion, did believing in the validity of his own stand.
The fact that it seems so clear to me that the statutes required
the signature and oath of each limited partner to amend a certificate
as to show a change of a general partner, or otherwise, does
not stamp Sampson's legal opinions and the advice he gave his
clients as knowledgeable fraud.

Certainly, such was not proven

by clear and convincing evidence.

There was no direct proof

that Sampson was aware of the provisions of Section 78-51-27,
which rendered his acquisitions of thq Osborn judgment, as a
lawyer, a serious violation of law.
73.

In a case filed in the District Court in Davis County,

entitled "Blackfoot Farms, et al v. Paul H. Richins, Richtron,
Inc., RFC, et al.,M (Case #2-30994), Judgfe J. Duffy Palmer after

2124
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a hearing held on November 19, 1982, Entered Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law on November 24, 1982 wherein he ruled
that Ag Management was not the generaj. partner of any of the
partnerships; that either Richtron, Ihc. or Richtron General
were the liquidating general partners, that notwithstanding
their withdrawals they were still in control of the partnerships;
and that the partnership certificates were never amended to
admit Ag as general partner.

It appears that Judge Palmer's

ruling was an embarrassment to Sampson after two years of control
of the partnerships with either Sampson's PC or Ag Management
purporting to be the general partner, and particularly when
Richins had during that two year period contended continuously
that their assumption of that role wa$ illegal and contrary
to law.

In so ruling Judge Palmer al$o ruled that attorney

James Brown, counsel for plaintiffs therein, was without any
authority whatsoever to prosecute and file such action on behalf
of any limited partnership.

However, this Court is without

knowledge as to what additional actiort Richins ever took, if
any, to proceed with the winding up of th£ affairs of the limited
partnerships.
74.

Any such action was probably affected by the fact

that prior to Judge Palmer's ruling, Sampson, as counsel for
Goff and certain limited partners, attended an IRS tax sale
held on October 29, 1982, relating to Richins and Richtron interests,

212 b
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and as the only bidder, bid in for $40,400 the interests being
sold and paid that amount to the IRS*

By that sale the IRS

purported to sell all of Richins' claims in the partnerships,
the Richtron entities, the purchase and resale contracts, claims
for repayment of advances, and stock in the Richtron companies.
These assets the IRS had purportedly taken by some 35 IRS seizures
and levies.

Thus, notwithstanding Sampson's set back in the

face of Judge Palmer's ruling, Sampson continued to lay claim
to and hold for his clients all of the Richins and Richtron
rights and interests in the partnerships and their properties,
including, as noted, all stock in the Richtron companies, doing
so by reason of the procedural consequences of the IRS tax sale.
75.

Emphasis was added to the legality of Sampson's claims

by two subsequent court rulings made by Judge Cornaby in the
District Court of Davis County, one on December 27, 1982, and
the second on July 21, 198 3, in both of which Judge Cornaby
ruled that the IRS sale was valid, that Goff, as trustee under
the IRS sale, was the purchaser of all Richins and Richtron
property interests, as evidenced and described by the IRS's
Certificates of Sale, and that such sa|.e covered all property
interests, all causes of action, and all rights to wind up the
affairs of the limited partners of which the Richtron companies
had been general partners.

Riding the saddle of the tax sale

and these two legal rulings, Sampson continued to exercise his

2 i Zo
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control over the partnership entities and properties, advising
all investors by letter of December 27, 1982 that since Judge
Cornaby had ruled the IRS sale valid, Goff as trustee for the
investors who had put up the $40,400 owjied all of the Richtron
assets and that he, Brown and Blanch had been elected directors
and officers of the Richtron companies. Sampson further expressed
the opinion that any efforts to challenge the IRS tax sale in
the federal court would be fruitless.

Nevertheless, Richins

continued to maintain that the IRS sale was invalid and urged
the investors to turn to him instead of Sampson.
This debate continued until May 16, 1984 when, contrary
to Sampson's prior prediction Judge David Winder of the United
States District Court for Utah entered an Order which fully
and unequivocally voided the IRS tax sale, declaring that Goff
had no interest in the capital stock of the Richtron companies,
nor in the right of those companies to wind up partnership affairs;
nor the right to institute causes of action, nor in any of the
specifically described real estate contracts and partnership
interests (which could not have excluded Gc^ff from his own limited
partnership interests acquired by purchase prior to and exclusive
of the tax sale).
Based upon Judge Winder's decision, Judge Cornaby on February
15, 1985 made a ruling vacating his prior two orders because
they had been based upon his assumption that the IRS sale was
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valid, noting the federal court had ruled otherwise.

I note

here that the record of this case reelects that prior to his
first ruling, Judge Cornaby had in fact expressed some doubt
that he had jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the IRS
sale.

Also, it is noted that although Judge Winder's ruling

was made on May 16, 1984, Richins took no action to vacate Judge
Cornaby1s prior orders until January 3, 1985, when he finally
filed a motion to do so.

I note that Judge Winder's ruling

stated, among other things that Goff had no interest in the
right of the Richtron companies to wind up partnership affairs.
Defendants1 counsel may have assumed that the federal court
ruling vacated any authority given Goff, as trustee, under Judge
Cornaby's prior orders.

Reference is ijaade to Finding of Fact

118 wherein, while considering the matter of punitive damages,
I make further comment concerning this de^ay.
76.

Richins prepared and placed iifito evidence a schedule

of property foreclosures in which he states, without showing
any foundation therefor, that the properties had all been foreclosed
on the following dates:
Burley
Catlow Valley 1-7
Kanosh
Moreland
North Bear Lake
Randlett
Richfield
Shoshone
Springfield
Taber

12/18/81
5/7/82
8/21/81
10/5/82
12/12/82
3/9/83
1/29/82
4/27/84
12/21/82
12/7/83

2.128
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East Taber
West Taber
Wixom
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11/7/83
8/8/84
11/7/83
6/25/82

Blackfoot, Pleasant Valley and Young Farms are also mentioned
as having been foreclosed, but no dates are shown.
details appeared on this exhibit.

No other

Richins stresses that all

foreclosures occurred while under Sampson's management, but
that as to the Richtron B-10, A-11 and A-13, partnerships, they
were sold or liquidated after December 2, 1980 by him and that
in those cases the limited partners received liquidating cash
distributions in excess of their capital contributions.
On August 28, 1984 Sampson wrote a letter to Richins acknowledging receipt of Richins1 letter of August 21, 1984, in which
Richins had stated that Sampson's organization had no interest
in the partnership farms.

The foregoing list indicates all

farms had been foreclosed upon by the dates of this letter exchange.
Sampson termed Richins' statement as crazy and false, stating
the farms were foreclosed on and they had made purchases directly
from the individual sellers after the individual owners had
taken them back, that he and his group h&d every right therein,
and for Richins to please not interfere.
No evidence was presented on the specifics of any foreclosure,
and the identities of any properties on which such repurchases
had been made was not disclosed.

Nor was any evidence presented
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as to whether any necessary steps were taken to wind up the
affairs of any partnership including the payment of debts, liquidation of assets, distribution of profits, if any, and to bring
about the final dissolution and termination of any partnership.
After trial and the Courtfs review of all the exhibits and testimony,
I found myself left to wonder what had become of the partnerships,
their properties, and the investments of the limited partners,
although during the trial Richins, in response to the court's
question, testified that none of the limited partners had to
his knowledge ever received any return on their investments,
77.

It is a reasonable inference that payments due to

the original owners as sellers were not made; that those contracts
fell into default; that a substantial reason therefore was that
no money was available to meet such payments, and that the probable
reason was the failure of many limited partners to pay the assessments necessary to obtain the funds to meet those payments,
and that foreclosure was thus inevitable.

As set forth in the

summary of evidence, of the sum of $645,101.38 shown as having
been received and disbursed by Sampson between June 27, 1980
and November 30, 1982, $185,668 was shown as spent for payments
on real property and sprinkling systems.

It was noted, too,

that one exhibit dated June 20, 1980, showed that on real estate
contracts some $3,462,010 was carried as a liability.
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Judge Cornaby's Order of July 21, 1983 contained a

provision that stated that neither attorney John T. Anderson,
nor any other counsel were entitled to represent Richtron entities
in legal proceedings. The case file suggests that this particular
provision was related to a hearing before Judge Cornaby on December
27, 1982 regarding the effect of the tax sale.

After an order

on such hearing was drawn, attorney John T. Anderson as counsel
for defendants filed objections to the wording of the proposed
Order.

A hearing was held on February 1, 1983 following which

the Court stated it did not find its position any different
than at the prior hearing, directed that the ruling remain as
before and that the Order be set out exactly as on the IRS Certificates.

Judge Cornaby then signed the Order of February 2,

1983, the details of which were set forth in Finding of Fact
75.
On February 2, 1983 Anderson addressed a letter to Judge
Cornaby advising him that several hours after the hearings before
him on February 1, 1983, John Sampson, counsel for the consortium
of investors who had made the purchase at the tax sale, called
Anderson for the purpose of "warning" him that unless he ceased
all representation of the various Richtron entities, including
prosecution of his recently filed federal court case, further
prosecution of motions and direct appeal to obtain modification
or reversal of Cornaby1s recent rulings, Sampson would seek
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"sanctions" and "other" relief against him, suggesting that
Sampson had been laboring under the assumption that Judge Cornaby's
recent rulings had that effect. Anderson requested an opportunity
to file objections to the proposed order under Local Rule 2.9,
and was using the letter as the only me^ns he knew of to advise
the Court of Sampson's bizarre interpretation.
A reason is not apparent from the ca$e file, but on February
3, 1983, Anderson filed a Notice of Withdrawal as counsel for
defendants and Richins entered his Notice of Pro Se Appearance.
Thereafter, a flood of subpoenas and requests for discovery
were issued by Richins, leading attorney Handy, then counsel
for plaintiffs, to file a motion on April 21, 1983 requesting
the court to enter an order directing Richins to obtain competent
counsel to represent him in various cases pending in the Second
District Court.

The motion was granted and Richins filed a

petition for an interlocutory appeal £rom the Court's Order
to that affect.

The Supreme Court accepted the petition which

related to six separate cases, one being 29552, the case at
bar.

The other cases were 28349, the Vatlmont Credit Corp. suit

against Richins and his wife, Richtroh, Inc., and RFC, into
which Sampson, Marilyn Brown, Blanch and Sampson's corporations
were brought in as third party defendants; 33526 which was an
action by Richins as trustee of the Leo H. Richins Family Trust,
against 23 limited partners seeking declaratory judgment relief
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respecting the family trust's right, title and interest in certain
assets in which those 23 named defendants, as limited partners,
claimed ownership rights; 33527 which was an action by the Richins
Family Trust against nine named limited partners, Sampson's
PC and Ag Management to enforce terms of a promissory note evidencing
an obligation for $22,067.46; 33528, a similar family trust
obligation for $16,533.37 agianst five limited partners and
Grandview Properties; and 29700 involving a suit by Young Farms
against Richins, Richtron, Inc., the Allreds and the Bank of
Utah, in which Richins filed a Counterclaim seeking dissolution,
winding up and termination of the partnership.
The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's rulings
which had granted Handy's Motion on these cases, but only 29552
is before this Court in this lawsuit, and while the Supreme
Court's ruling also extended to the other cases, I have no information as to the disposition of those other cases or their present
status and I want to make it clear that in my decision herein
I do not purport to make any rulings with respect to those other
cases.

The fact that John T. Anderson later re-entered his

appearance as counsel for defendants took care of that problem
and rendered it moot as far as this case is concerned.
79.

As I have earlier indicated the main thrust of defendants'

Counterclaim lies primarily within their fourth claim for relief
which among other things asserts a claim for relief based upon
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Privilege is an affirmative defense (casecited) which does not become an issue unless
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other activities of his business included such things as numerous
letters of complaint, continued threats to cancel the contract
and sell the building, his refusal to pay the contracted share
of bills, and his suit for repossession, termination and injunction.
The Court noted that taking "in isolation" each named activity,
such activity might be justified as an overzealous attempt to
protect its interests under the contract of sale, but as such
no isolated activity would establish the Intentional interference
element of this tort, though some might give rise to a cause
of action for breach of specific conttact provisions, or of
the duty of good faith performance which inheres in every contractual
relation.

But, said the court, in total and cumulative effect,

as a course of action extending over a period of three and one-half
years and culminating in the failure of Isom's business, Leigh's
acts "cross the threshold beyond what is incidental and justifiable
to what is tortious."

The court notecj Leigh's argument that

Isom's lossess resulted from his inadequate working capital,
or from his unilateral decision to close the store after being
immediately served with Leigh's complaint ar^d taking out bankruptcy,
and responded that there was substantial evidence of causation
to support the jury verdict, and suggested the jury could have
found that the initiation of this lawsuit Was but another instance
of Leigh's ongoing pattern of harassment.
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In the case at bar the plairttiff Sampson is indeed

the defendant on the Counterclaim, and thus the Supreme Court's
use of those terms in its Leigh decision becomes easily recognizable
in its application to the parties in this case.

While we are

not here invovled with a contract between Sampson and Richins
or his companies, as Leigh and Isom were, we are involved with
a claim of Sampson's alleged tortious interference with economic
relations between the defendants and the limited partnerships
in which a Richtron company was the general partner.

Some of

the significant facts noted by the Supreme Court in the Leigh
case reminds one of many facts seen in the voluminous summary
of the facts established by the evidence in this case.
82.

We come to the question as to whether Sampson intentionally

interfered with the defendants' existing and potential economic
relationships with each of the limited partnerships under their
respective partnership agreements.

It is my opinion, and I

so find, that the preponderance of the evidence, indeed overwhelmingly so, answers that question in the affirmative.

I

think the summary of the evidence and the Findings of Fact support
that finding.

It is not my desire nor my intent to try to again

summarize all of the evidence that brings me to that determination.
But some significant facts stand out that in summary demonstrate
that over a period of at least four and one<-half years, culminating
in the end, if not the destruction, of defendants' businesses,

2,n
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Sampson's acts "cross the threshold be|yond what is incidental
and justified to what is tortious."

Some such facts I will

attempt to summarize as briefly as possible.
83.

However, before doing so and because such summary

may have relevance to the second element our Supreme Court put
into its definition of this tort, I think it would be well to
first further note that court's comments about the required
elements of "improper purpose" or "improper means."
As to the former the court said:
The alternative of improper purpose
(or motive, intent, or objective) will support
a cause of action for intentional interference
with prospective economic relations even
where the defendant's means were proper.
The court goes on to note a statement by Prosser that there
has developed a general agreement that a purely malicious motive,
in the sense of spite and a desire to do harm to the plaintiff
for its own sake will make the defendant liable for interference
with a contract.

Prosser's comment as referred to by the court

concludes with the suggestion that the ^ourt may well look to
the "predominant purpose" underlying the defendant's conduct.
Our court goes on to say that bec&use it requires that
the improper purpose "dominate," this alternative takes the
long view of the defendant's conduct, Allowing objectionable
short-run purposes to be eclipsed by legitimate long-range economic
motivation.

Further, that problems inherent in proving motivation
9
- OQ
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or purpose make it prudent for commercial conduct to be regulated
for the most part by the improper means alternative, which typically
requires only a showing of particular cponduct.

The court then

said:
The alternative of improper purpose
will be satisfied where it can be shown
that the actor's predominant purpose was
to injure the plaintiff.
and goes on to quote the Alaska Supreme Court as saying (604
P. 2d 1090) that "If one does not act in a good faith attempt
to protect his own interest, or that of another but, rather,
is motivated by a desire to injure the contract party, he forfeits
the immunity affordable by the privilege" which in that case
was to compete.
As to the alternative requirement of "improper means,"
our Supreme Court said this requirement.

. . . i s s a t i s f i e d where t h e means
used t o i n t e r f e r e with a p a r t y ' s economic
relations are contrary to law, such as violations
of s t a t u t e s , r e g u l a t i o n s , or recognized
common-law r u l e s . Such a c t s are i l l e g a l
or t o r t i o u s in themselves ahd hence are
clearly 'improper' means of interference.
The court goes on to say that the me^ns may also be improper
because i t violates an established standard of trade or profession.
A further explanation appears from our court's statement
that:
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A deliberate breach of contract even
where employed to secure economic advantage,
is not, by itself, an1improper means.1 Because
the law remedies breaches of contract with
damages calculated to give the aggrieved
party the benefit of the bargain, there
is no need for an additional Remedy in tort
(unless the defendant' s conduct would constitute
a tort independent of the contract).
Neither a deliberate breach of contract
nor an immediate purpose to inflict injury
which does not predominate over a legitimate
economic end will, by itself, satisfy this
element of the tort. However, they may
do so in combination. This is so because
contract damages provide an insufficient
remedy for a breach prompted by an immediate
purpose to injure, and that purpose does
not enjoy the same legal imntunity in the
context of contract relations as it does
in the competitive marketplace. As a result,
a breach of contract committed for the immediate
purpose of injuring the other contracting
party is an improper means that will satisfy
this element of the cause of action for
intentional interference with economic relations.
I mention one other point our courti discusses in reference
to a California case (145 P.2d 305) which sustained a verdict
for damages for tortious interference with the plaintiff's business
wherein the California court said a breach of contract is a
wrong and itself actionable and that, "It is also wrongful when
intentionally utilized as a means of depriving plaintiff of
his employees."
83.

Throughout the Memorandum and Summation and these

Findings and Conclusions I have frequqntly had the occasion
to mention the names of Marilyn Brown and Keith Blanch as working
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with Sampson on matters involving thfe partnership affairs.
The evidence reflects and I so find that in May, 1980, Marilyn
Brown was working for Richins and his companies but quit upon
two weeks notice to go to work for Sampson for whom she did
a substantial amount of bookkeeping and letter writing concerning
partnership matters.

When Richins1 CPA - Hurd - wrote his memo

of resignation he offered an apology for giving such short notice
particularly where Brown had already given notice of her intent
to quit.
As to Keith Blanch he had worked as a field manager for
Richins and his companies on partnership matters, but he was
hired by Sampson almost immediately after Sampson got involved
in controlling partnership matters.
Richins had been involved in establishing the limited partnerships since about 1973 and in the years that followed he established
the 25 we have herein so often referred to. As to each, a Richtron
corporation was the general partner, RFC (but sometimes Richtron,
Inc.) was usually the Richtron company that purchased a farm
property under contract and resold it to the partnership at
a mark-up, and the partnership agreements were substantially
identical.

About 130 investors had bdcome limited partners

in one or more of the limited partnerships.

As stated in prior

findings, by May, 1980, Richins and his companies had become
confronted with substantial financial problems, as well as others
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likewise mentioned elsewhere, which were of such magnitude that
success in overcoming them seemed doubtful.

But important at

this point are Sampson's activities and the]Lr affect upon defendants
then existing or potential economic relations with respect to
those partnerships.
84.

Sampson was never an investor in any of these limited

partnerships, but began his activities in this case in May,
19 8 0 as counsel for just two limited pattners, Milton Goff and
Rex Kohler, who had a right to seek legal advice as investors
in some partnerships.

Their concerns were real and based upon

the problem facts and circumstances then confronting Richins
and his companies for which Richins, not Sampson, was responsible.
As counsel for Goff and Kohler, Sampson attended the May
29, 198 0, meeting of the Catlow Valley limited partners.

His

actions there were a bit more than ju$t privately counseling
his two client investors, for he not only recommended and got
started the movement to have RFC file fo£ Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings because of an impending foreclosure sale then set
for June 6, 1980, but he also expressed the legal opinion to
all present that he did not think RFC could claim and retain
its mark-up equity arising from RFCfs resale of the Catlow Valley
property to the partnerships for an amount in excess of what
it had paid for it, which Sampson stamped as a breach of fiduciary
duty, a theme which Sampson repeatedly expressed in the months

2i42
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Nowhere in the record do I find a statement

by Sampson as to what fiduciary duty was thus breached.

RFC

purchased land and resold it to a limited partnership under
a real estate contract which created no fiduciary duty regarding
price.

Also, at this meeting the idea of possibly employing

Sampson as counsel occurred to others and spread to investors
in other partnerships not involved in the May 29, 1980 meeting.
On May 30, 198 0, the very next day following the Catlow
Valley meeting, Sampson told Richins he and a group of investors,
whom he refused to identify, were interested in buying out the
Richtron interests in all the partnerships and taking over the
whole operation.
On or about June 1, 1980, the bankruptcy of RFC under Chapter
11 as recommended by Sampson was begu$ by attorney Leta, as
counsel for Richins.

However, at the first meeting of creditors

on this bankruptcy Sampson was there and, along with Richins,
had individual discussions with Glenn, the original owner and
seller of the Catlow Valley property; with Osborn about his
judgment; and with Knowles as attorney fot

Valmont.

As elsewhere

noted, in the months that followed Sampson represented Richins
and his companies in other lawsuits as counsel, many of which
went to default judgment.

The RFC bankruptcy did not stop the

foreclosure sale and in due time was dismissed.
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During June, 1980 Sampson pressed his discussions about
taking over the Richtron interests in the partnership and a
meeting was called for and held on Jiine 26, 1980, of limited
partners considered to be substantial investors from various
partnerships, the number or identity o|f whom Sampson was then
representing had not been fully made Iknown.

The major point

of discussion at this meeting was the purchase of the Richtron
interests in which Sampson played a leading role.

An offer

of $650,000 was made and Richins requested a recess to think
it over. However, his thinking time was intruded upon by Sampson
and Kohler and a heated discussion followed. Sampson told Richins
the settlement would be $650,000 at 13% or nothing.

Richins

told Sampson it was none of his business as he was not a limited
partner.

Kohler convinced Sampson to meet Richins1 suggested

figure of $700,000, so when the meeting continued, that amount
was agreed upon as the sum for which the Richtron interests
would all be sold. Richins said he wanted David Day, his attorney,
to draft the settlement agreement.

Richiris also said that during

the time it would take to complete drafting of the agreement,
a couple of creditors may file lawsuits *

Sampson said to send

him the complaints and he would answer tl(iem and stall them off.
Sampson further stated at the time th^t when the settlement
agreement was consummated, he would like to take over as legal
counsel for Richtron and exclude outside counsel, but Richins
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objected, notwithstanding which the investors supported Sampson's
request and voted for it, and this, notwithstanding the partnership
agreement gave the general partner full, and the limited partners
no, control over management and control Of partnership affairs.
One continuing contention and conflict that surfaced quickly
and remained in the forefront in negotiations, as well as in
the numerous writings Richins and Sampson each sent to investors,
as well as to each other, was Richins' claim that his companies,
and indeed his wife and his father's family trust, had continually
over the years made advances of monies to the various partnerships
to help pay obligations and land purchase contract payments.
Richins claimed such advances were made necessary by the failure
of many of the limited partners to pay their pro rata shares
of the assessments that were made by the general partners periodically in accordance with the express authority granted to the
general partner in Article V(l) (c) and the probable necessity
for which is mentioned in Article VII (13).
Richins prepared a schedule dated April 30, 1981 (Ex. 158)
which contained a column entitled "Net Advances" for each named
partnership, the total of which was $585,03 6 with interest due
thereon of $151,678, which Richins testified was prepared about
that date for the purpose of being an exhibit upon a settlement
agreement which they were at that tim$ endeavoring to reach.
However, the original settlement agreement drafted by Attorney
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Day pursuant to the June 26, 1980 meeting contained an exhibit
summarizing the "overall equity position" of the Richtron companies
which included in column III thereof the net advances "to or
from" the respective limited partnerships, which reflected a
"net" indebtedness to defendants of $393,840 (without interest).
The information contained in that column reflected that 12 partnerships were indebted to the Richtron companies on advances made
to them and that the Richtron companies were indebted to eight
partnerships for "advances" made to the Richtron companies by
said eight partnerships, it being noted that Article VII (13)
provides that not only could the general partner make advances
to the partnerships as needed, but that the general partner
would be entitled to receive advances from a partnership in
return. Article V (1)(c), which discusses in more detail advances
made by the general partner to a partnership/ states such advances
shall be repaid in accordance with the termls of the loan instruments
out of gross receipts, and that any and all unpaid advances,
together with accrued and unpaid interest, shall become immediately
due and payable upon the sale of the property or the termination
and dissolution of the partnership unless otherwise agreed upon.
The evidence did not contain anything about loan instruments
having been prepared when such advances toere made or repayments
being made out of gross receipts in accordance with the "terms
of the loan instruments," it being no^ed here and I so find

2i4o

-103-

SAMPSON V. RICHTRON

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

that the promissory notes which Richihs prepared on or about
June 5, 1980 and signed for the partnerships as president of
the general partner, did not constitute the "loan instruments"
as that term was used in the partnership agreement.

Nor was

there any evidence that there was a sale of a property or the
termination or dissolution of a partnership that made any advance
immediately due and payable.
However, since this lawsuit does not constitute a claim
for such advances against any partnership, the partnerships
"to whom" and "from whom" such advances w^re made and the amounts
thereof are irrelevant here, and the net figure of $393,840
mentioned above only has relevance as it relates to whether
or not such net advances should be an item or measure of damages
as to the claims asserted against Sampson l^y reason of his conduct,
which included his oft repeated assertions to the limited partners
and to Richins that any such advances were not valid obligations
owed to defendants.
Sampson almost from the beginning Expressed the view that
the advances claimed were not valid and did not constitute partnership obligations.

In letters to the investors, to Richins,

and in oral discussions Sampson repeatedly reiterated that view.
There was evidence the Leo H. Richins Family Trust furnished
$100,000 toward such advances and that Sh^ri Richins contributed
$32,000. There was some evidence that some of the limited partners
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refused to sign the settlement agreemdnt because it purported
to acknowledge indebtedness for such a<$vances.

Throughout all

the documentary evidence when advances were being discussed,
Richins1 position that they should be Repaid remained adamant,
while Sampson's position that advances were not valid debts
to be repaid to defendants by the partnership seemed just as
adamant, and he repeatedly told limited partners either orally
or in letters that such was his opinion and advice.

However,

other than a suggestion that such claims were self-serving,
Sampson never told the Court why advances so made did not become
partnership debts under the partnership agreements that were
repayable as provided therein.

I find that such advances were

made under the partnership agreement and were repayable as provided
therein.
I stress that my finding here is limited to just that.
The limited partnerships are not parties to this action and
I need not, and do not, make any ruling that any partnership
is indebted to a general partner in any amount.

Those advances

were made before May, 1980, when Sampson first became involved.
But the advances so made become of concern to the Court in this
lawsuit because one of the facts that became a part of Sampson's
conduct was his very early and oft repeated statements to all
limited partners, both orally and in writihg and over an extended
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period of time, that such advances were not partnership obligations
that were subject to repayment to the defendants.
My finding set out above with respect to the advances is,
in reality, a finding that Sampson was wrong in so stating and
is a part of Sampson's overall tortious conduct which I have
found caused injury to defendants.

As I have repeatedly stated,

the burden of proving damages and the amount thereof is upon
the defendants and to do so by a preponderance of the evidence.
I do not find that the evidence preponderates in proving that,
but for Sampson's statements to the investors that such advances
were not debts owed to the partners, the partnerships would
have in fact repaid the amount of such advances in full as shown
in the partnership books and records, or indeed any part thereof.
The evidence does not preponderate in showing that any of the
circumstances mentioned in the partnership agreements as triggering
the repayment requirement was proven to have occurred.

The

total amount of advances owed, whatever they may be, does not
herein give us a yardstick for determining damages, but Sampson's
conduct with respect thereto would be a factor to consider with
respect to the damage issue.
85.

One of the problems Richins faced in May, 1980, was

the distrust of JLimited partners, as mentioned in detail elsewhere,
and the payment of capital contributions assessed by Richins
became a matter of controversy and one over which limited partners
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active in the negotiations were not willing to further place
under Richins1 exclusive control as in the past. Since an agreement
for settlement had been agreed upon on June 26, 1980, relations
between Richins and Sampson were then generally amicable, so
Sampson became involved in the collection of funds from the
limited partners who refused to deliver them to Richins.

Sampson

was then to pass them on to Richins for distribution as needed
to meet debts and expenses.

That plan was not followed to the

letter and Sampson began placing and retaining partner contributions
in his trust accounts at his bank, and particularly so when
the settlement agreement was not approved.
As early as July 18, 198 0, when Murray First Thrift had
scheduled its foreclosure sale on the Pleasant Valley property
at Roosevelt, Utah, Sampson took it upon himself to attend the
sale and work something out.

He obtained $30,000 from Olsen,

a partner in Pleasant Valley and took $10,000 from the funds
of another partnership he already had in his trust account,
went to Roosevelt where he talked to Kay Lewis, attorney for
Murray, who was handling the sale, told him it was investor's
money and paid the $40,000 to Lewis, about $1,800 of which was
in excess of what was owed which Murray later returned to Sampson.
Lewis gave Sampson a reconveyance deed for the general partner,
who was of course the obligor to Murray, stamped the note paid,
and gave them to Sampson who thereafter refused to deliver those

2i"i0

SAMPSON V. RICHTRON

-107-

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

documents to Richins though requested several times to do so.
86.

When attorney Day finished drafting the settlement

agreement Sampson sent copies to all the investors with a request
that they sign it and return it directly to Richins.

Many did

so but several did not, so the settlement agreed upon was not
thereafter consummated.
Although Richins had stated at the May 29, meeting he would
withdraw his company as general partner and let the Catlow Valley
partnerships elect someone else; and although during June, 1980,
Richins gave formal notice of withdrawal of the Richtron general
partner to three partnerships (Blackfoot, Snowville and Kanosh);
and although the partnership agreement expressly provided that
a majority of the limited partners in interest of any partnership
could by such majority vote, remove the general partner and
elect a new one, it appears that Sampson never suggested to
his clients, whoever they were, to follow that simple course.
87.

Instead, as previously noted, when it became apparent

that the settlement agreement had failed, Sampson sent out a
letter to all limited partners, together with a power of attorney
form, requesting each to sign, which form when signed gave Sampson
a total irrevocable right to vote their interests in the various
partnerships, which he said, would enable him to remove Richins
as general partner, rather than noting that it was a Richtron
corporation that held that position.

in his letter Sampson
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told the investors that since settlement was not possible, they
must remove Richins and his organizations as general partner
and thereafter commence legal actions against them to retain
the properties, roll back the contract prices and pursue other
legal remedies. Sampson further stated they had to raise $400,000
for payment on the properties and present litigation costs;
and that to get some consensus and order along with a united
front, he was forming a management corporation and it would
become the general partner of all partnerships.

He requested

all contributions be sent to him, it being noted here that he
was then neither a limited or general partner and had never
established that he was counsel for all limited partners. Sampson
said that each would be given proper credit for the money sent
and he would vacate Richins1 forfeitures of the capital investments
of those limited partners who had failed to pay their assessments.
A substantial number of the powers of attorney were signed
and returned to him and using them and relying thereon, he elected
his own professional corporation, which he had by then formed,
the general manager of each limited partnership and prepared
and filed amended partnership certificates which he alone signed
—

individually and as president of his PC —

so under authority of the powers of attorney.

allegedly doing
Even if it be

assumed that a valid voting right was transferred to Sampson
by each limited partner so signing, enabling him to vote the
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Richtron general partner out and his own PC in, the law required
that an amended certificate be filed and that it be signed and
sworn to by each member of the limited partnership.

Such amended

certificate was not so signed and sworn to by even one limited
partner, and thus constituted a complete failure to comply with
the explicit requirements of state law and was not valid.
88.

In January, 1981 Sampson obtained an assignment of

the Osborn judgment ($75,683.73) from Osborn, under an agreement
to pay Osborn $20,000 immediately, $10,000 more in two weeks
and another $10,000 in three months.

Sampson sent the $20,000

using partnership funds then deposited in his trust account.
Upon the $20,000 payment Sampson obtained an assignment of the
judgment from Osborn to himself in his own name, which act was
a direct violation of Section 78-51-27 of the Utah Code. Within
three weeks after receiving the assignment, Sampson had another
attorney file this lawsuit on the Oregon judgment showing Osborn
as plaintiff.

Why Sampson took the assignment in his own name

but filed the Complaint in Osborn's name was never explained,
but when the assignment came to light and a motion filed, Sampson
was substituted as party plaintiff.
The Osborn judgment assignment ran into further complications,
triggered by the failure of Sampson to pay the remaining $20,000
as agreed.

Osborn rescinded the assignment for failure of consi-

deration, had it reinstated in the Oregon court, and near the
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end of 1981 levied execution on his judgment through a sheriff's
sale purporting to cover all of the defendants' property interests,
whatever they were, in the Catlow Valley Farms.

Osborn bid

$50,000 at the sheriff's sale, obtained a Certificate of Sale,
and consummated a further deal with Sampson pursuant to which
Sampson collected $45,000 from Goff and the other plaintiffs,
paid it to Osborn, obtained a warranty deed from Osborn conveying
to Goff as trustee for those who put up the $45,000 all the
property interests Osborn had acquired through the sheriff's
sale, reciting a $65,000 consideration in the deed.

Sampson

thereafter also obtained, in Goff's name as trustee, an assignment
of the Osborn judgment which also recited $65,000 as the consideration.

Sampson had Handy come in as new counsel for plaintiff

who then got a court ruling substituting Goff, trustee, as plaintiff
in the case.

Such action by Sampson as an attorney was another

violation of Section 78-51-27.

This case thus remained alive

with Goff as plaintiff, but with no amended complaint being
filed to allege these new facts or what relief Goff was seeking.
89.

It also became known that it was contrary to law for

a professional legal corporation to serve as a general partner
in a limited farming partnership, so Sampson then incorporated
Ag Management and proceeded by use of the powers of attorney
previously obtained to substitute Ag Management for the Sampson
PC as general partner of each limited partnership.

Although
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Sampson prepared documents giving notice of such change to all
investors, no amendment to the Certificate reflecting such change
was ever filed as required by law, not even one with Sampson
as the lone signator thereon as had been done for the change
to Sampson's PC as general partner.

Sampson advised all limited

partners that such change in the general partner had been made,
directed that all payments were to be made to Ag Management
through him and he thereby continued to control the operation
of each partnership,
90.

By this time Richins had sent a written notice to

all limited partners in all partnerships that the Richtron general
partner had withdrawn and would proceed to wind up the partnership
affairs and terminate the partnerships.

Again, notwithstanding

such notice, no action was taken by the partnerships, as provided
in the agreement, to meet and by majority vote remove Richtron
as general partner and elect a new one.

Instead they, together

with Sampson, were all apparently willing to let Sampson use
the powers of attorney as he saw fit to achieve such a change.
Also, it appeared that no action was taken by Richins to further
wind up the affairs, notwithstanding his written notice that
he would do so.
91.

Meanwhile, things went along on that state of affairs

until Judge Duffy Palmer (as detailed in Findings of Fact 73,
74, and 75) entered an Order in the District Court on November
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24, 1982 declaring that Ag Management was not the general partner
of any of the partnerships; that the Richtron general partners
although having withdrawn, remained in control as such to wind
up the partnership affairs; and stated that partnership certificates
had never been amended to show Ag Management as general partner.
92.

Notwithstanding this unexpected set back, Sampson

contended that he and his clients were still in control of all
partnerships and owned all Richtron interests by reason of the
fact that Sampson had about three weeks before, on behalf of
Goff as trustee, purchased all the Richtron interests at the
tax sale held by the IRS on October 29, 1982, for the sum of
$40,400.
Although the IRS had been investigating the partnership
affairs for several months and held such tax sale to collect
taxes allegedly owed by Richins and his wife and his companies,
Richins had repeatedly contended that what the IRS had done
was contrary to law. When the sale was held with Sampson appearing
as the only bidder for Goff as trustee, Richins wrote to the
investors stating the sale was illegal and they should think
about coming back to him in the conflict with Sampson.

Sampson

responded by letter to all investors dated December 28, 1983,
advising them of Judge Cornaby's first ruling that the IRS sale
was valid, and of the significance of the IRS sale, stating
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that Richins1 contentions had no substance and no federal court
was going to void that sale.
93.

Sampson's prediction lost to Richins1 contentions

when, on May 16, 1984, Judge David Winder of the United States
District Court entered an Order as previously noted, which unequivocally voided the IRS Tax Sale of October 29, 1982, stating
Gof f had no interest in the capital stock 0f the Richtron companies
nor in the rights of these companies to wind up the partnership
affairs, nor the right to institute causes of action, nor in
any of the real estate contracts and partnership interests.
(See Conclusion of Law 44)
Notwithstanding this ruling Sampson by letter to Richins
dated August 28, 1984, advised Richin£ his contentions that
Sampson's organization had no interest in tfye partnership properties
was "crazy and false" because after th£ original land owners,
who had originally sold the farm land to tjie various partnerships,
had foreclosed on the defaulted contracts * his clients had repurchased lands from these owners directly and for Richins to not
interfere.

From Richins1 schedule setting forth the dates on

which each property had been foreclosed, it appears that all
foreclosures had occurred prior to the date Sampson wrote Richins
this letter.

It also appears therefrom that all foreclosures

had occurred, except East Taber (August 8, 1984) prior to the
date of Judge Winder's Order invalidating the tax sale, and
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all had been foreclosed after Sampson took over control of the
partnerships by the manuever of votin|g, by use of the powers
of attorney, to replace his PC as general partner in place of
the Richtron general partners.
At Finding of Fact 83, I began a summary of Sampson's conduct
for the purpose of setting forth why I thought, and so found
in Finding of Fact 82, that Sampson's conduct over the years
had in fact "crossed the threshold beyond what is incidental
and justified to what is tortious."

I recognize and regret

that what followed Finding 83 was repetitious in many things,
but I believe the summary sustains my referenced Finding.
94.

The record in summary thus shows that in May, 1980,

Richins and his companies had control of at least 25 limited
farm partnerships with assets and liabilities of such a nature
that they had serious financial problems in May, 1980, when
Sampson first became involved.

It further shows that when Sampson

first got involved he had nothing in th^ 25 partnerships except
two clients that wanted advice.
by the end of 1980 —

By Saitjpson's acts and conduct

within seven months —

Sampson had taken

over and assumed control of the 2 5 partnerships, that he was
receiving all of the funds, disbursing them and using them in
whatever way he determined.

He continued such control for five

years, yet produced no evidence as to whit had happened to those
25 partnerships.
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Sampson suggested from time to time that his sole

objective was to salvage the partnership assets for the limited
partners to the point of at least getting back their investments.
The evidence does not show that all investors joined in retaining
Sampson as their attorney or their proxy, but the evidence does
make clear that Sampson's main goal and effort soon became one
of getting rid of Richins from all partnerships and obtaining
control thereof for himself and his clients whom he never fully
specifically identified.

I think the evidence shows, and so

find, that his self-declared benevolent motive soon changed
to one of greed and a vendetta to oust Richins and take complete
control.
I thus find as facts that in May, 1980 the defendants had
existing economic relations with at least 25 limited partnerships;
that Sampson quickly and intentionally interfered therewith;
that he did so for an improper purpose, including a desire to
do harm to defendants for its own sake, a mere officious intermeddling for no other reason than a diesire to interfere, and
such a showing of facts as to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence to a substantial degree that the improper purpose
predominated any other purpose; and thatf he did so by improper
means, which included means that were contrary to statutory
law relating to limited partnerships and the required means
of amending a certificate; and to statutory law controlling
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the conduct of attorneys set forth in Section 78-51-27 from
which it is clear that Sampson's handling of the Osborn judgment
on two separate occasions both constituted a misdemeanor punishable
as such or conduct justifying suspension or disbarment.

Further

improper means are to be found in Sampson's assumption of the
role of counsel for defendants in certain cases and then taking
serious actions against defendants and making use of facts obtained
while involved in an attorney-client gelation in violation of
the ethical standards adopted as a guide to the conduct of lawyers.
The examples I point to as being illustrative of both improper
conduct or improper means are not intended to state that no
other such conduct pointing to improper purpose or improper
means can be found in the record for I believe that many other
stated facts as disclosed by the evidence could be looked to
as supporting the build up of evidence clearly preponderating
in finding the presence of both alternatives of the second element
of the tort as defined by our Supreme Coutrt.
96.

It is to be remembered that in Leigh v. Isom, supra,

our Supreme Court included in its definition of the tort of
intentional interference with prospective economic relations
as a necessary third element that the tortious conduct "caused
injury to the plaintiff."
self-evident.

From the evidence the injury seems

Recognizing some repetition, I again note that

in May, 1980, notwithstanding all of the problems heretofore
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noted as confronting the general partners, Richins and RFC,
either Richtron Inc. or Richtron General was the one general
partner in each of the 2 5 existing limited partnerships, each
of which was buying their respective farm properties under contract
with RFC or Richtron Inc., each had assets and each had existing
obligations. By the end of May, 1980, Sampson was already beginning
to throw his weight around and by the ^nd of 1980, through the
use of his collected powers of attorney, he had assumed and
obtained control contrary to law of most, if not all, of the
partnerships; had all assessed funds coming his way; had control
thereof; had allowed default judgments to be entered against
Richins and/or his companies; and had for all practical purposes
reduced Richins control in partnership affairs to a letter writing
role.

He had in violation of state and penal statutes acquired

the Osborn judgment and commenced this lawsuit thereon on February
11, 1981.
Sampson had in effect acquired and asserted control of
the limited partnerships by substituting first his own PC and
then his Ag Management as purported n|ew partners, but doing
so illegally because it was not done in compliance with state
law.

From the evidence it does not appear that Richins ever

again gained actual control over any of tl}e partnerships, although
he had successfully reversed Sampsonf£ procedural tactics in
the state and federal courts and in the Supreme Court of Utah.
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On the other hand Sampson had during patft of this time received
a favorable ruling in the district court supporting his efforts
in the IRS tax sale until the sale wafe voided in the federal
court.

Regardless of Sampson's apparent belief that what he

did was legally proper, the facts were otherwise, and his violation
of express statutory provisions to achieve his results hardly
measures up to a standard of performance expected from the legal
profession.
97.

Thus, I find that Sampson by his tortious conduct

caused injury to the defendants.
98.

The main problem, here now btecomes, from the Court's

point of view, having found an actionable tort and injury to
the defendants caused thereby, the question as to what damages,
if any, the defendants have suffered as a proximate cause thereof.
The burden of proving damages and the amount thereof, if any,
on the Counterclaim is upon the defendants.

The standard of

proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.

The credibility

of evidence and testimony in this caste is a matter that the
Court must decide.
99.

In their Counterclaim defendants allege and seek recovery

of millions of dollars in damages, both actual and punitive.
As stated in their Counterclaim the prayers for damages in each
claim for relief are jointly stated, as a combined claim for
all defendants together, as though thte defendants, although
each in a different status, were each entitled to base their
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This they cannot do, as their

claims for relief are based upon different rights.
Richins individually had no interest in any of the partnerships.

He was president of Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General,

one or the other being the lone general partner in the partnerships.
He was also president of RFC and Frontier Investments, both
corporations organized by him.

The office of president of each

of these four corporations gives him ho additional rights or
claims for relief that he does not haVe as an individual, if
any.

Richins did assert an individual claim for relief in the

third claim of the Counterclaim which claim he abandoned during
the trial.

The Second Amended Counterqlaim identifies Richins

as president of Richtron, Inc. and RFC.
The first claim asserts Sampson acted as counsel for Richins
as well as the corporate defendants.

Thus Richins1 individual

claim on this count is that as an individual party in any lawsuits
in which Sampson is alleged to have dofte an actionable wrong,
he has an individual claim against Sampson.

The same is true

in the second claim which is, in effect, based upon negligence
of Sampson.

The fourth claim asserts that Sampson interfered

with and invaded Richins1 right to earn a livelihood.

The fifth

and sixth claims do not purport to assert a claim for relief
for Richins individually.
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100. RFC's role in the partnership matters is centered
around the contracts to which it was a party.
held dual roles.

As to these RFC

RFC appears as buyer of farm property from

the original owner under a contract that set out a purchase
price and terms of payment which involved a down payment, installment
payments on the balance and the interest to be paid.

After

so buying a tract of farm land RFC would then become the seller
of that particular tract to an individual limited partnership
under a contract which set out the terms thereof.

The sale

price was always fixed at a higher price than that paid by RFC
under its purchase contract from the owner.
is referred to frequently as the mark-up.

The difference

The contract also

fixed its own installment payments and usually, if not always,
called for a higher interest rate. Details concerning the properties
RFC so bought and sold are to be found in its bankruptcy schedules
or other exhibits.

RFC was a limited partner in Catlow Valley

Farms 2 and 6^but had no other interest, powers or authority
therein under the partnership agreements.

It was entitled only

to receive its payments due from each partnership to which it
sold land upon which it had a corresponding obligation to make
the contract payments due the original seller under what to
RFC was a purchase contract. RFC's rights rested on such contracts
and aside from its limited partnership interests, its profits
lay in its marked-up selling prices to

the partnerships and
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higher interest rates and not to any profits from operations
or a future resale.

Its maximum profit that it could ever expect

to achieve under these contracts was based upon a total payoff
by the partnership to RFC under their contract less RFC's total
payoff to the landowner from whom it had purchased the property.
The financial problems RFC experienced at the time it filed
its Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding all arose before Sampson
became involved.
101. The RFC bankruptcy was filed June 5, 1980.

Finding

of Fact 56 shows the execution on the same day by Richins as
president of the general partners of the quit-claim deeds by
which the partnerships named therein conveyed the partnership's
interest in the land it had purchased from RFC back to RFC.
Finding of Fact 57 also shows that on that same day Richins
prepared and signed as president of the general partner 18 promissory
notes which obligated each limited partnership listed therein
for the amounts shown, or the total amount equal to the aggregate
advances made to the named partnership as shown by the books
and records.

Each note made Richtron, Inc., Richtron General

and RFC joint payees thereon.
so was never established.

By what authority Richins did

The note provided that it was payable

on demand but in no event no later than ten days after various
occurrences, including the withdrawal of Richtron, Inc. as general
partner.
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Section 70A-3-802 of the Code provides that unless otherwise
agreed where an instrument is taken for an underlying obligation,
the obligation is suspended pro tanto until the instrument is
due or if it is payable on demand until its presentment.

If

the instrument is dishonored, action may be maintained on either
the instrument or the obligation.

Thus, under this statute

the obligations claimed to have been owed on advances were suspended,
being in effect replaced by the obligation created on the notes
and remained so suspended until the notes (being demand notes)
were presented for payment, or until ten days after the withdrawal
of the general partner.

They are partnership obligations whether

asserted on the instrument or the obligation and neither the
notes nor the advances are mentioned in the pleadings.

They

are not Sampson's obligations as such, but whether they fall
within the scope of the allegation of each claim for relief
as set forth in the Counterclaim of "injury and damages of a
character and in an amount to be ascertained at the trial" is
a matter to be resolved.
102. I note from the pleadings that Richtron, Inc. was
stated to have been organized in part for the purpose of acquiring
real property in its own name for management, syndication, and
resale to various third party limited partnerships.

No such

reason was stated in the pleadings as to such being a reason
why RFC was incorporated. In any case where Richtron, Inc. occupied
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a buyer-seller situation such as RFC occupied, its rights in
that capacity would be identical to those described for RFC
in Finding 100.

However, its main role, and the only role of

Richtron General, appearing from the evidence was serving as
the general partner of most of the limited partnerships as shown
elsewhere in these documents.
As general partners the rights to Compensation of Richtron,
Inc. and Richtron General in any of the partnerships to which
one or the other was the general partner are to be determined
from the partnership agreements.

Those agreements set forth

that the general partners are entitled, first, to a management
fee during the first two years of the operation, and, secondly,
to a 10% share of the final profits.
The management fee was payable on the date of the agreement
equal to 10% of the total consideration given for the property.
It appears the management fee was paid immediately off the top
of the down payment the limited partnership made on the property.
No further management fee was to be paid but the general partner
was to be reimbursed currently out of partnership assets for
all costs and expenses reasonably incurred by it on behalf of
the partnership.

Also, the general partner was entitled under

the partnership agreement to 10% of any profits realized out
of the final disposition of the property and after the limited
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partners had received cash or property in value to the amounts
of their capital contributions.

The other 90% of the profits

were to go to the limited partners.

Thus, the general partner

was entitled to nothing from the partnership after the management
fee and current expenses unless a profit remained upon the final
disposition of the property.

From thfe evidence it does not

appear that defendants established a claim of any entitlement
to damages for unreimbursed current expenses. Such is an important
factor to be considered in determining what amount of damages,
if any, the general partners would be entitled to recover and
upon them, as I have stated, rests the burden of proof.
103. Frontier Investment was incorporated and alleged in
the Complaint to have been made the assignee and transferee
of all right, title and interest of aljL defendants in any and
all monetary proceeds received in this case.
was denied by plaintiffs.

The allegation

It has no claim for relief that it

can assert against plaintiffs for damages for no injury to it
is attributable to plaintiffs.

Because of its unique role for

which it was incorporated, it was made a party defendant by
Court Order.

The record contains no evidence of such alleged

assignment to it.
104. Defendants undertook to prove damages by various financial
schedules they placed into evidence.

Exhibit 223 was a schedule

showing that between June 27, 1980 and November 30, 1982, Sampson
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received $645,101.38 from partnership sources and disbursed
the whole thereof to various parties, including $60,182 in legal
fees to himself and $78,184.18 for "general overhead."

Richins

in preparing this schedule did not show a further breakdown
on the overhead expense item.

This exhibit gives a complete

detailed listing of some $491,873.82 ^s having been collected
from named limited partners in the individual amounts shown
and the dates such amounts were deposited in one of Sampson's
bank trust accounts.

Also listed are crop sales and rent money

totaling $153,227.56 with a detailed breakdown of the source
and amounts of such funds and the dates and bank accounts of
Sampson's into which each amount went, with certain exceptions
showing how some funds were handled without going through one
of Sampson's bank accounts.
The exhibit shows a detailed account of how these funds
were spent summarized by Richins as follows:
Payments to Richtron
Property payments
Sprinkler payments
Legal fees - Joan O'Neil
Purchase Richtron farm equip.
Osborn Judgment purchase
Valmont Credit Judgment purchase
Murray First TD purchase
Utah PCA RE Contract payment
IRS Tax Sale payments
Legal fees - Sampson
Keith Blanch - wages & expenses
Marilyn Brown - salary & expenses
General overhead

$ 32,500.00
146,551.03
29,117.15
2,000.00
3,500.00
65,000.00
15,000.00
38,138.21
10,000.00
40,400.00
60,182.68
96,057.15
28,470.48
78f184.18
$645,101.38
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The property payments of $146,551.03 primarily involved
payments to the original owner-sellers and did not include payments
by the partnerships to RFC as payments on those contracts.
The payments to Marilyn Brown included $600.00 to settle a lawsuit
in which she was defendant.

The General Overhead remains a

mystery as to specifics, but presumably covers Sampson's office
expenses.

The other expense items have been rather thoroughly

considered in other findings.

I note that this exhibit covers

up to November 30, 198 2, which is about one month after the
IRS tax sale and a week or so after »}udge Palmer put an end
to Ag Management's role as general partner.
105. Richins prepared various schedules of receipts and
disbursements from various bank accounts that included entries
after November 30, 1982.

Exhibit 217 contained information

relating to the John P. Sampson, Attorney at Law, Trust Account.
It reflected receipts between December 20, 1982 to August 30,
1983 totaling $11,574.50 and no disbursements.

$11,000 were

shown as deposits from Ag Management ($5,000) and Consolidated
Farms ($6,000).

Exhibit 218 relating to the John Sampson, PC

Trust, purported to cover period from December 4, 1980 to November
30, 1982 but shows one receipt of $1,517 on July 12, 1983 from
Virgil Condon and four disbursements from July 12, 1983 to August
10, 1984, totaling $1,035.36, three to Ag Management for expenses
and one to Consolidated Farms for expense?.
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Exhibit 219 related to the Ag Management Account for the
period from February 16, 1982 to October 29, 1984.

The first

entry after November 30, 1982 was December 3, 1982.

The last

entry was October 29, 1984.

During this period 75 deposits

were entered to this account, 56 of which came from Consolidated
Farms and totaled $143,000.

The remaining deposits totaled

$87,700, $20,000 from Snowville rent, $51,974 from Springfield
grain and other miscellaneous sources.

During this period 2 60

disbursements were made from this accdunt, the total of which
I did not compute, but for the total period covered by this
account, as of October 29, 1984, there was a credit balance
of $43,103.

For the entire period covered by the schedule,

receipts totaled $352,547 and disbursements totaled $309,444.
One disbursement of $51,000 was made to Consolidated Farms;
$32,460 was paid to Everingham on the Springfield properties;
$16,119 to Utah Mortgage and Loan as a mortgage payment on Snowville;
and $8,000 to Sampson for attorney's fe&s.

Other disbursements

ranged from nominal amounts to disbursements of several hundred
or several thousand dollars.

Numerous numbered checks were

found to be missing so information with respect thereto was
unavailable, but there was no evidence that any such checks
had cleared the bank.
106. Consolidated Farms, aka Consolidated Western Farms
was incorporated by Sampson for the sole purpose to receive
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the assets of all the limited partnerships.

Exhibit 220 reflects

that this account was opened on November 15, 1982 and the summary
extended to October 29, 1984.

Total receipts were $778,136

and total disbursements were $632,539, leaving a balance of
$145,597. An examination of the sources 4>f the receipts disclosed
that they were all from contributions of named limited partners
with a small part coming from various partnerships.

As in the

Ag Management account there were numerous missing checks.

As

to some the date, amount, payee and pi^rpose was obtained from
some source so that that information was included, but during
19 84 the numbers of 96 checks were listed and shown as missing
by Richins. The missing numbers appeared in groups of consecutive
numbers.

However, there was nothing In the schedule to show

whether bank statements were examined or that any of the missing
numbered checks had in fact cleared the account.

I note that

this account was opened four days prior io Judge Palmer's ruling
declaring Ag Management was not the general partner in any partnership.
An examination of the listed checpks discloses that all
but a few of the checks were disbursed either to Ag Management
or to Keith Blanch or to one of his banH accounts.

On or about

October 14, 1983 $100,000 went to a law firm on "Randlett."
Several checks went to Marilyn Brown for salary.

$24,000 was

paid to Sampson on legal fees, it appearing that beginning April
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1, 1983 Sampson began drawing $3,000 petf month from this account
for legal fees.

Other checks went for miscellaneous expenses.

Activity in the account following the federal court ruling in
May, 1984, showed deposits totaled about 574,320 and disbursements
of about $12,000, all of which went to Ag Management.
107. Keith Blanch maintained two checking accounts upon
which Richins submitted a schedule of receipts and disbursements.
One was in the First Interstate Bank of Oregon, and Exhibit
221 shows the period covered in this analysis was from November
3, 1980 to May 10, 1983. The analysis of this account reflected
receipts of $159,515 and disbursements of $219,981 or an excess
of $60,4 65 of disbursements over receipts.

The source of the

receipts reflects they were almost totally transfers from the
John Sampson PC Trust Account up to March 5, 1982 when the transfer
of funds were made from the Ag Management account. It is difficult
to distinguish the nature of the disbursements, but they appear
to have been used to pay Blanch's petsonal expenses, as well
as business expenses.

How the apparent overdraft was handled

is not answered by the exhibit but the dxhibit does not indicate
that the account was opened on November 3, 1980, the date of
the first entry on the schedule, and ma^ have had a substantial
amount in deposit on that date.
108. The second bank account that Blanch had was at the
Idaho Bank & Trust. Richins1 summary (E^. 222) covers the period
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of July 8, 1983 to December 31, 1983. Rdceipts during the period
totaled $108,326 and the disbursements tbtaled $107,849, leaving
a balance of $47 6.

About half of the deposits are shown as

being transfers from Consolidated Farms while the remaining
are identified only by a deposit slip number reflected by the
check register.

Information concerning disbursements reflect

many were personal and many business in nature.
109. From the foregoing it appears that partnership funds
and disbursements therefrom were accounted for up to October
29, 1984, that date being the date of the last entries in the
Ag Management and the Consolidated Farms accounts with the former
leaving a credit balance of $43,103 afad the latter a credit
balance of $145,597, both of which were active at the time the
federal court ruled the IRS tax sale of October 29, 1983, invalid
in May, 1984.
110. Another exhibit (227) offered by defendants as evidence
of damage was a balance sheet for RFC as of April 30, 1981.
It listed assets and liabilities which contained both an "Historical"
listing, which was based upon the assumption that no partnership
real estate contracts had been forfeited, and a "Present Market"
listing which was based upon the assumption that all partnership
real estate contracts had been forfeited, the land repossessed
by RFC and shown at estimated market Value.

The Springfield

and Moreland Properties were indicated as being included as
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if they had not been sold and assigned.

After listing assets

and liabilities Richins included a MStockholders Equity," which
under the "Historical" listing showed an equity of $1,368,025
which consisted primarily of "retained earnings" of $1,158,958,
and the balance in preferred ($30,000) aind common ($2,225) stock
and additional paid in capital ($176,842) •

Under the "Present

Market" listing the equity was shown as $5,638,856.92, the total
difference being attributed to an "Eqitiity Adjustment for Land
Foreclosure" valued at $4,270,831.92.

The source of market

value data was not shown, but under 1|:he latter calculation,
"Land buildings and irrigation equipment" was assigned a value
of $8,206,000.

No oral testimony was $iven to further explain

this exhibit.
111. Another schedule (228) datecfl. July 1, 1981 showing
a status report for RFC of real estate contracts payable and
equity showed an "Estimated Market Value" for some 20 partnerships
of $9,900,120, real estate contracts payable of $3,889,864 with
an equity of $5,582,205, it being remembeired that one year before,
this company had filed for bankruptcy.
112. During the summer of 1980 whil^ settlement negotiations
were under consideration, Richins prepared a schedule to "give
an idea of values."

Richins testified he fixed such values

based upon contacts with other realtors, his own experience,
the purchase contracts and his recordb.

The schedule showed
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the acreage and land values of each partnership, the combined
totals of which were $12,380,400 for 14,374 acres.

Again

—

it was June, 1980 that RFC filed its bankruptcy.
113. Richins prepared a consolidated balance sheet for
Richtron, Inc., dated June 20, 1980 (226) footnoting that it
was for management and internal purposes only as all computations
were subject to audit.

An asset for "£eal estate contract re-

ceivables" was given a value of $4,831,3t5 while the liabilities
included an item of "real estate contracts payable" which was
shown as $3,462,010.
114. A final accounting was prepared by Richins just before
or during the trial of this case.

He de$cribed it as a "summary

of partnership equities" which he testified fixed the values
and amounts shown therein as of June 30, 1980.

Richins began

this schedule by using the same market values he had used in
his schedule in the summer of 1980, but excluding Snowville,
Grandview and Young Farms. His schedule Reflected a total market
value of $11,214,400, total debts of $4,712,420, and a total
equity of $6,411,980.

A comparison of these market values was

made to the market values for the sa^e properties listed on
the bankruptcy schedules filed in the RF<$ bankruptcy proceedings
on or about July 1, 1980.

Snowville, Grandview and Young Farms

are not included on either schedule.

The bankruptcy schedules
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did not include Blackfoot, North Bear lake, Pleasant Valley
and Randlett.
With these adjustments Richins estimated market value of
the same properties listed in the bankruptcy schedules totaled
$9,539,400, while the market value for the same properties as
set out on the bankruptcy schedules was &3,937,357.

Total debts

owed on the farms listed on the bankruptcy schedule were shown
on Richins1 schedule as being $4,034,t300, leaving a claimed
net equity of $5,505,100 on these fanr(s on Richins1 schedule.
As can be clearly seen, the market values of the farms shown
on the bankruptcy schedules was less than the total obligations
shown therefor on Richins1 schedule. The dates of these comparative
values are noted —

they are, in fact, one day apart.

115. The schedules prepared by Richins, as considered in
Findings 110 through 114, purport to be documents by which defendants
are attempting to show damages in the millions of dollars as
alleged in their Counterclaim.

In doing so it is obvious that

they are based upon the assumption that aljl partnership properties
belonged to defendants, not to the partnerships, and that defendants
are endeavoring to recover what Richins estimates their market
values to be.

Under the partnership agreements the two Richtron

general partners got their management fees at the beginning
of the partnership existence, and are ehtitled to nothing more
than 10% of the profits, if any, remaining upon final sale of
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the properties, with the remaining 90% going to the limited
partners.

There is in fact, no assurance, even disregarding

the problems defendants and the partnerships were confronted
with in May, 1980, that in the end after final sale of the properties
that there would be profits remaining to be so divided.
As already noted, the defendants have not proven anything
owing on the ongoing operating expenses for which they were
entitled to reimbursement under the agreement.

The only other

claim they can assert against the partnerships are the advances
about which much has been said, the basis for return of which
is likewise set forth in the agreement?.

The values set forth

in the schedule considered in Finding 114 are supposed to be
fixed as of June 30, 1980.

RFC is by that date already in the

bankruptcy with its assets passing to the control of the bankruptcy
court.

It appears that by drafting and executing the quit-claim

deeds on June 5, 1980, for all the partnership properties, Richins
intended to ignore the effects of the bankruptcy and take from
the partnerships their respective interests in their properties.
The whole scenario presents this uiiusual picture.

Richins

is president of RFC and of the two Ri<Jhtron general partners.
As president of RFC, he contracts to buy a farm property, and
then contracts to sell it at a marked-up price to a limited
partnership whose total affairs fall within the control of the
general partner of which, as just stated, Rtlchins is also president.
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He thus signs this partnership contract for both the buyer and
the seller, fixing the terms thereof as he has chosen.

He,

as president of the general partner, is responsible for seeing
that the partnership pays its annual installment to RFC, and
also responsible for fixing the assessments and collecting the
funds for making that payment. If he, as president of the general
partner, defaults in making such payment for one reason or another,
he then decides whether to have RFC declare the contract with
the partnership in default and take whatever steps are necessary
to foreclose out the partnership interest and have RFC take
over the partnership property, subject of course to the annual
payment due the original seller.

It seems apparent to me that

that is what he did when he executed the quit-claim deeds of
June 5, 1980.
What the real estate contracts between RFC and the individual
partnerships provided is not found in the record and I do not
know.

Such real estate contracts usually include provisions

setting out procedures to be followed to forfeit out a defaulting
party.

Such procedures would have to be followed and they usually

do not allow a forfeiture without any notice.

No one knew about

these quit-claim deeds except Richins until he chose to make
what he had done known, either by the recording of the deed
or advising others of the use he intended to put them to.

By

his actions he had made preparations in his own way, thereby
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putting them out of business without the consent of the limited
partners in violation of Section 48-2-9.

The provisions of

Article V (4) of the agreement makes a general partner liable
to limited partners for losses caused by the willful misconduct
or gross negligence of the general partner.

That provision

is not an issue in this case.
Richins recorded all the quit-claim deeds by January, 1981,
and yet within the same time frame he has given formal written
notice of the withdrawal of the general partners and of his
intent to wind up the partnership affairs.

The notice of such

intent did not advise the limited partners that he had, by use
of the quit-claim deeds, thereby deprived them of their 90%
interests in any final profit realized upon sale.

There is

no evidence in this record which proves by a preponderance thereof
that the quit-claim deeds executed by Richins were obtained
by proper, legal procedures or that they were, for any other
reason, valid and effective as a means of depriving each partnership
of its interest in its property.

Since the partnerships are

not parties to this action, I need make no finding with respect
to #how such actions affected them, but I do find that by use
of the quit-claim deeds the defendants did not acquire the whole
interest in the partnership farms to accord them a valid claim
for damages at the market value thereof.

Furthermore, I find

the valuations Richins used in his schedules lack credibility.
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In my opinion no reasonable foundation was laid to justify them.
One day he values property at over 9-1/2 million dollars, while
he is negotiating a settlement, but the next day values the
same properties at $3,937,357 in his bankruptcy schedules.
116. Another reason for questioning the credibility of
his evaluations appears in the Compromise and Settlement Agreement,
upon which both Richins and Sampson had agreed, which contained
one provision that seems of significant relevance. That provision
stated that the original purchase agreements more accurately
reflected the present value —

as of August 1, 1980 —

of the

raw land because the surplus of farm land on the then existing
market.

This agreement reflected the total contract equity

on all partnership properties —

defined as the original purchase

price less the balance due from the partnership — was $1,184,065.
This agreement was drafted by Richins1 attorney, David Day,
agreed to by Richins and acceptable to Sampson.

Although the

agreement was never consummated and settlement negotiations
are not generally admissible as evidence on values or damages,
it does suggest a depressed farm real estate market existed
at that time which would present a problem to any property owner
seeking to sell his farm property.
Furthermore, Richins was willing to settle and dispose
of his Richtron assets for $700,000 at a time he now claims
they had a net worth exceeding six million dollars.

I find
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the credibility of such evidence of net worth weighs heavily
against such values as being a fair and reasonable measure of
values and credible evidence of damages.
117. Richins also undertook to shpw damages by use of a
personal asset and liability statement dated March 15, 1978
showing a net equity of $1,684,490, $1,528,464 of which was
attributable to an equity in Richtron, Inc.

The weight of this

bit of evidence is substantially lost when I reflect upon the
problems confronting the Richtron companies two years later
in May, 1980.
118. As noted at the outset the defendants assert in some
of the claims set forth in their Counterclaim that Sampson's
conduct had been actuated by malice and bad faith, thereby justifying
an imposition of punitive damages for which in the first and
fourth claims they assert an award of $1,000,000 in punitive
damages should be granted.

For many years our Supreme Court

fixed "willful and malicious" conduct as the basis for awarding
punitive damages.

But in Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc.,

657 P. 2d 2 67, our Supreme Court stated that punitive damages
may be awarded in cases where one acts in reckless indifference
and disregard of the law and his felloW citizens.

In Clayton

v. Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (1982) our court
cited a ruling by the Tenth Circuit Coutt of Appeals (439 F.2d
1303) stating its approval of "such gross neglect of duty as
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to evince a reckless indifference of the rights of others on
the part of the wrongdoer, and an entire want of care so as
to raise the presumption that the person at fault is conscious
of the consequences of his carelessness,"
One wonders how much less proof is required to meet the
standard as stated in these words than does "willful and malicious
conduct."

The easing of the requirements was, in my opinion,

brought on by the facts and circumstances in cases where the
conduct was considered so wrong as to justify punitive damages
even though the long used "willful and malicious conduct" test
could not be met.

This requires a consideration of the existing

facts and circumstances of the case which I have long and meticulously dwelt upon and which I do not propose to repeat here
at length.

The case is an unusual cage and although I have

had no trouble in finding liability on claims for relief asserted,
particularly on the fourth claim, the burden remains with defendants
of proving their entitlement to punitive damages as well as
the amount thereof.

The claim for punitive damages requires

the Court to examine the evidence carefully in the light of
the standards set by our Supreme Court for awarding them and
to consider the conduct of Sampson in the l^ght of all the existing
facts and circumstances.
Sampson enters the picture as counsel if or two limited partners
who have learned of and become disturbed by the financial problems
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confronting Richins and his companies and the partnerships in
May, 1980, the details of which have been stated and restated.
At the May 29, 1980 meeting Richins offered to step aside and
allow the Catlow Valley partnerships to select a new general
partner.

During June, 1980 Richins formally withdraws his geneal

partner from three partnerships.
so from all of them.

By January, 1981, he has done

He and Sampson agreed upon a settlement

at the June 26, 1980 meeting.

For the next four of five months

they work together with Sampson getting involved in collecting
funds from limited partners, some of whom refused to give them
directly to Richins.

When the settlement agreement fails of

fruition, Sampson, by then heavily involved with limited partners
in several partnerships, sees a need to get a new general partner.
Sampson, using the powers of attorney he obtained as a
voting proxy, votes first his PC and Later his Ag Management
in as general partner while being contuonted continuously with
Richins1 flood of correspondence with the partners challenging
the validity of such action, but not doing much else about it.
By the end of 1980 Sampson was pretty much in control of partnership
affairs, and remains so for two years until Richins, through
a motion for summary judgment (which could have been filed anytime,
and brought to a hearing on ten days Notice) finally gets a
ruling from Judge Palmer invalidating Ag's role as general partner.
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Unfortunately for defendants, about two weeks before, the
IRS has a tax sale for Richins1 failupe to file tax returns
and pay taxes on partnership property,

The IRS certificate

of sale gives Sampson's group a color of title, at least, as
the tax sale by the IRS is presumed valid.

Twice Judge Cornaby

rules the tax sale was valid and by courtt Order gives Sampson's
group complete control.

The partnership continues on under

the sale and court orders until May, 1984 when an Order is issued
by the federal court that the tax sale was in fact void.

But

the scratch of a pen does not undo and obscure from view all
that has gone on for four years.
Richins waited until January 5, ]i985, before obtaining
an order from Judge Cornaby vacating his prior two orders.
There is a suggestion in the record that Richins' counsel believed
Judge Winder's Order took care of Judgfc Cornaby's last Order.
The record further suggests that at a hearing before federal
Judge Aldon Anderson in late 1984 that a suggestion was made
that such was not the case, and that Cornaby's Order entered
in July, 1983 placing Goff in complete charge of all partnership
affairs might still be in effect.

I haVe heretofore set forth

the exact content of Judge Winder's Ordei* and what is provided.
Its affect on Judge Cornaby's last Order is not relevant to
the punitive damage question.

If punitive damages are allowable,

they would most certainly have to be based on events preceding
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The status of the 25 limited partnershps

at the end of 1984 is not disclosed by the record.
Though the Osborn judgment was acquired by Sampson in violation
of statutory law relating specifically to lawyers, the judgment
was entered because the defendants hejre had failed to pay an
obligation owing to Osborn.

Its acquisition, though in violation

of law because Sampson was a lawyer, oould have been acquired
in the same way by a non-lawyer without violating the law.
The Osborn judgment began to effect the Richtron empire when
and because it was entered, not when cind because this lawsuit
got its start therefrom some nine months later.

The fact that

those who acquired it paid out $65,0010 for it enures to the
benefit of defendants by reducing their liability for that amount
as heretofore ruled.
One wonders what Richins thought the partnerships were
expected to do.

The Richtron general partners1 withdrawal had

left them with an uncertain future.

Many limited partners had

sought legal advice from Sampson and he gave it to them.

The

fact that he erred in the advice given them does not render
his actions malicious.

They, too, could read and write, and

a simple sentence in the partnership (agreement gave them the
authority by simple vote to remove the general partner, elect
a new one and carry on the business of the partnerships.

Or,

they could have petitioned the Court to terminate the partnership

& ± O O

-143-

SAMPSON V. RICHTRON

and wind up its affairs.

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

They did neither.

They had Sampson.

When this case was filed February 11, 1^81, Richins could have
requested a restraining order against Sampson's interference
with partnership affairs. Instead, no doubt influenced by continued
settlement negotiations, he entered into a stipulation delaying
the filing of any responsive pleading. An Answer and Counterclaim
finally made it to the Court in July, 198$.
By my comments in this Finding it is| not my intent to point
the finger of blame at Richins and exonerate Sampson, for I
have already made my findings of his wrongdoing, but I think
it necessary to view Richins1 role in judging Sampson's conduct,
in considering the claim for punitive damages, and in doing
so, it is my opinion that as wrong as Sampson was in many of
the things he did, I think he believed himself to be right in
doing what he did and the way he did theirt. He should have known
the law, but I do not believe he intemtionally violated it.
For almost six months he worked amicably wit|h Richins on settlement.
When that failed, by powers of attorney tie got proxies to vote
the limited partner's interests.
general partner.

He d!id so, electing his PC

When that was said to be contrary to law,

he voted Ag Management in as general partner and so operated.
By the time Judge Palmer ruled that illegal, Sampson was able
to carry on under a color of authority by receipt of an IRS
Certificate of Sale, followed by two favorable rulings by Judge
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Cornaby until the IRS sale was voided in May, 1964, by a federal
court order.
The bitterness and contention that developed and existed
between the two men was long and drawn out and led to prolonged
controversies which had its roots in serious problems already
existing before Sampson entered the ring.

But I do not believe

the evidence preponderates in establishing the type of willful
and malicious conduct, nor the lessened type, required by our
Supreme Court decisions to justify or support an award of punitive
damages and I so find.
119. There yet remains a consideration of any issues of
fact raised by the affirmative defenses set forth in plaintiffs1
Reply to defendants' Second Amended Cbunterclaim which have
not yet been resolved.

Those affirmative defenses were (1)

defendants1 claims are barred by theit illegal, inequitable
and malicious conduct; (2) laches; (3|) waiver; (4) estoppel;
(5) breaches of duty and trust; (6) 4efendantsf combination
and conspiracy to defraud the limited partners; (7) defendants
have been unjustly enriched by the limited partners.
These defenses have application only to the claims asserted
against Sampson in the Counterclaim.

(Questions as to whether

Richins1 conduct gave rise to claims for relief by the limited
partners or the partnerships against hita and/or the defendants
are not to be answered in this lawsuit.

Sampson represented

2iS3

SAMPSON V. RICHTRON

-145-

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

many limited partners, but in this case he made no effort to
bring his clients in as third parties to assert claims.

I have

found from the evidence that Sampson intentionally interfered
with defendants' existing economic relations with the partnerships
for an improper purpose and by improper means causing injury
to them.

Factual questions yet to be answered relate to whether

or not any of the alleged affirmative defenses constitute a
defense to Sampson against liability for injury caused by his
tortious conduct.

There is no doubt that Sampson undertook

to help his clients, but his tort of intentional interference
with existing economic relations began to manifest itself the
first day after the May 29, 1980 meeting when Sampson told Richins
he and his clients wanted to buy Richins out and take over the
partnerships.
120. The affirmative defense that defendants1 claims are
barred by their illegal, inequitable and malicious conduct are
related to matters counsel for plaintiffs referred to in his
opening statement.

Counsel noted that Richins, acting for his

companies, prepared quit-claim deeds about the first week in
June, 1980, improperly conveying partnership properties from
the partnership to his companies illegally and without consideration,
and later used them by threatening to record them if the partnerships
refused his request for help; that Richins hid facts on true
conditions from the investors; that he improperly purused acts
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to dissolve the partnerships prohibited by the statutes and
improperly withdrew the general partner with no intention of
winding up affairs; that from June to December, 1980, Richins
tried to carve out what he considered tfc be his share of value
in the partnerships which had no value; and that during June,
July and August, 1980, a critical time, Richins refused to act
or help the partnerships without stating a reason, but withdrew
the general partner from three partnerships, completely abandoning
them and left them adrift rather than td> extend service to them
in winding up their affairs.
I have already put my stamp of disapproval upon Richins1
execution and use of the quit-claim deeds and set forth in substantial detail Richins1 failure to keep the investors informed
and report as required in the agreement.

I have considered

his withdrawals of general partners and riiled that Section 48-2-20
had no application thereto and have noted his failures to take
steps to wind up the partnership affairs, but Article V (5)
of the agreement states the general partner may at any time
withdraw from the partnership so his doing so could not be declared
improper.

I have also noted the simple, cllear cut and conspicuous

provision in the agreement that the limited partners by majority
vote could remove a general partner and elect a new one.

That

was probably what Sampson thought he was doing by his proxy
votes, but he failed to comply with statutory law. I have considered
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Richins1 formal withdrawal of the general partner from three
partnerships in June, 1980, which counsel says was done without
stating a reason and refusing help, leaving them to drift without
help.

The evidence reflects that two of the withdrawals were

sent the day after those partnerships held meetings at which
both Sampson and Richins were in attendance and at which Sampson
took the occasion to tell the limited partners that the markup
was illegal, that the advances need not b£ repaid, and otherwise
took Richins to task. As to the third partnership, the withdrawal
followed a telephone call from Sampson reporting the limited
partners of Snowville would no longer send contributions to
Richins.

I think the evidence shows these three partnerships

wanted Richins out, not his help, and so showed it very early.
If they were left adrift without help, one is left to wonder
why Sampson was there at all.

I do not view the settlement

negotiations as an effort of Richins tp

try to carve out his

share of the value, when it was Sampson Who led the troops and
put pressure on Richins to agree to the settlement reached.
121. As to the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel
and laches, these three defenses were considered by our Supreme
Court in Angelos v. First Interstate Bftnk of Utah, 671 P.2d
772 (1983), in which the court said:
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To constitute waiver, one's actions
or conduct must be distinctively made, must
evince in some unequivocal manner an intent
to waiver, and must be inconsistent with
any other intent.
As to estoppel, the court said:
The doctrine of estoppel his application
when one, by his acts, representations or
conduct, or by his silence when he ought
to speak, induces another to believe certain
facts exist and such other relies thereon
to his detriment.
As to laches, the court said:
Laches is not merely delay, but delay
that works to the disadvantage of another.
To constitute laches, two elements must
be established:
(1) The lack of diligence
on the part of the plaintiff; and (2) An
injury to defendant owing to such lack of
diligence.
As to these defenses plaintiffs1 counsel said estoppel
was involved because Richins had consented to Sampson coming
on board to help Catlow Valley and ovdrsee it and its funds.
Such consent was in fact coerced by some Catlow Valley partners
who unequivocally stated that they would no longer pay funds
to Richins, so right at the May 29, 1380 meeting, Hansen was
selected to supervise the funds and at the August 5, 1980 meeting
Sampson was given that responsibility by vote of the limited
partners who, under the agreement, had no such authority to
control partnership affairs. Sampson very quickly became involved
in other partnership affairs, such as taking $40,000 to Roosevelt
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on July 18, 19 80, to pay the Pleasant Valley indebtedness to
Murray First Thrift and did so.

Furthermore, the compromise

agreement was agreed to at the June 26, 1980 meeting and the
fact that the compromise agreement was being drafted during
this time, Richins didn't have much choice but to agree to Sampson's
involvement with Catlow Valley partnerships funds.

These facts,

coupled with all other facts and circumstances, did not constitute
an act or conduct by Richins which induced Sampson to believe
that certain facts existed. Nor did they evince in any unequivocal
manner an intent to waive control of th0 partnerships in favor
of Sampson.

They were both at that tim^ hoping the compromise

settlement agreement would be accepted, but Sampson knew what
he wanted and already had a hand on tfte controls should the
agreement fail, as indeed it did.
Counsel for plaintiffs did not press the defense of laches.
This controversy turned into a prolonged paper battle between
these two men over control of the partnerships.

I think there

was a lack of action on the part of Ricfrins in not seeking an
expeditious wind up of partnership affairs, but that worked
to Sampson's advantage, not to his injury.

I also think there

was some delay on the part of Richins in failing to challenge
the alleged appointment of Sampson's corporations as new general
partner.

It was not until November, 1982, that Richins got

before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment on which he
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was successful in getting Judge Palmer to rule on the illegality
of Ag Management's role as general partner in a case filed by
Blackfoot Farms against defendants herein.

But the reason for

such delay in the case at bar is not clearly shown.

That it

was not due to a lack of diligence is apparent from an eight
volume record. But, here too, this delay wgis to Sampson's advantage
as it came after the IRS tax sale on October 29, 1982 by which
Sampson and his group obtain another basis for claiming control
of the partnerships and Richins' holdings.

A challenge to the

tax sale in federal court and obtaining £ ruling thereon within
17 months hardly constitutes laches, particularly where, during
a portion of the time and at Sampson's efforts, Richins was
precluded by Judge Cornaby's Order from having the help of legal
counsel and on his own behalf made a tremendous effort to move
the case forward.
122. As to the defense of breach of duty and trust.

I

recall hearing nothing in counsel's argument that Richins had
a duty to Sampson which he breached or any evidence of breach
of trust.

Both men were at sword's points from the beginning

with almost continuous and constant contention.

I think the

evidence shows there was a genuine effort made by both men to
settle the controversies during the sujnmer and fall of 1980,
during which time relations eased between the two, but several
matters triggered a renewal of the conflicts in the latter part
of 198 0, although notwithstanding what followed, I think the
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evidence showed a renewal of settlement efforts in 1981 that
carried on into 1982.

The flood of correspondence from both

men to the investors usually contained comments of distrust
of one for the other.

In my opinion each had a duty to the

other to act in good faith in their joint efforts to effect
a settlement and each endeavored to do so.

I find no duty which

Richins otherwise owed to Sampson which was breached, nor any
obligation of trust that lends support to this alleged affirmative
defense.
123. The remaining two affirmative defenses are alike in
nature, both alleging a defense based upon allegations as to
what defendants did to the limited partners.

One was that there

was a combination and conspiracy to defraud the limited partners
which was not pled with particularity.

The other was that the

defendants had been unjustly enriched by the limited partners.
Fraud requires proof by clear and convincing evidence.

But

this is not a lawsuit between the partnerships and the defendants.
At this point I am only concerned with whether or not either
of these alleged affirmative defenses bar liability of Sampson
for his tortious conduct.

Sampson is supd in this Counterclaim

for his individual conduct.
any partnership.

He was not a limited partner in

He was president of two corporations which

claimed to be general partners, but neither was legally so.
Sampson thus had no rights under the partnership agreements.
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What rights or defenses the partnerships may have in a controversy
with defendants do not inure to Sampson's benefit.
Up to the meeting of May 29, 1980 with Catlow Valley partners
the evidence showed no acts of Richins that were alleged to
have been fraudulent.

One of the main reasons that the problems

arose which confronted Richins in May, 1980, was not misuse
of funds, but Richins1 failure to pre$s the limited partners
to pay their assessments provided for in title agreements. Instead,
defendants made advances to various partnerships to meet partnership
obligations which probably totaled almost $400,000.

Richins

did not want to press the non-payers and "stir up" trouble and
said he thought the problems could be worked out.

The complaint

of the limited partners when the problems surfaced was directed
more towards Richins1 failures to collect assessments from all
partners or treat their capital accounts as provided in the
agreements.

Richins1 failed to make the annual audited reports

called for in the agreements, but no evfidence was tendered by
Sampson that such audit was made or requested by any limited
partner during the period prior to May, 1980.

It was, however,

clear from the evidence that Richins1 (tPA - Hurd - found his
records poorly kept.

But such problems, as elsewhere noted,

arose before Sampson's involvement.
The execution of the quit-claim deeds, heretofore considered
at length, constitute one questionable action on the part of
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Richins, but I do not see that it and what followed with respect
thereto affords Sampson any defense for his tortious conduct.
The probability is that the deeds constituted a means by which
to combat the tortious acts of Sampson in taking over control
of the partnerships.

As to the claim of unjust enrichment from

the limited partners, the evidence established that as to each
partnership there was a 10% management fee, based upon the selling
price of the property, that went to the general partner at the
time the partnership agreement was executed.

As to several

of the partnerships, the 10% management fee represented several
years of effort on the part of Richins and his general partners.
I believe the management fees were used in part in making advances
to various partnerships.

No further fee was payable and the

agreement provided for the general partner to get 10% of any
profits upon final sale.
any partnership.

That percentage was never paid on

There was a mark-up on the resale price of

the property to the partnership that Would have been profit
to defendants had the contracts paid out.

None did and default

on payments due on the real estate contracts, both buyer and
seller, became an early problem.

Sampson always maintained

that the mark-ups were void but no legal authority was ever
cited by Sampson in support of that contention.

No specific

evidence was offered by Sampson either as to the source or the
amount of the alleged unjust enrichment.
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124. During the trial evidence was received that tended
to show an alteration in one or more partnership agreements
which increased the maximum amount of capital assessment limited
partners could be required to pay on an annual basis.

There

was substantial discussion about this alleged alteration during
closing argument with plaintiffs1 counsel contending that the
alteration led to Valmont Corporation changing its mind on a
sale of sprinkling equipment and agreeing to a sale which imposed
a $750,000 obligation on the Catlow Valley Farms. Counsel contends
that without such alteration the Catlow Valley partnerships
would not have been burdened by such an obligation on property
worth only $250,000.

Counsel for defendants took exception

to such contention, stating Valmont extended $750,000 credit
for its own reasons, that there was no evidence in the record
as to what Valmont relied on, and opposing counsel's contentions
constituted pure speculation.

On December 31, 1980 Valmont

took a $714,000 default judgment, a case Sampson allegedly represented defendants upon, but let go to default judgment.

Defense

counsel points out that Sampson made a $15,000 payment to Valmont
on the judgment, but Richins employed other counsel and had
the default judgment vacated for which Richins paid an attorney's
fee.

Defense counsel further argued that if such alleged change

was made as alleged, "so what," it had no relevance to this
case and Sampson's alleged
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interference with the Richtron companies trying to wind up partnership affairs.
I agree the Valmont obligation created a very heavy financial
obligation to the Catlow Valley partnerships, but it put a sprinkler
system on their properties.

I agree also with defense counsel's

contention that no matter for what reason Valmont extended credit
and sold the sprinkler system to those farms, it constitutes
no defense to Sampson's liability on the Counterclaim for his
own tortious conduct.
125. In his opening statement counsel for plaintiffs stated
that a vital issue was who had the rights to run the farms.
From the evidence Sampson's asserted right lay in his use of
powers of attorney as voting proxies to replace the Richtron
general partners with first his PC and then Ag Management.
This asserted right prevailed until Judge Palmer declared Sampson's
general partner had no legal right to control.

But then his

asserted right continued by reason of the IRS sale on October
29, 1982 and the two orders of Judge Cornaby confirming the
validity of the tax sale.

But the sale turned out to be void

as determined by Judge Winder in May, 1984.

Sampson thus had

control and possession for four years, but under circumstances
that were determined as lacking in legality.
Richins' right to run the farms lay in his creation of
the partnerships, the agreement for which made a Richtron company
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general partner from the beginning, gave said general partner
complete control, and although withdrawals took place, the law
gave them the right to retain possession and control to wind
up the affairs and terminate the partnership's existence.
One answer to counsel's stated issue is to be found in
the Court's ruling that Sampson's intentional interference with
defendants' existing economic relations was tortious.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ftN
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
1.

Richtron, Inc. as general partner upon the Catlow

Valley limited partnerships 1-7, was liable to Osborn for the
drilling work done by him on those farms.
2.

Richins and RFC were liable to Osborn as the guarantors

of that obligation for Richtron, Inc., the general partner.
3.

None of the limited partners of the Catlow Valley

limited partnerships 1-7, nor the limited partnerships had any
liability to Osborn for the well drilling work he did on their
farms.

(Comment:

the court said:

In Evans v. Galardi, 546 P.2d 313 (Calif,)

"A limited partnership can generally be described

as a type of partnership comprised of one Or more general partners
who manage the business and are personally liable for partnership
debts, and one or more limited partners who contribute capital
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and share in the profits, but who take no part in running the
business and incur no liability with respect to partnership
obligations beyond their capital contributions.")
4.

With Osborn having failed to record a mechanics lien

for his unpaid labors, his judgment did not create a judgment
lien against the farm property the limited partnerships were
then buying.
5.

There was no improper dealing, misrepresentation,

or deceit in satisfaction of the obligation that gave rise to
the judgment as Richins was in full dontrol and allowed the
obligation to Osborn to go unpaid and thui the alleged affirmative
defense of estoppel as applied to that contention has no merit
as against any claimant on the Complaint.
6.

Under the partnership agreements capital contributions

were added to a partner's capital account and such funds when
paid were within the control of the general partner for whatever
use the general partner should determine.

Sampson had no legal

authority to collect and spend such funcfts including the payment
of $20,000 to Osborn upon the judgment assignment transaction.
7.

Furthermore, Sampson's action in obtaining the assignment

was void as being contrary to statutory law.

Section 78-51-27

of the Utah Code provided that "an attorney shall not:

Directly

or indirectly, buy, or be in any manner interested in buying
or having assigned to him, for the purpose of collection, a

u *J ^ JL
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bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book, debt, or other
thing in action, with the intent and for the purpose of bringing
an action thereon."

This statute further provides that any

attorney who violates this statute is guilty of a misdemeanor
and shall be punished accordingly, and his license to practice
may be revoked or suspended.
8.

Sampson's purpose in acquiring the assignment was

to bring an action thereon, such being filed on February 11,
1981, and in doing so he violated this statute.

(Comment:

As shall be set forth later, such action was also alleged to
have been a violation of professional ethics)
9.

The revocation of the assignment by Osborn for failure

of consideration renders moot the illegality of Sampson's action
in obtaining the assignment in January, 1981.
10.

Sampson's actions in paying the $45,000 following

Osborn's purchase of defendants' property interests at the sheriff's
sale and acquiring the new assignment of the judgment was a
violation of the second portion of Section 78-51,27 which states
that an attorney shall not "(2) by himself, or by or in the
name of another person, either before or after action brought,
promise or give, or procure to be promised or given, a valuable
consideration to any person as an inducement to placing, or
in consideration of having placed, in his hands or the hands
of another person, a demand of any kind for the purpose of bringing
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action thereon, or of representing the claimant in the pursuit
of any civil remedy for the recovery thereof."
11.

This statute is a prohibition against actions by an

attorney only in obtaining such a claim anld provides for punishment
of the attorney, but is silent upon the validity of any claim
thus acquired.

It does not bar non-4ttorneys from acquiring

such claims for the purposes forbidden by the statute to a lawyer.
While Sampson was again subject to the penalties or punishments
provided in the statute, the limited partners listed in Finding
17 who put up the amounts indicated to make the purchase from
Osborn did not violate the statute or otherwise act illegally
in doing so.
12.

The $50,000 bid Osborn made at the sherifffs sale

gave him all the property rights the three defendants then owned
or had an interest in in the Catlow Galley Farms property.
He acquired a quid pro quo for his bid and by his doing so he
received assets which entitled the judgment debtors to a $50,000
credit as a payment on the judgment.

Osborn passed those assets

on to Goff as trustee in the warranty1 deed Osborn gave Goff
and although the assignment recited a $65,000 consideration
was paid therefor, the assignment of the judgment gave to Goff
only the deficiency remaining in the judgment after all proper
credits were deducted therefrom.

The fact that Osborn accepted
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an attorney/client relationship existed between Sampson, Richins
and Richtron companies in which Sampson represented said parties
as clients and was not merely acting as counsel for limited
partners who, for some reason, may have had an interest in the
lawsuits involved.
22.

Sampson's conduct in representing interests adverse

to those of defendants after once establishing the attorney/client
relationship constituted a breach of fiduciary duty by a lawyer
to his clients and of trust and in doing so violated ethical
standards adopted by the bar association relating to attorney/client
relationships, duties and responsibilities.

Such conduct is

a part of the overall conduct of Sampson concluded to be tortious
in the conclusions that follow.

But defendants1 evidence did

not establish by a preponderance thereof that such conduct proximately caused identifiable damages specifically arising out
of such conduct.
23.

The claims asserted by Richins and RFC against the

plaintiffs for whom Goff was trustee have no merit and they
are entitled to no damages thereon and thus no offset against
the plaintiffs1 award of damages as set forth in the findings.
24.

Sampson's acceptance of the representation of defendants

in various lawsuits as set forth in the findings and his failure
to answer or otherwise respond, or to take steps for defendants
to obtain other counsel and thereby avoid defaults, constituted
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negligence and a failure to measure up to the standard of care
to be expected of members of the legal profession.

However,

as to such negligence defendants proved damages only in the
total amount of $2188.70 which consisted of attorneys fees paid
Gary Kennedy for work done to set aside the default judgments
in the Valmont and Interlake Thrift cases for which amount defendants
are entitled to a judgment against Sampson on their second claim
for relief, Richins in the amount of $2027.40 and Richtron,
Inc. in the full amount of $2188.70.
25.

Under the Certificate of Limited Partnership the general

partner had the authority to assess, without limitation, the
limited partners for partnership obligations such as installment
payments due on land purchases, costs of irrigation equipment
and other necessary expenses.

The general partner did not have

authority, upon failure of a limited partner to pay such assessment,
to sue the limited partner for the unpaid assessment, but did
have authority under the agreement to reduce the limited partners1
interest in the partnership as well as to reduce his capital
account.
26.

The General Partner could not make capital investments

in any partnership, but did, under express provisions of the
partnership agreements, have the discretion to advance monies
to the partnerships for use in the operations.

The aggregate

amount of such advances to any partnership became an obligation
of the partnership to the general partner making those advances
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to be repaid in accordance with the loan instrument or the agreement.

Any such advances to any partnership established by the

evidence was a debt repayable to the general partner.
V (1) (c) and ARticle VII (13)).

(Article

Sampson's statements to the

contrary to the limited partners did not} alter such obligations.
While as counsel for ^ji^-J-imited partners, he was free to give
them advice and his own legal thinking on all issues, he could
not by giving such legal advice alter obligations created under
legal relationships, nor can he escape personal responsibility
for injuries he may have caused thereby simply because he was
a lawyer giving advice to clients.

Injuries he may have caused

to his own clients by wrongful advice gire not relevant to this
case.
27.

Richins, as president of the general partners, and

in complete control along with members of his family, had been
the guiding light of each partnership in whom the investors
had placed their confidence.

He knew as the one drafting the

partnership agreements and the person responsible for putting
all the partnerships together, that he as president was the
agent for each general partner and th^tt such general partners
could act only through him.

Richins1 acts were the acts of

the general partners and the general partners were bound by
Richins1 acts or failures to act, for whatever fell therefrom
upon the general partners under the partnership agreements and
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Thus his conduct as established by the evidence plays

a significant role in examining claimed injuries and damages,
if any, allegedly resulting therefrom.
28.

The undisclosed execution by Richins as president

of the general partner of the quit-claim deeds on or about June
2 and 5, 1980, which deeds purported t0 convey all partnership
properties to RFC of the partnerships named in Finding of Fact
56, was contrary to law and therefor^ void.

While the farm

properties were being purchased by tfye partnerships under a
contract with RFC, the legal effect Of the quit-claim deeds
was to deprive the partnership of its main if not its only,
asset which would make it impossible for the partnership to
carry on its ordinary business.

Section 48-2-9 (2) specifically

states that the general partner has no authority to do this
without the written consent or ratification of all the limited
partners. While a general partner has full charge of the management,
conduct and operation of partnership affairs (Article V (1)),
Article VII (6) states that in the eVent the general partner
desires to take any action which is subject to the consent of
the limited partners, the general partner shall give each limited
partner notice of the proposed action.

Such notice was not

given and precluded limited partners from objecting thereto
within the fourteen days

allowed

in said Article.

Section

48-2-10(1)(b) states limited partners shall have a formal account
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of partnership affairs whenever circumstances render it just
and reasonable.

It is difficult to conceive of any circumstance

falling more closely into this statutory provision than the
secretive conveyance of the partnership farms to a third party.
Finally and most importantly, there is a need some place along
the line for a winding up of the affairs of the partnership,
foremost among which is to provide for payment to the creditors.
This could not be successfully done if the general partner has
first disposed of the assets of the partnership.

Any claim

by defendants that the recording of $uch deeds six or seven
months later gave defendants complete ownership interest for
which they appear to assert the fair market value thereof as
a measure of damages is, in my opinion, without merit and I
so conclude.
29.

On June 5, 1980 Richins prepared and executed the

eighteen promissory notes set out in Finding of Fact 57.

The

content of the notes shows they were intended to cover the obligations owed by the various partnerships for advances of monies
Richins claims were made to the partnership.

The content also

shows that such notes were not made at the time an advance was
made, which Article V(l) (c) seems to imply should be the time
when the "terms of the loan instrument" should have been established.

However, I do not conclude that delay in executing

such loan instrument rendered the obligations for advances void.
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Such delay certainly left all concerned without any guidelines
for repaying the advances out of gross receipts of a partnership
as set forth in that Article.

That Article states that such

advances shall not be deemed a capital contribution, but also
that such advances shall become immediately due and payable
upon the sale of the property or the termination or dissolution
of the partnership.

Article VII (a) stated that the partnership

shall "terminate" upon the "withdrawal0 of the general partner
and that upon termination, the partnership affairs shall be
wound up, its liabilities and obligations to creditors paid,
all remaining assets shall be distributed as provided in Article
IV and the partnership shall then be dissolved.
terms of the agreement the "withdrawal"

Under these

of the general partner

effected a termination which would have rendered the advances
immediately due and payable.

Sampson's repeated admonitions

to the investors and his repeated contentions to Richins that
the advances did not have to be repaid are factors to be considered
in determining the tortiousness of his conduct.
30.

As to Findings of Fact 59, 60, 61 and 62, Richins1

instructions on one hand to the limited partners of Blackfoot,
Snowville and Kanosh in June, 1980, that the Richtron general
partner had withdrawn and that they wer£ to go ahead and elect
a new general partner, while on the other hand telling them
that the partnership was then terminated and its affairs were
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to be wound up, debts paid, the assets distributed and the partnership would be dissolved, did in my mind, raise confusion in
the minds of the investors in those partnerships as to what
they were to do or what they could expect.

The suggestion to

elect a new general partner implies that the business of the
partnerships was to continue. The statement that the partnership
was terminated and its affairs would be wound up puts the burden
to do so on the Richtron general partider and renders needless
the election of a new general partners.

He appeared, as did

Sampson later on, to place his own erroneous interpretation
on what the law allowed him to do.

As elsewhere considered,

it is my opinion Richins misinterpreted Section 48-2-20.
31.

Finding of Fact 63 notes that at the meeting of June

26, 1980, discussions resulted in Sampson first becoming involved
in the receipt and disbursement of partnership funds.

This

function began because investors at tl}e meeting insisted that
Richins alone was to no longer handle su<ph funds. While Richins
consented, the authority of the limited partners to direct such
action without thereby becoming active in partnership affairs
did not exist.

The partnership agreement^ placed the full charge

of the management, conduct and operation of the partnerships
in all respects and in all matters upon the general partner
and specifically provided that no limited partner shall take
part in the conduct or control of the affairs of the partnership.
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The settlement agreement tentatively reached at the meeting
undoubtedly influenced this course of action.

Article V(l) (b)

authorizes the general partner to employ on behalf of the partnerships persons, such as attorneys, to render the type of extraordinary
services not generally rendered by owners and operators of property.
Collecting partnership funds and disbursing them are not "extraordinary services," but are in fact the services generally rendered
by the general partner of a limited partnership.

I question

Richins1 authority to consent to Sampson's role in the collection
of funds and I do not believe limited partners can hire a lawyer
to represent them and direct him to participate in partnership
affairs that are within the exclusive control of the general
partner.

But what was done, was done —

probably because all

concerned believed the settlement agreement would resolve the
existing problems and, pending execution thereof, obligations
of the partnerships had to be met and funds to do so had to
be collected.

However, this tentative arrangement pending the

drafting and consummation of the settlement agreement is not,
in my opinion, a factor to be given much weight in weighing
the legality of what Sampson did in the months that followed.
32.

As mentioned in Finding of Fact 64, and as elsewhere

frequently referred to, Sampson made repeated contentions that
the limited partners or the partnerships had no obligation to
repay advances made to the partnership by the general partner.
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As noted elsewhere, Section 48-2-1 and Article VI(1) clearly
provide that limited partners shall riot be personally liable
for the debts of the partnership or any of the losses thereof.
But this freedom from liability extended to the partners does
not extend to the partnerships and to pay partnership liabilities,
limited partners are subject to assessments at the will of the
general partner.

In such contentions I believe and so conclude

that Sampson as a lawyer had a responsibility to make clear
that under the partnership agreements advances were subject
to repayment as provided in the agreement and I find nothing
in the evidence that suggests Sampson ever fulfilled that responsibility. While Sampson may have believed this opinion he expressed
so often, it did not make it so and is a part of his conduct
to be examined in determining whether tort liability was proven.
33.

With respect to what is stated in Finding of Fact

65, I note that Richins did frequently stress the fact that
by his withdrawal of his companies as general partners, such
withdrawal legally terminated the partnership under Section
48-2-20 of the Code and set the course for its dissolution.
I have reflected upon that contention at considerable length
and concluded the section needed consideration.

It provides

that the "retirement, death or insanity of a general partner
dissolves the partnership, unless the business is continued
by the remaining general partners (a) under a right to do so
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stated in the certificate, or (b) with the consent of all members.M
I have concluded that both (a) and (b) are premised upon the
existence of more than one general partner in the limited partnership
as it then exists.
As I read this statute, if one general partner retires,
dies or becomes insane, a surviving general partner, if there
be one, can continue the business under this section only if
his right to do so is so stated in the certificate, or such
surviving general partner obtains the consent of all members
to continue the business.

Unless the requirements of (a) and

(b) are met, a remaining general partner has no authority under
the statute to prevent the statutory dissolutionment that is
triggered by the prevailing conditions at the time.

Where there

is no "remaining general partner" to continue the business under
Section 48-2-20, the provisions of Section 48-2-24(2)(e) would
have no application with respect to amendment of the certificate,
nor would the selection of a new general partner cure the defect.
The phrase "retirement, death or insanity," of a general
partner also appears in Section 48-2-9 which states that without
the written consent or ratification of the specific act by all
the limited partners, a general partner or all of the general
partners shall have no authority to, among other prohibitions,
continue the business with partnership property on the death,
retirement, or insanity of a general partner unless the right
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My conclusion is that

this statute also supports the conclusion I came to regarding
Section 48-2-20 as set forth in the preceding paragraphs.
34.

As I have reflected upon the issues of this case and

the contentions made therein, I have pondered over the meaning
and scope of the word "retirement" ap used in the statute.
I note that the word "retirement" is not used in the Certificate
of Partnership Agreement.

The word used in the Certificate

that seems to approach it in use and purpose is the word "withdrawal," a word not found in Utahs Limited Partnership Act.
The word "retirement" has no applicable definition in the Code.
Upon research I found Dickson v. Hansman, 413 P.2d 378
(Wash.), which case considered a contract using the words "death,
permanent disability or retirement of" and discussed the meaning
of "retirement."

The court noted that both sides cited many

definitions bearing upon some phase of the meaning of "retirement."
That court determined that the circumstances existing relating
to the choice of that word, with no definition being added,
were significant and concluded the parties did not intend it
to mean resignation, quitting or withdrawal from the business
at any time or in any manner.

Under the "ejusdem generis" canon

of statutory construction where words follow the enumeration
of particular classes of things, the general word will be construed
as applying only to things of the same general class as those
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(Black's Law Dictionary - 5th Edition, p. 464).

Both death and insanity have application only to persons and
not to legal entities and connote a permanent incapacity to
perform.

Thus, it seems to me, that the legislature intended

the language of Section 48-2-2 0 to apply to general partners
who were real people having the capacity of experiencing death,
insanity, or retirement, and as to the latter, reaching that
stage in life where one by age or physical ailments is unable
to continue on in the normal course of events.

I do not believe,

and so conclude, that the word "retirement" as used in the statute
and the word "withdrawal" as used by Richins are synonymous.
Neither death, insanity or retirement has any reasonable or
literal application to a corporation, yet Richins repeatedly
relied upon Section 42-2-20 as including a voluntary withdrawal
by his corporations as general partner, at any time, for any
reason, and using any means, as a basis for his authority for
the dissolution and termination of his partnerships.

He should

have relied upon the partnership agreements he drafted.
Section 48-1-3 provides that provisions of this chapter
(which relates to general partnerships) shall apply to limited
partnerships except insofar as the statutes relating to such
partnerships are inconsistent herewith.
define "dissolution."

Chapter 2 does not

Chapter 1, Section 26, states:
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The dissolution of a partnership is
the change in the relation of the partners
caused by any partner ceasing to be associated
in the carrying on, as distinguished from
the winding up, of the business.
Section 48-1-27 provides that "On dissolution a partnership
is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of the
partnership affairs is completed."

Dissolution is thus not

termination, but is rather the opening of the door for winding
up the affairs of the partnership business that has leads to
termination.
35.

From the foregoing it is my conclusion and I so rule,

that Section 48-2-20 is not applicable to the issues of this
case and Richins1 repeated referral to that section as a basis
for his authority to follow the course he took was an erroneous
application of and reliance on the statute in question.

Thus,

I think we must look to the Certificate of Partnership Agreement
and the provisions relating thereto to determine rights and
responsibilities arising out of the "Withdrawal" of a general
partner.
Relevant provisions of the partnership agreements have
been noted

(Finding 65) and further merttion will be made here.

Article V (5) provides that the general partner may at any time
withdraw from the partnership, sell or assign all or any part
of its interest as a general partner to a qualified party, by
giving notice to all limited partners,, and such notice shall
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be effective upon the receipt by the la^t partner of such notice
of withdrawal, sale or assignment.

$ection VII (2) requires

that all notices to be given under the agreement shall be in
writing.

Another provision (Article VI]}) states the partnership

shall terminate 22 years from the date thereof or upon the prior
occurrence of any one of certain listed events, included among
which is by the "withdrawal," of the general partner, or by
the affirmative vote of not less than a majority in interest
of the limited partners as provided in Article VI, paragraph
6(b), which states that the limited partners have the right,
by vote of a majority interest to terminate the partnership
and order the distribution of assets.

Paragraph 6(a) thereof

gives to the limited partners the rigl}t to remove the present
general partner and elect a new one.

Sihce the general partner's

"withdrawal" does not become effective until receipt of the
written notice by the last partner of the partnership, in that
interval of time -- until the effective moment of the notice
—

the limited partners could by majority vote remove the general

partner and elect a new one. Such action would avoid the termination
which the withdrawal of the general partner would othewise effect.
In this case there is no evidence that the limited partners
of any partnership did so after Richins sent out his notices
of withdrawal, nor was any evidence presented that any limited
partner failed to receive such notice of Withdrawal.
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Article VII sets forth the steps to be taken upon

termination by such withdrawal to effect a wind up of the partnership
affairs —

the payment of the partnership's liabilities and

obligations to creditors and the distribution of all remaining
assets as provided in Article IV of the agreement, which states
that after receipt by the limited partners of payment in value
of the amounts of their capital contributions, the remainder
is divided 9 0% to the limited partners and 10% to the general
partner.
Again I mention that the agreement makes it clear that
all unpaid advances made by the general partner to the partnership
are due and payable upon the sale of the property or the termination
and dissolution of the partnership.

I also note that Section

48-2-23 of our Code sets out the order in which the liabilities
of the partnership shall be paid in Settling accounts after
"dissolution," which as I have noted before, is a proceeding
that leads to "termination" under our Code.
39.

But

the

claims

for

relief

in the

Counterclaim

are

not based upon what did not happen, but rather upon the alleged
intentional

interference of Sampson with respect to partnership

affairs; whether
and

what

injuries

damages,

if

occured;

any, were

an$ if s o , what

proximately

caused

injuries
thereby.

This requires a careful examination of ^hat Sampson did or did
not do as required by law.

Sampson's de$ire, if not his intent,
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to take over control of all the partnerships was manifested
by him to Richins the first day after the May 29, 1980 meeting
of the Catlow Valley partnerships.

Sampson!s acts and course

of conduct are set out in Finding of Fact 67 through 75.

As

can be seen therein Sampson endeavored to remove the Richtron
general partners and elect first his PC ahd later his Ag Management
corporation as general partners in each partnership by utilizing
the voting authority he claimed was granted to him under the
powers of attorney.

The partnership agreements gave him an

easy way to achieve his goal and incredibly he did not use it
—

the majority vote by the limited partners when properly used

as required by law.
The provisions of our statutes state a limited partnership
can be formed by two or more persons, who desire to form a limited
partnership, signing and swearing to a certificate, which signing
and swearing are both mandatory as tcj) each member under the
statute.

The statute sets forth what such certificate shall

state (Section 48-2-2) . Section 48-2-24 provides that a certificate
shall be amended when a person is admitted as a general partner,
or if a general partner retires, diei or becomes insane and
the business is continued under Section 48-2-20, which section
I have heretofore considered at length.

Section 48-2-25 states

the writnig to amend a certificate shall conform to the requirements
of Section 48-2-2(1) as far as necessary to set forth clearly

*w4f i

SAMPSON V. RICHTRON

-181-

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

the change in the certificate which it is desired to make and
be signed and sworn to by all memberb.

In my opinion these

statutory requirements are explicit in requiring each member
of a limited partnership to sign and swear to any amended certificate, and in no sense of the word could Sampson's purported
voting proxies represented by powers of attorney allow him or
the limited partners to ignore the specific requirements of
these statutes and allege compliance therewith by use of only
his own signature under such powers of attorney.
The partnership agreements mentioned certain voting rights
the limited partners had —

to remove the general partner by

vote of a majority in interest and eledt a new one, or to vote
to terminate the partnership and order the distribution of assets.
Sampson may have read the agreement so as to lead him to think
that all he needed was authority to vote the interest of each
limited partner, that such authority could be obtained by use
of a power of attorney, and that once having obtained such powers
of attorney, he was authorized under the agreement to sit alone
in his own office, hold a partnership meeting, and cast the
votes to remove the Richtron general partner and vote his own
corporation in.

But, as stated, Section 48-2-24(d) states that

a certificate shall be amended when a, person is admitted as
a general partner and the statutes cited i^i the preceding paragraph
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require such amended certificate to bq signed and sworn to bv
all the members.
Section 48-2-25 also states that a certificate is amended
when there is filed for record in the office of the county clerk
where the certificate is recorded a writing in conformity with
the provisions of paragraph 1 thereof.

Also Article VII (9)

touches generally upon amending the Agreement by stating it
may be amended from time to time witty the written consent of
the general partner and all of the limited partners.
40.

I thus conclude under the ^acts and circumstances

of this case that in attempting to substitute his own corporation
(PC) as general partner, the amended certificate reflecting
such change was not signed and sworn to by each member of the
partnership as required by law, and thus the amended certificate
filed as to the substitution of Sampson's PC was invalid ab
initio as not being in conformity witih law and had no force
or effect in removing the Richtron general partners.
41.

As to Sampson's effort to substitute Ag Management

as general partner wherein no amended certificate was even filed,
I conclude that that effort also was invalid as not being in
conformity with law and had no force and effect in removing
the Richtron general partners.

I also Conclude that a document

entitled "Notice of Substitution" of a new general partner did
not constitute an amendment to the certificate, but that if
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it could liberally be said that it wfrs, and so intended, it
still lacked the required formalities of law.
42.

In closing argument counsel for plaintiffs' counsel

cited Rond v. Yeamons. et al., 681 P.id 1240, as holding that
the failure to file a certificate of limited partnership did
not affect liability thereunder and that the argument raised
against Sampson with failure to property file was a straw man
argument and not in conformity with what the Supreme Court said
in that case.

A reading of that case does not, in my opinion,

support counsel's contention.

In th^t case the partnership

certificate was signed but not recorded.

The plaintiff asserted

that the failure to file as required by Section 48-2-2(1) (b)
rendered the defendants' statement that it was a limited partnership
under the laws of Utah was a false statement and the failure
to record was not a substantial compliance with the statute.
Our court noted the issue had not beeri presented in the court
before, but that the Supreme Court of New Mexico had directly
addressed the problem in Hoefer v. Hall^, 411 P.2d 230.

There,

though the limited partnership agreement had been executed by
the parties, it had never been recorded under New Mexico statutes.
Our court said:

"The Court held that \^here neither the rights

of third parties, .... failure to record the certificate cannot
affect the existence of a limited partnership insofar as the
parties, inter se, are concerned."

Our cpurt then stated:
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We conclude that the failure to file
the certificate of limited partnership does
not affect the existence of the limited
partnership as an entity, in a controversy
between the partners themselves, where...the
interests of third parties...." is not invovled.
The case at bar is clearly distinguishable on the facts
as the interests of third parties are involved and the case
is not authority for saying the amended certificates Sampson
purported to use and file were valid and binding even though
not in compliance with state law.
43.

Finding of Fact 73 mentions Judge Palmer's ruling

that Ag Management was not the general partner of any partnership,
and Finding of Fact 74 sets forth facts concerning an IRS sale
of defendants1 property interests on October 29, 1982, which
preceded Judge Palmer's ruling by about two weeks.

The tax

sale was made to Goff as trustee and gave him at least a color
of title to continue the take over of whatever Richtron interests
were sold at the tax sale.

The IRS issued a Certificate of

Sale and its validity was confirmed by Judge Cornaby's rulings
which gave Goff control until Judge Winder's ruling in May,
19 84, declared the sale void and set aside all claim of rights
asserted by Sampson and his group under that tax sale.

From

Finding of Fact 76 it is apparent that by the time Judge Winder
entered his ruling, all partnership foreclosures had occurred
except East Taber, which was foreclosed on August 8, 1984.
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The evidence lacks any details as to what the foreclosures involved,
whether they resulted in a complete loss of partnership property
without any return to the partnership, and what, if anything,
was done as far as winding up partnership affairs, including
information as to what was done about e&ch partnership's debts,
assets, liabilities or profits remaining, if any.

From the

evidence the only information the court has is that as of the
date Judge Winder made his ruling, the Ag Management account
had a balance of about $28,7 00 which fay October 29, 1984 had
increased to over $43,000, while the account balance of Consolidated
Farms as of October 29, 1984 was $245,997, with $74,320 having
been received since Judge Winder's ruling and $12,000 having
been disbursed, all to Ag Management, more details of which
accounts are set forth in Conclusions of Law 64 and 65 that
follow.
44.

Judge Palmer's ruling that Ag Management was not under

the law a validly elected general partner of the partnerships
brought the Sampson's group's control oft that basis to an end,
but the prior IRS tax sale of October 29, 1982, followed by
Judge Cornaby's two orders, authorized the Sampson group to
continue its control of the property interests acquired by that
rule until Judge Winder entered his Order on May 16, 1984, which,
among other things, ruled as follows:
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Ordered that that certain United States
Internal Revenue Service public auction
conducted on October 29, 1982, in Ogden,
Utah, for the purpose of liquidating certain
tax liabilities of Plaintiff Richtron, Inc. shall
be, and the same hereby is, declared void
and of absolutely no force or effect; and
it is accordingly
Ordered that any and all Certificates
of Sale of Seized Property issued by the
United States Internal Revenue Service to
Goff or Goff's nominees or agents, shall
be, and the same hereby are, declared void
and of absolutely no force Or effect; and
it is further
Ordered that neither Goff nor his nominees
or agents have any right, title or interest
in and to (1) the capital stock of the plaintiff
corporations; (2) the right of the plaintiff
corporations to liquidate, wind-up, terminate
and render an accounting respecting the
affairs of any limited partnership of which
they are the liquidating general partners;
(3) the right of the plaintiff corporations
to institute or maintain causes of action
for or on behalf of themselves; and (4)
any of the real estate contracts described
in the notices of seizure at issue in this
proceeding.
From Judge Winder's ruling it is apparent that as of the date
thereof neither Goff nor his agents o|r nominees received any
valid rights from the IRS sale of defendants1 interests in the
partnership; and specifically no right, title or interest in
the capital stock of defendants1 corporations, the defendants1
rights to wind up the affairs of any limited partnership of
which they were the liquidating general partners, or in any
of the real estate contracts described in the notices of seizure.
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In my opinion Judge Winder's Order ended then and there Goff
or his agents1 or nominees1 right to take any further steps
in the wind up of any affairs of any jpartnerhsip in which the
Richtron companies remained as general partners, and I so conclude.
From Finding of Fact 7 6 it appears that notwithstanding
Judge Winder's ruling, Sampson by his letter of August 28, 1984
continued to assert rights in the properties, alleging as a
reason therefore that he and his group had repurchased some
of the farm properties after they had been foreclosed upon,
but giving no information as to which properties they had so
purchased, or when, or any information as to what partnership
interests may have passed back to the control of Richtron general
partners by reason of Judge Winder's ruling.

Whether defendants

should be granted an accounting from Sapipson after he took over
control of all partnerships at the beginning of 1981 will await
completion of further Conclusions of Law4
45.

Sampson's telephone call, considered in Finding of

Fact 78, to John Anderson, counsel fcjr defendants, "warning"
him that unless he ceased all representations of the various
Richtron entities, including a federal court case recently filed
and appeals to modify recent District Court rulings, he would
seen "sanctions" and "other relief" against him, was not a limitation
put upon Anderson by Judge Cornaby's Orcfter of February 3, 1983.
Sampson's action in so stating to Andertson was, in my opinion,

2;J3i

SAMPSON V. RICHTRON

-188-

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

unprofessional conduct and I so conclude as I examine the facts
of this case bearing upon Sampson's conduct.
46.

From what is stated in the findings up through Finding

of Fact 75, I conclude that Richins has not established by a
preponderance of the evidence that Sampson's conduct interfered
with and invaded, as alleged "his ricfot" to earn a livelihood
as a syndicator of limited partnership interests, as distinguished
from an alleged intentional interference with existing or potential
economic relatinos, nor with anticipated opportunities for employment
as alleged. As to Richins1 claims for relief on these two limited,
but specific grounds, I conclude that they should be and are
denied.
47.

In Utah a claim for relief for intentional interference

with existing or prospective economic relations states a claim
upon which relief can be granted, and imposes upon the claimant
the burden of proving the three elements of that tort as set
forth in Finding of Fact 80.

I conclude that such a claim for

relief is set forth in the fourth claim, note that the other
claims for relief are realleged as a part of the fourth claim,
and so evidence received with respect to other claims has a
part in defendants' meeting their burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the three essential elements of that
tort.
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As to Finding of Fact 84, I do not believe and so

conclude that, as repeatedly contended by Sampson, a markup
in the contract price for which RFC or Richtron, Inc. sold farm
property to a partnership by contract w£s a breach of fiduciary
duty which rendered such contract, or the mark-up therein contained,
illegal and void.
49.

Sampson, as also considered in Finding 84, by instructing

Richins to send him any complaint and summons served upon him
on any lawsuit, and stating that he would answer it, and doing
so when such was sent, created a lawyer/client relationship
between them, and did so likewise as tjo cases sent to Sampson
in which he failed to answer the Complaint and let a default
judgment be entered.
50.

The limited partners had no authority to vote Sampson

in as attorney for the Richtron companies, yhen and if the settlement
agreement was consummated, as Sampson requested and allowed
them to do at the June 26, 1980 meeting.
51.

Finding of Fact 84 also considers facts relating to

the ongoing conflict between Richins afld Sampson over advances
made to the partnerships by defendants or members of Richins1
family.

The partnership agreements recognized that it would

probably become necessary for monies to be advanced to a partnership
to meet expenses, and specifically provided that the general
partner could make such advances periodically which would constitute
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loans to the partnership to be repaid by the means provided
for therein.
I conclude from the information in Finding 84 that the
Richtron general partners made such advances to twelve named
partnerships which advances became and were loan obligations
of the particular partnership receiving them to be repaid as
provided in the partnership agreements. From the same information
I find that defendants received advances from eight limited
partnerships as set forth and how these advances were handled
by the defendants I have not gleaned from the evidence.

The

advances included money furnished by the Leo H. Richins Family
Trust and by Shari Richins.
I further conclude that the oft repeated statements by
Sampson that the advances did not have to be repaid which he
made to investors, with no explanation a£ to what the agreements
provided with respect thereto, were erroneous, and in my opinion
such repeated statements had the effect of convincing some limited
partners that the partnerships had no obligation to repay the
advances to the general partner and constituted a factor in
the failure to have the settlement agreement consummated; and
such was an improper means used in hi|s interference with the
economic relations existing between the partnerships and the
general partners.
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Sampson had no authority to use partnership funds

to pay off Murray First Thrift at a foreclosure sale on July
18, 1980, or to refuse to turn over the reconveyance deed made
out to the general partner to Richins. Such act was an intentional
interference in partnership affairs.
53.

As set out in Finding of Fact 87, the written solicitation

of powers of attorney giving Sampson the right to vote for the
limited partner, contained the written stated purpose that they
must remove Richins and his organizations as general partners
and to thereafter commence legal action to retain the properties,
roll back the contract prices and pursue other legal means.
Such request, together with his written instruction that all
contributions to the partnerships were to be sent to him, was
an intentional interference with the defendants' existing economic
relations and was done for an improper purpose of taking over
complete control of the partnerships.

iSuch affirmative actions

were certainly more than mere advice of a lawyer to his clients.
54.

Sampson's election of his PC as general partner (Finding

of Fact 87) for each partnership, voting under the powers of
attorney, and his failure to have the amended certificate reflecting
such change personally signed and sworn to by each limited partner
before filing, but instead signing such amended certificate
individually and as president of the PC, was in direct violation
of provisions of Utah's Limited Partnership Act and rendered
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the amended certificate null and void and negated his PC holding
the position of general manager.
55.

As to Finding 88, Sampson's obtaining of an assignment

of the Osborn judgment to himself for t|he purpose of commencing
an action thereon was a direct violation of Section 78-51-27,
which is in a chapter of Title 78 that contains statutes relating
only to attorneys, and which section makes such action a misdemeanor,
punishable as such as well as subjectting him to a suspension
or revocation of his license.

A violation of law is an improper

means of interfering with existing economic relations and was
in this case.

His use of partnership funds for such purpose

was unauthorized as Richtron, Inc. rqmained general partner
with complete control over partnership affairs.
Sampson's similar action a year latfer (set forth in Finding
88) in obtaining an assignment of the Osborn judgment to maintain
an action thereon was a separate such violation of law and a
further use of an improper means.
56.

Sampson's attempted substitution of Ag Management

as general partner of each partnership in place of Sampson's
PC, as set forth in Finding 89, without even filing an amended
certificate showing such change, was contrary to law, a nullity
and gave Ag Management no authority to act as such.

This too

constituted an intentional interference with existing economic
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relations by an improper means, namely, the violation of state
law.
57.

From all the Findings of Fact up to and including

Finding 95, I conclude that the evidence clearly preponderates
in establishing that Sampson intentionally interfered with the
existing economic relations defendants had with some 25 limited
partnerships, and that he did so for an improper purpose and
by improper means.
58.

Based upon the summary of facts set forth in Findings

of Fact 96 and 97 I conclude that Sampson by his tortious conduct
caused injury to the defendants.
59.

Defendants are separate parties, different entities

and must assert and prove their own claims for relief which
are based upon different rights.

(See bindings 99 through 103)

However, they each assert jointly the same claims for relief,
with one or two exceptions, so the pleadings are deemed amended
to consider the legal bases on which each claims relief.
Richms appears as an individual with no interest in the
partnerships either as a limited or general partner.

His office

as president of the Richtron companies does not add to his rights
or claims for relief.

He asserts he and Sampson had an attorney-

client relation and in any action in which Sampson was negligent
or wrongful in what he did, he individually can and does assert
a claim for relief.

The evidence suppotts the contention that
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in certain cases Sampson appeared as cpunsel for Richins named
individually as a party therein. But Ricljiins, as do his companies
asserting the same claims of attorney/Client relationship, has
the burden of proving that whatever Siampson did proximately
caused injury and damages thereby.

while Sampson's conduct

in these claims have relevance to the Intentional interference
claim, and will be considered therein, to prove a right to recover
on the first and second claims and the amount of damages recoverable
each defendant has its own stated burdens of proof.

In this

case it was proven that in some actions in which he appeared
as counsel for defendants, he allowed default judgments to be
taken against them.

As to the default judgments entered in

the Valmont and Interlake Thrift case$ there was evidence to
show damages resulting from the injury of said default judgments,
as set out in Conclusion #24 for which Richins and Richtron,
Inc. are entitled to judgments against Sampson as set out in
that Conclusion.

Recognizing that the alleged wrong doing of

Sampson asserted as claims in the first and second claims for
relief is related and relevant to the claim under the fourth
count, I conclude as to the first claim the defendants have
individually proven the wrongful conduct but each failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence the amount of damages,
if any, they sustained as a proximate result of the alleged
wrongful conduct.
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In this case RFC did not assert! a specific claim against

Sampson as a limited partner in Richfield Farms and in Catlow
Valley #2 and #6, but Sampson totally ignored RFC's role as
a limited partner and did nothing to protect RFC's interest
as a limited partner in those three partnerships.

Sampson by

his conduct certainly interfered with RFC's existing economic
relations it had in these partnerships, causing the loss of
its invested interests as a limited partner therein.
RFC's entitlement to other damages must be determined from
ascertaining its losses, if any, in not receiving its share
of any payments made by the partnership on the land it was buying.
RFC had not been receiving payments from the general partner,
whose duty it was to pay, on the partnership's obligation on
its land purchase contract, and had thus itself defaulted upon
payments owed to the original seller$.

As noted, it was in

fact confronted with a foreclosure said on one of its contract
properties on June 6, 1980.

Upon filing bankruptcy, its rights

and obligations passed to the control of the trustee in the
bankruptcy court.

No evidence was presented to the court as

to what, if anything, the bankruptcy court ever did with respect
to RFC's interest in the properties.

It appears it did not

stop or delay the foreclosure sale set for June 6, 1980. Counsel
advised the court that someplace along the line the bankruptcy
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proceedings were dismissed and the automatic stay in this case
as far as RFC was concerned was terminated.
In December, 1980 Sampson purported to elect his PC as
general partner replacing the Richtrofc general partner.
took over and retained control of the partnerships.

He

How RFC's

bankruptcy affected his control was not disclosed by any evidence.
He retained control until they were reportedly foreclosed upon
by the original owner.

Evidence with Respect to what happened

in such foreclosure was not presented to the Court.

Apparently

Sampson, like Richins, was unable to save the partnerships,
or to wind them up or to terminate their existence. From December,
1980, or earlier, Sampson held the pu|rse strings, receiving
and disbursing hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Sampson as

the president of the purported general partner, had the responsibility of seeing that the partnership paid its installments
to RFC on the purchase contract.

He had no authority to declare

a contract between RFC and the partnership terminated or void.
He always contended that the mark-up on the resale of the land
was a breach of someone's fiduciary duty —
—

and was invalid.

without saying who's

I do not agree.

If he used money contributed by the partners to make payments
on the property directly to the original owner, he omitted paying
RFC its share of the installment due.

Defendants have undertaken

to show how much was paid out as appears with findings beginning
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What use Sampson made of money not already

accounted for may indeed require an accounting, but defendants
still have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
what amount, if any, they were thus deprived of.
One exhibit defendants presented was 158, which, among
other things, set forth a "Net Contract Equity," which the exhibit
defined as the equity differences betyeen the Richtron real
estate contracts and the partnership teal estate contracts,
which, as

of

April 30,

1981,

was declared

therein to be

$1,306,574.69, most, if not all, of Which would probably be
mark-up.

This amount was not then due fcFC and does not afford

to us a measure of damages.

If adjusted for prior payments

made by the partnerships to RFC, it would probably reflect a
total mark-up which amount could be used as a measure of damages
only if defendants could prove that but for Sampson's conduct,
all partnership contracts would have been paid off in full.
This they have not done and could not do.
The financial problems which confronted the defendants
and partnerships in May, 1980 included defaults in land contract
payments by the partnerships to RFC (or Richtron, Inc.) over
which partnerships Richins, as president of the general partner,
had complete control. Richins also had control over the defaults
in RFC's payments to the original sellers as RFC also then was
completely controlled by Richins.

As previously set forth the
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Richtron general partners had formally withdrawn as such from
all partnerships by January, 1981, but they still had the obligation
to wind up partnership affairs, and although Sampson was a stumbling
block, defendants could have but did not seek court assistance
in effecting such wind-up responsibilities.

As I have elsewhere

stated, I think it appropriate here to note that although this
lawsuit was filed February 11, 1981, the defendants filed no
responsive pleading until July, 1982.
While I have concluded that Sampson by his tortious conduct
intentionally interfered with the existing economic relations
defendants had with each individual partnership, both for an
improper purpose and by improper means, thereby causing injury
to defendants, I am at this point ready to state, and so conclude,
that each general partner has failed to prove damages, or any
amount thereof, with respect to the general partner being deprived
by such conduct of unpaid current expenses —

which phrase does

not include "advances11 -- nor of its 10% of profits for any
partnership allowable to the general partner by the certificate
of limited partnerships upon termination if such profits then
existed.

Whether any partnership, if wound up as provided by

law and the agreement, would have had profits is pure speculation
based upon the evidentiary record in this case.
61.

Paragraph 3 of the General Averments of the defendants1

Second Amended Counterclaim states that Frontier Investments
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is the assignee and transferee of all right, title and interest
of all defendants in any and all monetary proceeds recovered
from the plaintiffs in this case.

Said allegation was denied

by plaintiffs in their reply to the Second Amended Counterclaim.
As stated in Finding 103 the court found no evidence in the
record of any such alleged assignment or transfer and thus concludes
that its right to such monetary proceeds, if any, was not proven
during the trial.
62.

As shown in Finding 104, Exhibit 223, contains evidence

as to Sampson's receipts and disbursements of $645,103.38 during
the period from June 27, 1980 and Novepiber 30, 1982, included
among which were disbursements of $146,551,03 which primarily
involved payments to the original owners^-sellers of the various
farm properties which Sampson made without paying those amounts
to RFC and/or Richtron, Inc. as requited in the real estate
contracts they had with the individual partnerships.
About one month prior to the ending date of this accounting
period, the IRS sale took place, and one w^ek before Judge Palmer's
ruling ended Ag Management's role as general partner.

Sampson's

claimed authority to continue control of the limited partnerships
after Judge Palmer's ruling was based upon whatever rights therein
were received under the IRS sale and the validity of that sale.
63.

As of August 30, 19 8 3 the Jo^in P. Sampson, Attorney

at Law, Trust Account contained $11,574.50,, which included deposits
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since December 20, 1982 of $5,000 from Ag Management and $6,000
from Consolidated Farms (Finding 105).
64.

As found in Finding 105, Exhibit 219 related to the

Ag Management Account for the period Of February 16, 1982 to
October 29, 1984.

Seventy five deposits made to this account

after November 30, 1982 totaled $230,1^00, $143,000 of which
came from Consolidated Farms, $20,000 from Snowville rent and
$51,974 from Springfield grain.
disbursements were made.

During the same period 260

As of October 29, 1984, the account

showed a credit balance of $43,103.

itmong disbursements were

one to Everingham of $32,460 on the Springfield property, one
of $16,119 to Utah Mortgage on Snowville, and $8,000 to Sampson
as attorneys fees.

Following the federal court's ruling in

May, 1984 that the IRS sale was void, abotit $14,300 was deposited
to this account from Consolidated Farms and some named limited
partners and $1,000 on Snowville rental. Only one $100 disbursement
was made after that ruling.
65.

Consolidated Farms was incorporated by Sampson for

the sole purpose of receiving the assets of all limited partnerships.

The account was opened on November 15, 1982 and a summary

thereof by Richins extended to October 29, 1984 on which date
a credit balance of $145,597 remained from deposits totaling
$778,136 consisting almost entirely of contributions from limited
partners.

One is left to wonder whether any of such payments
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by the limited partners would have b^en made to Richins had
he retained or remained in control.

(See Finding 106)

From

an analysis of disbursements almost all wete checks to Ag Management
or to Keith Blanch, or to one of his two bank accounts.
or about October 13, 1983

On

$100,000 wgs paid out on Randlett.

$24,000 was paid to Sampson on attorney's fees.

Following the

federal court ruling in May, 1984, receipts totaled about $74,320,
and disbursements about $12,000.
66.

Keith Blanch had two bank accounts, one in Oregon

and one in Idaho.

Between November 3, 1980 and May 10, 1983,

$159,515 was deposited in the Oregon account which consisted
almost entirely of transfers from the John Sampson PC Trust
Account prior to March 5, 1982 and from tjie Ag Management account
after that date.

Disbursements therefrom appeared to be for

Blanch's personal as well as partnership business purposes.
The Idaho account covered a period of July 8, 1983 to December
31, 1983 during which receipts totaled $108,326 and disbursements
$107,849.

The source of receipts appeared to be transfers from

Consolidated Farms.
67.

(Findings 107 and 108)

No evidence of receipts or disbursements after October

29, 1984 was received, but Richins1 schedules appear to substantially
cover all receipts and disbursements to that date.
68.

It appears from Finding of Fact 110 that the Springfield

and Moreland properties had been sold pripr to April 30, 1981.
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A balance sheet for RFC as of April 30, 1981, offered

as evidence of damage contained unexplained amounts based upon
assumptions that did not exist, including a "present market"
list of values, the source of which appears to have been opinions
of Richins.

I conclude this exhibit offers no credible evidence

of damages other than a possible source of determining markup
on resale of properties to the partnerships of about 40%.

(Finding

110)
70.

A status report of RFC dated July 1, 1981 offered

as evidence of value contained as afc}asisfor use therein of
an "estimated market value" of some 20 partnerships of $9,900,120,
which company one year before had filed bankruptcy proceedings.
I conclude that this exhibit offers no credible evidence on
damages.

It did reflect a total of $3,889,364 payable on real

estate contracts.
71.

(Finding 111)

While settlement negotiations were under way and RFC

had just filed bankruptcy, Richins prepared a schedule "to give
an idea on values" showing, based upo^i his opinion, a total
combined real estate value for all partnerships of $12,380,400
on 14,374 acres, which "idea on valuels" I conclude lacks any
foundational basis or credibility on damages.
72.

(Finding 112)

A consolidated balance sheet for Richtron, Inc., dated

June 20, 1980, was prepared by Richins for "internal use only"
with all computations subject to auditj.

For all partnerships
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it listed real estate contract receivables as valued at $4,831,315
while those

payable totaled

$3,462,j010 or a difference of

$1,396,305.

I have searched the mass of exhibits in vain for

evidence as to what the total original purchase price was for
all property purchased by RFC or Richtron, Inc. from original
owners and what the total prices were for those same properties
when resold to the partnerships.

This ba|lance sheet (226) though

dated June 20, 1980, in my opinion, coirtes closer to reflecting
that ratio of those totals than any other exhibits.

Copies

of the original buy and resale contracts were never placed into
evidence.

Using this schedule, it reflects an average markup

upon resale to the partnership was about 28.35%.
73.

(Finding 113)

Just prior to trial Richins prepared a "final accounting"

which he described as a "summary of partnership equities" determined
by him as of June 30, 1980. Using values Affixed to the properties
in the schedule mentioned in Conclusion 6f Law 71, but excluding
Snowville, Grandview and Young Farms, this schedule showed a
total equity of $6,410,980.

This schedule, when compared to

the schedule of properties contained in the bankruptcy schedule
for RFC, which did not include the abbve three partnerships,
nor Blackfoot, North Bear Lake, Pleasant Valley and Randlett,
and when adjusted for those not included on the bankruptcy schedules,
showed an estimated market value of the properties that were
listed on the bankruptcy schedules to total $9,539,400, while
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the "market value" for those same properties as valued in the
bankruptcy schedules was $3,937,357, which reflects a value
less that the total indebtedness on those same properties which
was shown on Richins' schedule as $4,034,300.

These values

were selected by Richins for the two purposes indicated for
dates that were one day apart. The purposes of the two evaluations
are evident.

Richins1 schedule showing a high valuation was

to try to furnish a yardstick for measuring damages in this
lawsuit, while the low values set out in the bankruptcy schedules
reduced valuations to a point, less than obligations, (Finding
114) , thus showing no real equity for the bankruptcy court to
administer.
74.

The defenants' rights to 10% of the profits upon the

wind up of partnership affairs and final resale of the land
is fixed by the Certificate of Limited Partnership.

The Richtron

general partners, even after withdrawal, had the duty and obligation
under the law to wind up the partnership affairs and terminate
the partnerships, when there had been no valid exercise of the
partners1 right to remove by majority vote the general partner
and elect a new one. Richins continuously challenged the validity
of Sampson's actions with respect to installing a new general
partner, yet delayed in seeking help from the court to rule
on his challenge when prompt action seemed indicated. The defendants
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any
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final profits, of which they were entitled to 10%, existed as
to any partnership and the Court so concludes.

(Finding 115)

(See also Conclusion 60)
75.

The facts set forth in Finding of Fact 116 have credibility

as to true value, but not with respect td proving damages.
76.

Based upon the facts considered in Finding of Fact

118, it is my opinion that the defendants did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence an entitlement to punitive damages
in this case and I so conclude.
77.

Based upon the facts set forth in Finding of Fact

12 0, it is my opinion that the affirmative defense raised by
Sampson and considered therein has no merit, for Sampson did
not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that facts existed
which established this alleged affirmative defense as a defense
to and an excuse for Sampson's tortious conduct, and I so conclude.
78.

As to the affirmative defenses of estoppel, waiver

and laches, it is my opinion that Sampson did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Richins1 actions at any time
induced Sampson to believe certain facts existed that led to
Sampson's detriment; or by his actions evince in any unequivocal
manner an intent to waive his control over the partnerships
and step aside in favor of Sampson; nor did Richins' actions
at any time constitute a lack of diligence which brought injury
to Sampson; and I so conclude.
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In Finding of Fact 122, the affirmative defense of

breach of duty and trust is considered and from the findings
made I conclude that the alleged defense is without merit or
factual support.
80.

Finding of Fact 123 touches upon two final affirmative

defenses noted in Finding 119 and comments upon certain facts
relating thereto.

Based thereon I find n0 merit to either defense

and so conclude.
81.

As to the dispute set forth in Finding 124, I conclude

that while the alleged actions may be relevant in another lawsuit
between parties having an interest therein, such contentions,
even if assumed to be true, would not constitute a defense to
Sampson on the Counterclaim which is based on Sampson's tortious
conduct beginning a substantial period of time after the Valmont
obligation was incurred.
Dated this

/V
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day of t»ap, 19861.

BRYANT R. CROFT
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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VERDICT ON PLAINTIFFS'
COMPLAINT
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on plaintiffs1 Complaint against the defendants, Paul H. Richins,
Richtron, Inc., and RFC, the Court renders its Verdict thereon
as follows:
1.

As to defendant Richtron, Inc./ the Court finds the

issues on the Complaint in favor of the defendant, Richtron,
Inc. , and against the plaintiffs Milton R. Goff as trustee for
Virgil R. Condon, Paul D. Huber, 0 & M Plumbing and Heating,
Earl V. Gritton, Philip 0. Boyer, Tofjfie Sawaya, and Russell
Smuin of no cause of action.
2.

As to defendants Paul H. Richins and RFC, the Court

finds the issues on the Complaint in fkvor of Milton R. Goff,
as trustee for the plaintiffs named in paragraph 1, and against
defendants Richins and RFC and renders a verdict thereon in
the amount of $5,683.16, together with interest thereon as provided
in the judgment and in the amounts (subject to correction for
error) determined and as set forth in Finding of Fact #21.
3.

As to the plaintiffsf Complaint I rule that John P. Sampson

is not a plaintiff with respect thereto and the verdicts set
forth above do not apply to him.
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Judgment shall be entered accordingly with a formal judgment
to be prepared and submitted to the Court by counsel for the
plaintiffs upon receipt of written notice of the signing and
filing of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating
to the Complaint.
ON DEFENDNTS' COUNTERCLAIM
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on defendants1 Counterclaim against John P. Sampson and the
named plaintiffs for whom Milton R. Goff sues as trustee, the
Court renders a decision and its verdict^ thereon as hereinafter
set forth.
On their second claim for relief Richins is entitled to
a judgment against Sampson for $2027.40 and Richtron, Inc. is
enitled to a judgment against Sampson $2188.70.

(Payment of

one would constitute a credit for payment of the other.)
The ultimate issue in this case is as to what damages,
if any, defendants are entitled to against Sampson for the injuries
he caused to defendants or any one of them by his tortious conduct
of intentionally interfering with existing economic relations
they had with the limited partnerships or any other party.
Counsel for defendants provided a reference to Torts Second,
Chapter 13, relating to Interference with Contract, which, under
Section 766(g), states:
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A similar situation (to voidable contracts)
exists with a contract that/ by its terms
or otherwise, permits the third person to
terminate the agreement at will. Until
he has so terminated it, the contract is
valid and subsisting, and the defendant
may not properly interfere with it. The
fact that the contract is terminable at
will, however, is to be taken into account
in determining the damages the plaintiff
has suffered by reason of its breach.
In this case the partnership agreements provided that the
contract was terminable at the will of either the general partner
or the limited partners.

The general partner could withdraw

at will and terminate the partnership while the limited partners
could either by majority vote remove the general partner and
elect a new general partner (which method could not affect the
general partner's right to share in partnership profits and
distributions as provided in the agreement) , or terminate the
partnership and order the disposition of assets.

In either

event, upon termination the affairs were to be wound up as provided
in the agreement.
Section 774A of Torts Second relates to damages for liability
in cases involving interference with contract cases. It provides:
(1) One who is liable to another for
interference with a contract or prospective
contractual relation is liable for damages
for
(a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits
of the contract or the prospective relation;
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(b) consequential losses for which
the interference is the legal causes; and
(c) emotional distress or actual harm
to reputation, if they are reasonably to
be expected to result from the interference.
The Second Amended Complaint contained a claim for relief
by Richins for slander.

During the trial counsel for defendants

stated Richins would not present any evidence upon this claim
and it was dismissed.

No evidence was presented of emotional

distress and I thus rule that damages under (c) in the preceding
paragraph will not be considered or allowed.
In the Comment it is stated this section applies only to
the recovery of compensatory damages and that one who becomes
liable for interference is liable for the pecuniary loss of
the contract or the relation.
person

In the case in which a third

(the partnership here) is prevented from performing a

contract with the plaintiff, the plaintiff may recover for the
loss of profits from the contract.

When it is the plaintiff

himself who is prevented from performance of his contract with
a third person, he may recover for expense to which he is put
or for other pecuniary losses incurred in making his performance
good.

In the case at bar it is apparent that both situations

existed.

Sampson prevented the partnerships from performing

their contracts with defendants by his taking over complete
control of the partnerships and thereby prevented the defendants
from completing performance on the agreements with the partnerships.
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The Restatement in its comments under damages spotlights
the Court's problem with the comment that:
A major problem with damages of this
sort is whether they can be proved with
a reasonable degree of certainty.
It goes on to say that sometimes, when the court is convinced
that damages have been incurred, but the amount cannot be proved
with reasonable certainty, it awards nominal damages.
Another important principle stated is that the action for
interference with contract is one in tbrt and damages are not
based on the contract rules, and it is not required that the
loss incurred be one within the contemplation of the parties
to the contract itself at the time it was made.

The plaintiff

can also recover for consequential harms, provided they were
legally caused by the defendant's interference.
I have ruled that Sampson's conduct constituted a tortious
intentional interference with existing economic relations causing
injury to defendants, or some of them, and have examined and
considered the evidence to determine whether defendants proved
by a preponderance of the evidence facts sufficient to establish
damages with a reasonable degree of certainty from a tort, not
a contract, point of view.

I have done so with respect to Richins

individually; with respect to the general partner of each partnership
which as to most partnerships was Richtron, Inc., and was Richtron
General as to the others; and with respect to the contract seller
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of the farm properties to each partnership, which in most partnerships was RFC and was Richtron, Inc. as to the others.

I note

that RFC was also a limited partner in two (#2 and #6) Cat low
Valley partnerships with a capital account of $7,911 in #2 and
of $2,103 in #6, and in Richfield Farms with a capital account
of $20,960.00. Also, Richtron, Inc. had a limited partner interest
in Pleasant Valley of $4222.50.
During the trial defendant Frontier investments was identified
as a corporation organized by Richins to which each of the other
defendants had assigned whatever funds were received as damages
in the trial of this case.

I thus se$ no need for the Court

to undertake any attempt to divide whatever damages may be awarded
the general partner between Richtron, Inc., and Richtron General,
nor to the contract seller between RFC and Richtron, Inc.

Facts

which I consider proven by a preponderance of the evidence and
relevant to the question as to whether damages were proven with
a reasonable degree of certainty are being set forth in what
follows.
In May, 1980, the Richtron companies with Richins as the
owner and president of each have agreements with 2 5 limited
partnerships going, though not without serious problems at that
time, and within seven months thereafter Sampson, a lawyer,
has in his own way obtained and taken over control of all partnerships and retained it over the next four years.
His control was so complete that he precluded defendants
from having the general partner control and manage the affairs
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of each partnership and from winding up the affairs of each
partnership.

The "winding up" process involved the sale of

assets; the payment of each partnership's liabilities and obligations
to creditors (or adequately providing therefor); the distribution
of all remaining assets as provided in Article IV which first
required the repayment to all limited partners the amounts of
their capital contributions, and then distributing 90% of the
remainder to the limited partners and 10% to the general partner;
and as the final step in the liquidation process the cancellation
of the Certificate of Limited Partnerships in the manner provided
in Section 48-2-25 of the Code.
The general partner was a party to each partnership agreement.
Upon execution it received its management fee.

It was entitled

to no further compensation for its management services, and
had to await final dissolution and termination to receive its
10% mentioned in the previous paragraph, with no assurance that
upon wind-up there would be any final remainder or profits from
which its 10% was to come. Ongoing expenses incurred in management
were payable, but I have ruled there was no proof that any such
expenses were due.

The only remaining claim the general partner

asserted during the trial was the repayment of advances it made
to various partnerships prior to May, 1980.

I have made mention

several times of Sampson's repeated declarations to the limited
partners that any advances by the general partner to any partnership
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need not be repaid, both orally and in writing.

Sampson even

questioned that any advances had been made, but I have found
the evidence shows otherwise, and note here that in May, 1980,
Hurd mentioned in one of his memoranda that no more advances
could be made because the creation and sale 0f additional partnership
properties had been stopped because of the state securities
commission's stop order.

I have already ruled that Sampson's

declarations regarding the advances were erroneous and that
they were obligations owed by the partnership to the general
partner.
In this case the uncertainty lies in the amount thereof
and what damages, if any, should be allowed.

The evidence estab-

lished that the Leo H. Richins Family Trust put up $100,000
for advance purposes and that Shari Richins put up $32,000.
The total of such advances was not specifically proven with
one exhibit (160) produced thereon, an exhibit attached to the
Compromise and Settlement Agreement, approved by both Richins
and Sampson, showing net advances of $393,840, not including
interest and subject to audit for completeness as of August
1, 1980.

An uncertainty appears here because it appears to

be a net figure, not explained, which showed about $535,000
in advances to 12 partnerships remaining unpaid with about $142,000
being deducted which appears to have been advances or loans
by eight partnerships to the general partner.

No oral testimony
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A logical inference is

that Richins used funds received from the limited partners of
the eight partnerships for purposes other than their own obligations,
such as advances to the other twelve partnerships to pay their
obligations, or possibly to pay some general partner obligations.
Reference is made here to the eighteen promissory notes
executed on June 5, 1980, by Richins as president of the general
partner of each partnership.

Eleven of these notes were in

various round figure amounts totaling $529,000, while the notes
for the seven Catlow Valley partnerships recited that they were
for $100 or "the total amount equal to the aggregate advances"
made to the partnerships as shown by "the financial records
and accounting books."

All the notes recited that they were

for advances in the amounts shown or as disclosed by such records.
One other exhibit fixed the amount owed by the partnership on
advances at $600,000, including accrued interest.
The partnership agreements contained a provision that any
and all advances, together with accrued and unpaid interest,
became immediately due and payable upon the sale of the property
or the termination and dissolution of the partnership "unless
otherwise agreed upon."

It is apparent from the evidence that

Richins had not made known to the limited partners that obligations
for such advances were owed to the general partner by the partnerships until May, 1980, when information concerning partnership
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and Richtron problems began to surface.

It is thus apparent

that repayment of the advances was conditional upon the end
results of each partnership.
Section 48-2-23 of the Code states that in settling accounts
after dissolution the liabilities of a limited partnership shall
be entitled to payment in the order fixed therein, which is,
first, payments to creditors (excluding the general partners);
second, to limited partners in respect to their share of the
profits and other compensation by way of income on their contributions; third, to limited partners in respect to the capital
of their contributions; and fourth obligations to general partners.
Here too, it is apparent that repayment of the advances to the
general partners was conditional upon the end results of each
partnership, which leaves no assurance that any partnership,
if properly wound up, as provided by law and the partnership
agreements, would have been able to repay any of the obligations
owed by it to the general partner for such advances.
But it is clear from the evidence that Sampson's control
blocked any winding up and dissolution of the partnerships by
the general partners.

While, as I have repeated elsewhere,

help from the court was always available with respect thereto,
and noting again that defendants did not file a responsive pleading
to plaintiffs1 Complaint for almost eighteen months (probably
because of settlement negotiations) it is clear that with Sampson's
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repeated contention that such advances did not have to be repaid,
there would be no effort in his control of the partnerships
to repay any of said advances or to take proper steps to wind
up the affairs of any partnership and thereby determine if the
sale of any partnership property would produce funds sufficient
to repay any advances, or part thereof, or produce any profits.
But the problem here is not to determine the debts of the
partnerships, including what each may have owed on advances,
but rather it is to determine what damages, if any, can with
reasonable certainty be attributed to Sampson's tortious conduct
either for pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contracts,
or the consequential losses for which his interference was the
legal cause. Consequential damages may be defined as such damages,
loss or injury as does not flow directly and immediately from
the act of the party, but only from some of the consequences
or results of such act.

(Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition,

p. 352).
Defendants contend that one other area must be considered
in determining damages to the general partners and that is the
alleged unauthorized receipts and disbursements by Sampson of
partnership funds.

Evidence offered in support thereof is found

in the summaries Richins made of Sampson's financial records
and accounts, which were finally made available to him by discovery
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Evidence contained in such summaries

may be summarized as follows:
The John P. Sampson trust and business accounts showed
receipts by Sampson of $645,101.58 from limited partners and
farm receipts between June 27, 198 0 and November, 1982.

The

total of such receipts was disbursed by Sampson during this
period for various listed purposes, included among which were
payments of $146,551 on partnership properties to the original
owner; $96,057 to Blanch for salary and expenses; $28,770 to
Marilyn Brown, secretary to Sampson; $60,182 to Sampson for
legas fees; and $7 8,18 4 to "general overhead", the details of
which sum was not included in the analysis.
Between December 20, 1982 and August 30, 1983, Sampson
deposited $11,574.00 into his "attorney at law trust account",
$5,000 of which came from Ag Management and $6,000 from Consolidated
Farms.

As of August 30, 1983, these funds remained in this

account.
Between February 16, 1982 and October 29, 1984 the sum
of $352,547 was deposited in the Ag Management account.

Of

that amount $230,700 was deposited after November 30, 1982,
the ending period for the $645,101.58 summary, (supra).

Of

the latter amount, $143,000 were transfers from the Consolidated
Farms account, $20,000 came from Snowville rentals, $51,974
from Springfield grain and the balance from miscellaneous sources.
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Disbursements from this account for the entire period was $309,444,
leaving a credit balance of $43,103 at the end of that period.
Each disbursement was indentified, the court noting that $51,000
went to Consolidated Farms, $32,460 to Everingham (the original
property owner) on Springfield, $16,119 to Utah Mortgage on
Snowville and $8,000 to Sampson on attorney's fees.
Between November 15, 198 2, and October 29, 1984, the sum
of $778,13 6 was deposited in the Consolidated Farms account.
Most of the deposits came from limited partners, farm income,
and Ag Management, with minor amounts from miscellaneous sources.
Deposits of $74,320 were made to this account after Judge Winder's
ruling in May, 1984 voiding the IRS tax sale to Goff, trustee,
with about all of these deposits coming from limited partners.
Disbursements from this account during that period totaled $632,539,
leaving a credit balance of $145,597 on the last date of the
summary period. Most of these disbursements went to Ag Management
and the Keith Blanch accounts, although $100,000 were paid to
attorneys for Randlett and $24,000 went to Sampson for legal
fees.

After Judge Winder's ruling, $12,000 was withdrawn, all

of which went to Ag Management.
As set forth in the Findings Keith Blanch had two bank
accounts, one in Oregon and one in Idaho.

Between November

3, 1980 and May 10, 1983, the sum of $159,515 was deposited
in the Oregon account.

The initial deposit included a check
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for $10,713.68 which David Gillette gave to Sampson on August
27, 1980, stating by letter that such funds were to be used
exclusively for Catlow Valley Farms and were to be released
to the general partner of the Catlow Valley partnerships after
Sampson and Richins "had finalized their arrangements to work
together".

Sampson endorsed this check and sent it to Blanch

before its deposit in the Oregon account on November 3, 1980,
doing so contrary to Gillette's instructions and without any
legal authority to do so.

The other sources of these deposits

were all from the John P. Sampson PC Trust account up to March
5, 1982, after which date the balance of the deposits came from
Ag Management.

Withdrawals from this account during that period

totaled $219,981, which is an unexplained overdraft of $60,465
above deposits.

Checks to "Cash" or to Blanch or his wife (as

wages) totaled about $31,000.

The balance went for various

itemized expenses, the checks for which suggest that many of
such disbursements were probably for Blanch1 s personal obligations.
On July 8, 1983, a check for $2,476.70 payable to the Idaho
Bank closed this account.
Between July 8, 1983 and December 31, 1983 there was deposited
in Blanch's Idaho bank account the sum of $108,326, the initial
deposit of which was the $2,476.70 from the Oregon bank account.
All of these deposits came from Consolidated Farms. Disbursements
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from this account during that period totaled $107,489, the pattern
of which was similar to disbursements from the Oregon account.
From the foregoing it appears that from June 27, 1980 to
October 29, 1984, approximately $1,522,000 of unduplicated funds
were deposited in the various accounts over which Sampson had
control.

The last date of any of Richins accountings was October

29, 1984, on which date the accounts (if we include the account
with $11,574 deposited therein) had $200,474 remaining on deposit.
From disbursement it appears that Sampson took out $103,000
for attorney's fees, with $78,184 being withdrawn from his trust
accounts as general overhead during the period of June 27, 1980
and November 30, 1982.

Even after Judge Winder's ruling in

May, 1984, some limited partners contributed $74,320 which went
into the Consolidated Farms account.

There is no evidence as

to the purpose for which some limited partners continued to
give Sampson funds after that ruling, but it is apparent that
with all but one farm foreclosure completed before Judge Winder's
ruling Sampson and said limited partners were doing something
with respect to partnership property affairs.
Upon closing argument counsel for defendants stated that
Sampson and twelve people ended up with all the "Richtron assets".
He probably meant partnership assets, but as I noted in my findings
and conclusions, no evidence was placed in the record establishing
that such was in fact the case, but if so, absent any such evidence,
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I cannot consider this statement as a factor upon which this
decision can be made.

I have repeatedly noted the absence of

evidence as to what finally happened to the partnerships and
their properties other than a schedule showing only the dates
upon which foreclosures presumably took place.
Also, upon closing argument counsel for defendants suggested
that the schedule (Ex. 223) showing the receipts and disbursements
of some $645,000 was a basis for determining changes, suggesting
an interest award on each payment from the date received should
be computed and allowed, together with the $645,000 expenditures,
since Sampson's use of these funds did the partnerships no good
and made it impossible for Richins to liquidate the partnerships.
He made no reference to the $877,000 collected by Sampson, independent of the $645,000, nor the uses made thereof.

An unknown

answer remains to the question as to how much, if any, the limited
partners would have contributed to Richins had the course of
events left him in complete control and receipt thereof.

But,

as stated before, in May, 1980, Richins had 25 limited partnerships
he was administering as president of the general partners over
which Sampson had in seven months1 time assumed and taken control
and in a manner which proved to be illegal and contrary to law.
I think it is clear from the evidence that most of the
funds that passed through Sampson's hands were paid out on partnership expenses. He, of course, took out over $100,000 as attorney's
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fees, paid thousands of dollars to Marilyn Brown, and sent Blanch
over $556,000.

At closing argument defense counsel mentioned

two lines of cases discussing the question as to whether funds
were used or converted by a volunteer which were disbursed for
partnership obligations should be giveh an offsetting credit.
He stated one line said a volunteer was not entitled to any
credit while the other line held a converter was entitled to
credit to the extent he applied funds to pay outstanding debts.
The case book authority referred to said ofce line of cases appears
to hold that where the converter's possession is "wrongful from
the beginning" statutes in some states

precludes him from taking

credit for reducing the plaintiff's debt by the conversion.
The other line says even if the converter is at fault and acts
in bad faith, damages ought to be reduced where the converted
property is used to discharge the plaintiff's debt to a third
party. This case with its mass of convolute^ facts and circumstances
cannot be so simply categorized, but if any decision is such
as to require the application of either ruling, I would say
that credit must be given as to all funds used to apply on legitimate
partnership obligations.
Turning now to RFC's claims for relief, I note that in
Sampson's initial meeting with Richins in May, 1980, and at
the May 29, 1980 meeting of Catlow Val|ley partners, Sampson
immediately, and thereafter repeatedly4 said mark-ups on the
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sale price by which RFC (or Richtron, Inc.) resold the farm
properties to the partnerships involved a breach of fiduciary
duty and rendered them void.

The resale contracts were not

themselves placed into evidence, but thQ record shows they all
contained a markup (disclosed in the prospectus), a down payment
and periodic installment payments with an increased interest
over what was to be paid as interest upon the original contracts
of purchase.

From Exhibit 227 I note a Suggested total mark-up

for all partnerships of about $1,466,000, and from Exhibit 226
one of about $1,369,000.
Problems causing and resulting in defaults on contract
payments due RFC by the partnerships have heretofore been noted,
as well as RFC' s own defaults on its purchase contracts.

One

subject discussed at the May 29, 1980 meeiing was that the foreclosure sale set for June 6, 1980, was confronting RFC.

Even

if a true value of RFC's equity in eac^h partnership property
under its resale contracts could be established, circumstances
existing in May, 1980, created a strong probability that some,
if not all, of such contracts would nev£r be paid out.

Thus,

exhibits 226 and 227 do not prove damages to RFC to any reasonable
degree of certainty.
Other factors affecting RFC's damages from Sampson's actions
are present. About June 1, 1980, RFC filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding, brought on by Sampson's suggestion and the unauthorized
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vote of a few Catlow Valley limited partners at the May 29,
19 8 0 meeting.

This proceeding presumably brought all of RFC's

assets and liabilities under control of the bankruptcy court,
prior to the dismissal of those proceedings.

The record contains

no evidence of what happened to RFC under control of the bankruptcy
court.

It appears the foreclosure sale on June 6, 1980 was

not stayed.

It does not appear that during the bankruptcy pro-

ceedings any installment payments due RFC on the partnership
purchase agreements were ever paid into the bankruptcy court,
although evidence showed Sampson made a $100,000 payment to
attorneys for Randlett on October 13, 1983; a $32,460 payment
to Everingham on February 28, 1983 on Snowville; property payments
of about $146,000 direct to owners prior to November, 1982;
and a suggestion, but with no other facts with respect thereto,
that Springfield and Moreland were sold before April 30, 1981
(Finding 110) .

The bankruptcy schedules filed by RFC did show

a total equity in its contracts of a value less than its total
debts.
At the May 29, 1980, meeting Sampson, although in attendance
as counsel for only two Catlow Valley partners, took it upon
himself to tell all in attendance that the mark up on the price
of each property upon its resale by RFC to the partnership was
a breach of fiduciary duty and unenforceable.

Sampson's attitude

and repeated statements thereafter made to this effect makes
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certain that Sampson at no time had any intent to honor the
partnership's obligations in their respective contracts with
RFC.

I note here that even had the limited partners, with or

without Sampson's guidance, properly and legally removed the
Richtron general partner and elected a new one, such new general
partner would have had no power or authority to declare the
RFC contracts void and no longer in force and effect.

Such

new general partner may have said the partnerships would no
longer make payments to RFC, only to thereafter meet the consequences
that probably would have followed, but could not have ruled
them void and unenforceable.

But with RFC in bankruptcy and

the Richtron general partners still in control of the partnerships,
one is hard put to point to any act of Sampson that up to that
point had caused any damage to RFC.

I note also that at the

May 29, 1980 meeting the limited partners there voiced a strong
reluctance to make any further assessment payments to Richins
without any controls thereon.

Even Richins suggested there

that funds needed to meet pressing Catlow Valley obligations
be placed in Hansen's hands to handle to which those in attendance
agreed.
But the very next day Sampson disclosed to Richins the
desire of himself and others (who, he did not say) to take over
all the partnerships and buy out defendants' interests.

This

started a snowball rolling which unfortunately did not stop.
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Sampson's employment as counsel spread immediately to other
partners or partnerships.

Such quick developments may well

have influenced Richins to do what he did on June 5, 1980 when
he executed guit-claim deeds by which he purported to convey
back to RFC all of each partnership's intelrest in their respective
farm properties.

Richins1 actions in later recording those

guit-claim deeds, done about the same time Sampson was taking
steps to collect proxy powers of attorney to vote in his PC
to replace the Richtron general partner, ijiay thereby have created
an excuse for Sampson, while exercising Ian illegal control over
the partnerships as president of the presumably newly elected
general partner, for not making any future payments to RFC on
its contracts, and all this without regard to the control of
the bankruptcy court at this time over RFCt matters.
At the time Richins executed thos£ quit-claim deeds, any
partnership default on installment payments to RFC was Richins'
responsibility, as it was under his control as president of
all the Richtron companies that those payments were not made.
It appears from the evidence that Richins had the idea that
once he conveyed legal title to the f^rm properties back to
RFC by the use of these deeds, the partnership interests in
the farm properties was gone, perhaps aloiig with the 90% interest
in any profits that the limited partners were entitled to upon
resale of the properties and termination of the partnerships.
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He further appears to have concluded that upon repossesion of
the properties by the former owners, he could assert and fix
damages by the market value he personally placed upon the farm
properties.

As I set forth in the Findings and Conclusions,

the validity of those deeds were questionable to say the least.
But RFC is here asserting a claim for damages it alleges occurred
by the conduct of Sampson.

Aside from its interest as a limited

partner in Catlow Valley partnerships 2 and 6, which totaled
$10,014, and in Richfield which totaled $20,760.50, RFC's claim
for relief lies in its claim that Sampson's tortious conduct
constituted an intentional interference with its existing economic
relations with each partnership, resulting in injury.

Sampson's

conduct certainly constituted an intentional interfernce with
RFC's existing contract relations with each partnership.

RFC

had to look to complete pay off on its contracts to realize
its fully hoped for profits on the contracts.

With conditions

as they were RFC' s only reasonable expectancy for gain on its
contract could be found only in dissolution of each partnership
in accordance with law and the agreements with the hope that
sufficient funds would be realized through the dissolution to
pay it something for its equity.

Before such hope could be

achieved any dissolution would have required the receipt of
sufficient funds to first pay off all obligations remaining
due to the original owners, or sold under circumstances by which
the buyer was willing to pay off the balance owed to the original
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owner in a manner acceptable to such owner.

Sampson by his

conduct precluded any such circumstancestfromoccurring.
But Sampson alone was not responsible for RFC's losses
on its economic relations with the partnerships.

By May, 1980,

Richins had so mismanaged partnership affairs that they did
not have funds to pay installments owe|d to RFC, so RFC could
not pay its installment obligations to the contract sellers.
Substantial judgments were obtained for failure to pay partnership
obligations. .Fartners were angry because of Richins1 failure
to follow the partnership agreements upon assessments and failure
to pay; to give an annual audited report to each; to have the
properties appraised by a qualified appraiser and give the partners
a report on the value of their holdings; to advise them regarding
advances and obligations with respect thereto; and to keep them
advised of the problems that developed.

Richins agreed that

RFC should be taken into bankruptcy and 4id so, yet he executed
the quit-claim deeds and had them recorded; and apparently gave
no consideration to his obligation to ladvise the bankruptcy
court that such had been done.

Finally, and of great importance,

was Richins1 failure to himself undertake efforts to wind up
partnership affairs and bring about dissolution and termination
with any resulting benefits to all concerned.

The courts were

there to help him do so but he never used them for that purpose.
I recall that in the Blackstone suit against defendants, they
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counterclaimed seeking dissolution; but when Judge Palmer ruled
in their favor that Ag Management was not legally elected general
partner, any further efforts in that case on their Counterclaim
was not brought out in this trial.

Even in the case at bar,

Richins did not seek a wind-up and dissolution by this Court,
From the acts of both Richins and Sampson and the consequences
that followed, this Court is hard pressed to find evidence that
establishes to a reasonable degree of certainty the amount of
damages caused by Sampson's tortious conduct respecting the
RFC contracts.

Even if Sampson had never appeared on the scene,

it does not appear probable that Richins and RFC could have
prevented foreclosure of the original purchase contracts, based
upon the existing facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence.
1 do find that Sampson gave no recognition to RFC's limited
partnership interests in Richfield Farms and Catlow Valley Farms
2 and 6, nor to Richtron, Inc.'s limited partnership interest
in Pleasant Valley, that he ignored its rights as such limited
partners, sent no notices to either, offered no evidence as
to what in fact happened to the interests of the Pleasant Valley,
Richfield and Catlow Valley limited partners, and thereby caused
a loss to RFC and Richtron, Inc. in the amounts of their respective
capital interests in those partnerships.
As to Richins individually, I have already ruled that his
claim against Sampson under the first claim lacked proof of
damages and that his claim for an alleged interference with
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his making a living or obtaining future Economic benefits failed
for lack of proof.

On Richins1 second cl^im, damages of $2027.40

for attorneys fees paid Gary Kennedy fdr vacating the default
judgment, granted to Valmont against Richins and Richtron, Inc.
because Sampson failed to file a responslive pleading, have been
allowed.
Upon closing argument the thrust of plaintiffs1 counsel
regarding damages was that Richins1 mismanagement, resulting
in all the problems existing in May, 1980, coupled with the
alleged unsconscionable markups on the resale contracts, caused
his own demise.

He argued that the stop order of the state

securities commission prevented the sale of more partnerships
and Richins had no funds of his own that could keep the partnerships
going.

The payment of all assessments might have helped.

But,

as repeatedly considered, a substantial part of the Richtron
funds were loaned back to partnerships as advances and never
repaid, with Sampson doing nothing to s^e that they were, but,
on the contrary, repeatedly saying that tftey need not be.
It was problems created by Richins1 mismanagement followed
by Sampson's tortious conduct that brought this case to court
for a decision as to whether any damages are recoverable upon
the Counterclaim.

As floundering as the partnerships were,

Sampson saw value there and spent what now totals six years
in achieving what he now has, whatever it may be, leaving Richins
and his companies with no tangible assets or values.

Even after
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Judge Winder ruled the IRS sale of Richtron assets to Goff as
trustee void and of no force and effedt, Sampson undauntingly
went forward, collected $74,320 from certain limited partners,
undoubtedly using such funds for purposes he saw fit, together
with the $200,000 remaining in his bank accounts as of October
29, 1984, doing so presumably upon th£ theory that existing
new relationships put his actions beyond the control of the
courts.
As stated before, damages are in tort, not in contract,
rendering liability for damages for either the pecuniary loss
of the benefits of the contract or consequential for which the
tortious interference is the legal cau^e.

I think that as to

some claims for relief damages, of at least a consequential
nature, have been shown with a reasonable degree of certainty
by a preponderance of the evidence.
As I noted at the outset, defendants seek an accounting
from plaintiffs on their fifth claim.

I have at times in my

findings and conclusions noted that perhaps certain aspects
of the case then under consideration suggested that an accounting
may be called for.

However, at the end of all my Findings and

Conclusions, and giving due consideration to the detailed schedules
prepared by Richins from Sampson's records, I have concluded
that any further accounting would not add to the certainty of
the evidence as I now see it; that it is time a decision was
rendered in this case, and that such request should be and is
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I have been told in the evidence that foreclosures

occurred on all partnership properties and the dates thereof,
but nothing else.

I have often made reference to the fact that

the record contained no evidence as to what happened to the
partnerships and their properties, but I shall not allow my
curiosity in that regard to further prolong a decision in this
case.
It is thus the verdicts of the Court ithat:
1.

I find the issues as to Richiins1 individual claims

against the plaintiffs, excluding Sampson, and all of them in
favor of the plaintiffs and against Richin^ of no cause of action.
As against Sampson Richins is entitled to a judgment for $2027.40
2.

I find the issues as to RFC as ftollows:

In favor of RFC and against the plaintiff Sampson in the
sum of $30,974.50. Since the date of such loss cannot be determined,
no interest thereon is granted.
In favor of RFC and against Sampson for his tortious conduct
in intentionally interfering with its existing economic relations
with the partnerships, but for which I can allow only nominal
damages because, although convinced that damages have been incurred,
there has been no proof with reasonable certainty of the kind
or amount thereof, nor by a preponderance of the evidence.
Nominal damages in the sum of $100 are granted.
3.

I find the issues as to the Richtron general partners

in favor of Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General and against
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the plaintiff Sampson and grant a verdict thereon in the sum
of $250,000.
Richtron, Inc. , as a limited partner in Pleasant Valley,
is granted a judgment against Sampson in the sum of $4222.50
4.

As to any claims asserted by defendants against plaintiffs

Milton R. Goff, trustee for Virgil R. Condon, Paul D. Huber,
0 & M Plumbing and Heating, Earl V. Gritton, Philip R. Boyer,
Toffie Sawaya, and Russell Smuin, I find the issues in favor
of said plaintiffs and against the defendants and render a verdict
of no cause of action.
5.

As to the claims asserted by defendants and against

Sampson for an accounting and injunctive relief I find the issues
in favor of Sampson and against the defendants and render a
verdict of no cause of action.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly with a formal judgment
to be prepared and submitted to the Court by counsel for defendants
upon receipt of written notice of the signing and filing of
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating to the
Counterclaim.
The signing of this verdict, too, shall await the final
entry of the Findings and Conclusions.

Dated this

//

day of September, 1986.

DISTJB1CT COURT JUDGE
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